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"Business Format” Franchising and EEC Competition Lav.
PART I
1.Introduction
Franchising, having originated in the United States of 
America, is now flourishing and spreading all over Europe today. 
You can buy an ice-cream or a pet dog - or you can have your car 
rust-proofed or your suit dry-cleaned, all at franchise outlets. 
Businessmen apparently love this new marketing technique, and 
consumers buy enthusiastically in response to it.
However, this happy scenario has been from its beginning 
- and is still, to an extent - under the shadow of European 
national competition laws and EEC competition law itself. These 
legal systems have the potential - for the most part as yet unused 
to rule that franchising arrangements, or some aspects of them, 
are anti-competitive - whatever that may mean - and so illegal. As 
it happens, perhaps surprisingly, before any national court or 
legislature has ruled specifically on this question, the EEC 
Commission and European Court of Justice have become involved not 
only in making decisions in individual cases, but also in laying 
down general rules in this new and difficult area. So far there
3
/have been the ruling by the European Court in Pronuptia , three
2 ‘individual exemptions under a.85(3) of the EEC Treaty, and a 
draft block exemption^ prepared by the Commission.
These developing rules of course restrict the freedom of 
franchisors and franchisees to make.the kind of contract with the 
kind of clauses that they would otherwise have chosen to use. 
Clearly, businessmen, and in particular franchisors, have their 
own reasons for establishing franchise networks in the ways that 
they have hitherto chosen, and it is my intention in this paper to'- 
analyse the approach of the Commission and the Court - as': 
evidenced by the judgment and exemptions mentioned above - to - 
franchising, with particular reference to the aims and purposes 
behind their decisions.
The treatment of franchising displays a substantial 
departure from the usual rules applied by the EEC authorities to 
vertical restraints and distribution systems: therefore the 
results of the examination should be of interest and value not 
only for the insights which they provide into EEC franchising law, 
but also for their wider relevance to the development of EEC law 
on vertical restraints and competition law generally.
1. [1986] ECR 353.
2. Yves Rocher OJ 1987 L8/49; Fronuptia OJ 1987 L13/39;
Computer land OJ 1987 L222/12.
3. OJ 1987 C229/3.
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2;, Research questions to be studied
Part II of this paper will describe the phenomenon of 
franchising itself, and its success, and suggest possible reasons 
for its commercial popularity.
In Part III the different ways in which competition law 
can apply to franchising are discussed. The starting point is a 
consideration of the various aims and objectives that may be 
pursued by competition policy, and this leads to a discussion in 
each case of the choices that these motives imply for law-making. 
The list of possible objectives includes economic efficiency, and 
much of Chapter 8 is devoted to economic analysis of franchising. 
In this way, different approaches that are theoretically open to 
the authorities responsible for competition policy to take towards 
franchise contracts are outlined. Finally, particular reference is 
made to the possibilities allowed by the framework that exists in 
the EEC context.
Part IV is a description of EEC competition law on 
franchising as it has so far developed. Pronuptia, the only EEC 
jurisprudence as yet on franchising, and the individual and 
forthcoming block exemptions of the Commission, will be analysed. 
Emphasis will be laid on aspects of these which are relevant to a 
discussion of the motivation behind the policy choices, for the 
most part implicit, inevitably made by the Court and the 
Commission in their decisions.
Part V draws together the previous two parts in an 
attempt to suggest what may be the reasons behind the rather 
special treatment that has been accorded to franchise contracts by
5
the authorities. The policy choices made are discussed in the 
light of the possible objectives of competition law discussed 
previously, and an effort made to connect various aspects of the 
Court's and the Commission's approach with these different aims. 
In this way it is possible, finally, to draw some conclusions 
about the relative importance of different objectives pursued and 
the way in which the resolution of conflicts between them has 
affected the development of European competition law policy on 
franchising and may continue to affect it in the future.
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PART i r
3. What is "business format" franchising ?
This is simply the term given to the kind of franchising
with which I am dealing in my research^: that is, a particular
method of distributing a product, whether that product be goods or
services. It is to be distinguished from "industrial" franchising,
which involves the communication of methods of production and is
regarded by the EEC authorities rather as a question of
intellectual property or know-how law than as franchising.
Business format franchising is typified by the networks of retail
\
outlets under names such as "Benetton" and "MacDonalds" but it is 
by no means confined to the clothes and fast-food industries. It 
has been applied, for example, to markets as diverse as
hairdressing and the sale of computers.
4. Although it is not possible convincingly to draw a line 
between franchising and various other distribution methods, the 
EEC authorities have chosen to put what they call "business 
format" franchising into a distinct pigeonhole and to give it a 
separate block exemption and so it is convenient for me to deal 
with these contracts on that basis. My text explains franchising 
in simplistic terms, ignoring for the moment that it will often 
be very difficult to say whether a particular contract falls 
within the category "franchise" or not.
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Rather than attempting to give a technical, legal 
definition of franchising, I propose to explain the concept by 
means of an example:
4. How does it work ?
First, imagine a simple scenario^: you are a 
manufacturer of bridal outfits and accessories and your production 
business is successful and expanding. You already have a few 
retail outlets from which you sell your products to the public, 
and in these shops you have succeeded in developing an attractive 
and distinctive image: this is based on the names used on the 
shops and on the products, probably including intellectual 
property such as trademarks and tradenames, as well as the 
characteristic way in which your outlets are decorated and 
equipped. All of this has produced a reputation for good value and 
quality, signalled to the consumer when he sees one of these 
distinctive shops. You have in addition built up a considerable 
body of commercial know-how and business acumen which enables you 
to exploit the market for wedding dresses and accessories as 
efficiently as you do.
Since your rate of production is increasing, you would 
like to expand your capacity to distribute the products, at first 
within your own country but later maybe even to other countries. 5
5. The following facts are approximately those of the case 
Pronuptia, to be discussed infra.
8
You have essentially a choice of three different ways of doing 
this:
(a) You may yourself buy a number of further retailing sites in 
your chosen areas, and so set up many more shops on the model of 
the original ones. The people working in these new shops will, as 
in the old ones, be your employees and the shops can be run 
precisely in the way directed by you.
However, "vertical integration", as this method of 
business expansion is termed, has the major disadvantages that you 
yourself must not only provide the necessary capital investment 
required, but you must also shoulder the financial risk of any or 
all of these new outlets failing. You may not have access to the 
sums required, or you may simply be unwilling to take such a risk; 
alternatively, you may not wish to incur the considerable 
responsibilities of monitoring that arise when you have many 
employees working for you^.
(b) You may conclude simple distribution contracts ( with or 
without devices such as exclusive distribution or exclusive 
purchase clauses or a selective distribution network ) with 
independent retailers, who buy bridal gowns and accessories from 
you in order subsequently to sell them to the public from their 
own shops. In this case, each contract amounts to little more than 
a contract of sale between you and the retailer. 6
6. Rubin P.H., in The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of 
the Franchise Contract 21 Journal of Law and Economics 223
(1978), has argued that borrowing on capital markets should be 
cheaper than franchising, and that the real reasons that rational 
businessmen choose franchising must be sought elsewhere.
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In this way, you avoid the disadvantages of vertical 
integration, but there are other, serious drawbacks. Not only do 
your products no longer benefit from your commercial expertise, 
your distinctive decor and the associated image and reputation 
that you have built up, but the latter may even be damaged if your 
goods are sold in "cheap” surroundings or alongside shoddy goods 
of noticeably lower quality than your own.
(c) You may set up a franchising network. This is an alternative 
method of expanding your distribution which can be seen as lying 
midway between vertical integration and simple distribution 
contracts, and it can enable you to avoid many of the drawbacks 
associated with the two previous alternatives.
In a franchising network, the distributors remain 
financially and legally independent from you, the manufacturer - 
now the "franchisor" - but the contracts concluded by you with 
each independent distributor - now a franchisee - are not the 
simple contracts of sale described in (b) above, but ar? 
considerably more complex arrangements. The following is an 
example of the kind of set-up you might agree on:
Say that you marketed your goods under the trademark - by 
now well-known - of "Pronuptia". You might contract to allo^ a 
retailer not only to use this trademark in a particular area to 
sell your products, but to be the exclusive dealer in your goods 
in that area. In other words, he could put all his efforts - 
including his local knowledge of that area - into promoting your 
goods and enhancing their reputation, without fearing that an 
identical shop might open next door to his, and "free-ride” on his 
promotional work and sell the same products at a lower price. (The 
free-rider would be able to afford to charge lower prices as he
1 0
would not be Incurring the same promotional expenses as your 
franchisee would be.)
In addition, you would promise to provide commercial 
assistance to the retailer in advertising, staff-training, shop 
lay-out, marketing and inventory selection and control, since you 
are an expert in these matters and your new "franchisee" may know 
little or nothing about such things.
What will you, the franchisor, require in return ? You 
will probably ask for an initial lump sum plus a percentage of 
profits made by the business. Also, it will be essential that you 
restrict the use which may be made of the intellectual property 
rights and know-how you transfer, or they might be used to promote 
goods other than your own. You will want to ensure that the 
requisite standard of presentation of goods and premises is 
maintained and you may wish to retain considerable control over 
matters such as retailing prices, advertising and the quality and 
quantities of goods of other manufacturers which may be sold in 
the shop alongside your own goods.
The situation can of course be much more complicated, 
with, for example, another level of distribution being inserted - 
that is, sale by the manufacturer via wholesalers to the 
retailers- or the franchisor's original business being not simply 
one of production, but also perhaps of selection for sale of other 
people's products, or the provision of certain services. However, 
the foregoing should make clear the concept with which we are 
dealing.
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5. How popular is it 7 7
This third alternative, that of the franchise network, is 
rapidly gaining popularity all over Europe.
Franchising as a method of doing business , hardly 
surprisingly, originated in the United States of America at the 
beginning of the 1900's and has only in recent years begun to have 
a real impact all over the territory of the EEC, having become 
widespread first in France and, soon after, in the United Kingdom 
and Germany.
Between 30 and 40% of all retail trade in the United 
States takes place through franchise outlets: these are clearly a 
very major part of life for every consumer and for a large number 
of businesses over there. Already well-established in thf; 
seventies, franchising has probably now reached a more or less 
stable presence.
In Europe the franchising phenomenon apparently has some 
way to go before it reaches its peak, since in many countries it 
is only now that the business world is waking up to the potential 
of franchise networks. Franchising was introduced first to France, 
and it is there that it is the most widespread, there being around 
500 franchisors and 25 000 franchisees in the market. In England, 
too, it has been very successful: in 1986 there were about 440 
franchisors and 20 000 franchisees. The Federal Republic currently 7
7. The information in this chapter was taken from the three 
newspapers listed in the bibliography. Further statistics are 
given by the Advocate General in his opinion in Pronuptia.
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enjoys third place in terms of numbers: however, there is clearly 
some way to go still before the full impact of the phenomenon is 
felt.
In Italy, 1988 has been referred to as "1'anno del 
franchising": although there are already over 200 franchisors and 
more than 10 000 franchisees, the Italians, currently fourth in 
the European "listing", expect soon to forge ahead. For example, 
"Peperino" plan to open 200 shops selling children's clothes in 
the next three years, and 300 outlets marketing "Coca-Cola" 
clothes will also be appearing. These will join the franchises 
already in Italy: these include such diverse businesses as 
"Benetton", "Cacherel", "Armani", "Europcar", "Hertz", "Burgy", 
"Quick", "Alessi" and "The 3ritish School".
6. Why is it so popular ?
Some of the advantages to the franchisor of a franchise 
network in terms of investment capital required and risks borne 
have already been mentioned. This in turn means that business 
expansion can take place much more rapidly than it otherwise 
could. Also, the franchisee is self-employed: he is thus directly 
rewarded for the success or otherwise of his shop and by the 
profits he makes in consequence. So a franchisee may be expected 
to put in more effort and more hours than an employee who is on a 
more or less fixed salary. Related to this is the reduction in 
monitoring and management costs associated with the running of the 
network compared with those involved in a vertically integrated
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organisation®: it also explains maybe why franchising is a 
marketing formula which is particularly common in sectors such as 
the fast food industry, which are notorious for the difficulty 
which they have in keeping staff for any length of time. Another 
advantage is that the franchisor is not subject to employee 
protection legislation in his dealings with his franchisees.
Also, the franchisor’s products continue to be sold under 
his distinctive name and outlet appearance thus enhancing still 
further his reputation, whilst he retains sufficient control to 
ensure that this reputation does not suffer. Similarly, business 
know-how and expertise which he has acquired continue to be put to 
use to the benefit of his product, and yet clauses in the contract 
ensure that it is not abused in any way.
Another aspect of the appeal of this method must be the 
existence of the modern media of communication, in particular 
television, which enable a brand name or image to be advertised 
and therefore made well-known over a very wide area in a very 
short space of time. Similarly, increased ease of travel means 
that there are many consumers, abroad or away from home, who are 
looking for a signal that they can recognise and rely on.
For the franchisee, a franchise often offers, to people 
who might not otherwise have sufficient knowledge and experience 
in any market to be able to consider setting up on their own, the 
opportunity to run an independent business. With the continuing 
help of the franchisor, and the benefit of a name with an already 
established reputation, they may be able to do so. 8
8. See Rubin P.H. loc.cit. at note 6.
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The consumer, too, apparently likes franchising: it would 
appear that the more he travels the world, the more conservative 
he becomes in his eating and purchasing habits, and the more 
relieved he is to find a commercial name that he knows. For 
obvious reasons, the outstanding characteristic of outlets cf a 
franchising network is their uniformity, both in outward 
appearance and in the type and quality of goods or services 
provided. So it is, that whether you buy a MacDonalds cheeseburger 
in Milan, in Marseilles - or in Miami - not only will the burger 
taste exactly the same in each place, but you will be served by 
people wearing identical paper hats in each place, and the design 
on the paper napkin will probably be the same. This is because 
these are the kind of details that are laid down in the franchise 
contract - with the precise aim of preserving that startling 
uniformity. Judging by the commercial success of franchising as a 
distribution method, the public clearly very often chooses to 
enjoy the safety of "the devil he knows".
Its success is also almost certainly linked with the 
modern obsession with and weakness for an "image": once the 
correct (from the trader's point of view) associations have been 
made with the franchisor's name or symbol in the consumer's mind, 
the consumer will often continue to respond positively to the 
signal given out by the image - to a certain extent regardless of 
a change or even drop in quality. So
So much for the attractions for franchisors, franchisees 
and consumers of franchising: I will be considering later the 
views of lawyers and economists on the subject, but I will then be 
confining myself to the realm of EEC competition law.
15
7. What are the legal issues arising ?
Before turning to competitition law I would like to 
mention briefly some of the many different legal problems posed by 
franchising. I do not intend to do more than name them, however, 
since my purpose is merely to signal their existence, lest my 
rather narrowly-focused interest in article 85 of the Treaty of 
Rome were to give the erroneous impression that franchising law is 
only a part of competition law and does not have other important 
aspects to it.
For example, consumer groups may be concerned about the
qspread of franchising for reasons unrelated to competition in 
the market^: although the consumer seems to like it, it may hold 
hidden dangers. For that very uniformity which appeals to him so 
much may create the impression that he is dealing with an enormous 
and stable enterprise. In reality, he may in fact be dealing only 
with a small outlet on the verge of closing down, and, although t 
would not normally be in the interests of the franchisor to 
abandon the disappointed customer, the legal independence of the 
franchisee from the franchisor could create considerable - if not 910
9. Article 85(3) refers to consumers getting a "fair share" of 
the benefits of agreements exempted under it. For this 
reason Mr. Peter Sutherland (Director-General of the Commission's 
Competition Directorate) said at the 27th Annual Convention of 
the International Franchise Association that, "...the interests 
of consumers must also be taken into account in assessing the 
possibility of an [block] exemption." However, I am concerned 
here only with relations between franchisors and their 
franchisees and not with that between franchisees and their 
customers.
10. For more details of consumer concerns see e.g. the 3EUC 
report Ref.178/86 Franchising, Advantages and Disadvantages for 
Consumers(1986).
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insurmountable - difficulties in the way of holding the franchisor 
responsible for any loss or damage suffered^*; linked to this 
issue are, for example, the questions whether franchisees should 
be obliged to take out civil liability insurance or whether 
consumers should have a legal right to redress that could be 
enforced against the franchisor.
Similarly, it may be seen as important that franchisees
are not led, by a lack of information or even by misinformation,
into taking on franchises that they have little hope of running
successfully: in the United States of America there is detailed
12Federal legislation imposing heavy duties of disclosure on 
franchisors, with rules similar to those found in investor 
protection legislation. Or there may be "unfair" terms in the 
contract1 ;^ also there may be a need for particular protection of 
employees of franchisees if a franchise is liable to be terminated 
at very short notice for non-observance by the franchisee of 
-certain clauses of his complicated contract with the franchisor.
11. A case illustrative of the problem is that of the actions 
brought in France in respect of the franchise "Maisons LARA" 
which involved the building of pre-fabricated houses. It is 
descibed in the BEUC report mentioned in note 10.
12. See Sutherland M.S. The Risks and Exposures Associated with 
Franchise Noncompliance 42 The Business Lawyer 369 <1987) for 
an idea of the burden that this places on franchisors; see also 
the address mentioned in note 9: "...in Europe such a "Full 
Disclosure Act" does not exist yet in spite of the fact that 
there have been instances of some people being recruited by 
unscrupulous franchisors for doubtful business activities. We 
know these problems too, but competition policy cannot solve 
everything1 123(my underlining).
13. For an explanation of the "fairness" of, for example, 
strict termination clauses, in terms of the transaction costs of 
monitoring and limited information see Klein B. Transaction Cost 
Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements 70 American 
Economic Association 356 (1980).
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Questions of intellectual property law and know-how law are 
involved toor of course.
All I wish to make clear at present is that all sorts of 
areas of law are relevant to franchising and that the restrictive 
effects of clauses in franchising contracts on competition and the 
impact of competition law on franchising is but one of these 
areas.
18
P A R T  I I I
8. Is franchising anti-competitive ?
In competition law terms, franchising involves what are 
called vertical restraints (that is, restraints imposed between 
economic operators at different stages in production such as a 
manufacturer and a retailer, as opposed to "horizontal restraints" 
such as those that might be concluded between two manufacturers or 
between two retailers), of which it is possible to take some very 
different views. This is illustrated no less by current 
controversies than by legal history, both of which will be 
discussed in this chapter.
It is more or less agreed by the Member States of the EEC 
that "competition" - whatever that may mean - needs to be 
regulated at least to a minimal extent: in other words, Adam 
Smith's "invisible hand" cannot be relied upon alone to preserve 
competition in the market place. However, there is much diversity 
within the different legal systems of Member States: Italy does 
not yet have any competition law as such, for example, although 
there are plans to introduce some soon, whereas the United Kingdom 
and Germany have well-developed but widely differing laws. The 
EEC, of course, has its own original system which I shall be 
looking at in detail later.
Of course, all commercial contracts are anti-competitive 
in one sense: if A concludes a contract to buy some raw materials 
from B then there is no longer any opportunity for A to satisfy 
his needs from supplier C - even if he later discovers that he can 
do so twice as cheaply as he could do from B. So not only is A 
prevented from obtaining his, raw materials at the cheapest price
19
offered, but C is prevented from making a sale to A, although he 
is offering better value than 3. And yet without such contracts 
there would not only be no restrictions on competition - but there 
would be no trade at all as we know it. On the other hand, there 
is little argument that an agreement between all the manufacturers 
of cars to maintain their prices at a very high level, relying on 
the fact that people would have to continue to buy the product, is 
not healthy for the economy as a whole and should be discouraged. 
The problem comes, of course, when we try to draw the line between 
these two extremes, or, in other words, to define the 
"competition" that is to be protected by the law.
There is no doubt that franchise contracts restrain 
(usually, both parties’) freedom to trade in the market exactly as 
they choose. For example, the franchisor may bind himself not to 
compete with his franchisee in that franchisee's exclusive 
territory, and the franchisee may be restrained from buying the 
goods to sell in his shop more cheaply from other manufacturers. 
Third parties' opportunities to compete are also reduced, since 
terms in the contract may prevent competing manufacturers fro-n 
supplying the franchisee and competing retailers from obtaining 
the franchisor's goods to sell in the franchisee's area. Thus 
competition is restrained not only as between parties to the 
contract, but also with respect to third parties.
Despite the general agreement over the need for 
protection of "competition", however, what has not been by any 
means universally accepted or agreed upon is the exact meaning of 
"competition" or the precise aims or purposes of these rules.
There is no standard definition of the "competition" that 
we are trying to preserve by means of competition law, and it is 
not my intention to suggest one: the problem of definition is a
20
relatively abstract one and I intend rather to concentrate on the 
question of the aims of competition policy. Also, one must be 
aware of the existence of different kinds of competition: some 
kinds of restriction may increase, say, interbrand competition 
(that is, competition between products of different brands) at the 
expense of a loss in intrabrand competition (competition between 
products of the same brand14). The relative importance of inter- 
and intrabrand competition are controversial issues in some fora, 
in particular in the EEC institutions.
This means that one answer to those who complain that 
competition between franchisees is being eliminated by restrictive 
clauses in franchising contracts is to say that, although 
intrabrand competition is diminished, interbrand competition 
increases, and the overall result is no net loss of competition in 
the market as a whole. However, this willingness to sacrifice the 
one form of competition for the other may be suspect in so far as 
competition cannot be quantified and so it is hard to be confident 
that we are gaining at least "as much" as we lose.
As far as the object of competition law is concerned, I 
wish to signal a few of the possible differences of opinion that 
may arise. This is the main focus of this paper, since it is not 
possible intelligently to discuss alternative solutions to the 
problem of how competition law is to treat franchising before we 
have at least considered the logically anterior question of the 
aims and purposes of that law. After making explicit the choice of
14. In the context of franchising the reference to "brand" must 
be understood as referring to products sold under a particular 
franchise.
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aims, it is possible then to go on to see what policy it or they 
lead us to pursue.
All sorts of goals and interests apart from pure economic 
efficiency may be envisaged: consumer interests , the populist 
desire for protection of the small independent businessman, or 
some special project such as the EEC's political aim of market 
integration are some of the other most important goals that are 
often claimed for competition law. Market integration, in 
particular, is often cited by the Commission and the Court in 
answer to arguments of apparently unassailable economic reasoning.' 
Although these are social or political aims, with no basis or 
rational explanation in strict economic terms, their importance 
must not be underestimated, particularly in the EEC, where they 
are a strong guiding influence in competition law decisions, both 
for the Commission and for the Court of Justice.
In order to understand the nature of and so to seek a 
solution to the differences of opinion that arise in discussing 
and criticising competition policy and "anti-competitive" 
behaviour in the context of vertical restraints in general and 
franchising contracts in particular, these various possibilities 
must always be kept in mind.
Before examining the particular case of the way in which 
the EEC legal system treats franchising, I intend to conduct a 15
15. Consumer interests are by no means completely congruent with 
considerations of pure economic efficiency, for they include, for 
example, the interest of the consumer in realising that he is 
dealing with an independent franchisee and appreciating the 
consequences of this fact. However, the technical term "consumer 
welfare" is used by many writers as a synonym for economic 
efficiency, which is to my mind confusing.
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short survey of the attitudes that have in the past been taken to 
franchising contracts and other contracts involving vertical 
restraints. I shall be drawing almost exclusively on literature 
and jurisprudence relating to the law of the United States of 
America, although I will also be referring, to a limited extent, 
to EEC sources.
American sources are referred to at some length, not so
much because of the concrete similarities that exist between
American and EEC competition law, although there are many
parallels to be drawn: the main reason is that the equivalent law
and hence debate in the EEC setting and indeed in that of the
individual Member States not well-developed enough, nor is the
reasoning of its jurisprudence explicit or apparently
sophisticated enough alone to furnish us with sufficient ideas and
material on which to base discussion. The European Court of
Justice tends to state its position rather cryptically in
comparison with the kind of arguments that we find laid out in
judgments from the United States. So the American experience of
16coming to terms with the different aims claimed for antitrust 
law is instructive in the current discussion, and its literature 
and jurisprudence on the question of the place that economic 
analysis should play in judicial decision-making are particularly 
rich and abundant.
In this context it is particularly instructive to observe 
the debate - judicial no less than doctrinal - now almost one 
hundred years old, that has been going on in the United States 
over the question of what the purpose or aims of their competition 
law - in particular, the Sherman Act - are. Of particular interest 16
16. "Antitrust" law is simply American for competitition law.
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is the way in which it has been applied to vertical restraints in
1 7  1 8general and to franchise contracts in particular.
The problem of deciding whether competition is harmed by 
franchising contracts is conceals the much more fundamental- 
question of what the aims of competition law are: since- 
"competition" is not in the law of the United States or of the EEC 
or anywhere else defined, it is therefore uncertain exactly what 
we are protecting and we are led inevitably to pursue consciously 
or unconciously, explicitly or implicitly particular goals rather 
than others. The purpose of what follows is to look at the various 
aims that have been put forward in the name of competition and of 
franchising. The different views themselves will be considered, as 
will their implications for the attitude to be taken to 
franchising. This is in order that we may later be better able to 
assess the solution for franchising adopted in the EEC:
(i) The traditional approach and "populist" claims 178
17. Rather than to treat them as a separate category of 
contracts, the American approach has tended to be to apply to 
franchise contracts the same general principles that apply to all 
vertical restraints: it is for this reason that the discussion 
will often refer to vertical restraints instead of confining 
itself always to franchising.
18. In summarising the following developments I have drawn 
heavily on an excellent article by Popofsky L. and Bomse S.V.: 
From Sylvania to Monsanto: No Longer a Free Ride 1985 Antitrust 
Bulletin 67.
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The freedom of franchisors to make the contracts they 
wanted was, for a time, threatened by what is sometimes described 
in the USA as a "populist" philosophy of competition policy. This 
is often contrasted with - or even presented as the antithesis of 
- the goal of economic efficiency. According to this ethic the 
freedom of the individual businessman - the franchisee, for our 
purposes - is of paramount importance. In other words, "freedom of 
competition" is equated with the freedom of the individual trader 
to determine his own commercial strategy.
This idea is closely bound up with the traditional
American fear and dislike of excessive concentration of economic
power and its consequences such as increased government
intervention and political powerful political lobbying by big
business. Only the older jurisprudence would support the view that
smallness for its own sake should be protected by antitrust
19laws, and the point made by most modern adherents to this
"school" is rather that the existence of the competition process
should not be sacrificed to the blind pursuit of the greatest
2 0output for the lowest price.
In our example, past members of this school would have 
argued that it should be a function of competition law to preserve 
the freedom of the many retailers to decide upon their own market 
strategy for selling wedding dresses and not to be controlled by a 
single, powerful franchisor.This view, admittedly at the extreme 1920
19. e.g. Pitofsky R. The Political Content of Antitrust 127 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1051 at 1058 where he 
states explicitly that amongst the various goals that he 
considers should be pursued he does not number smallness for its 
own sake.
20. e.g. Elzinga K.G. The Goals of Antitrust: other than 
Competition and Efficiency, what else counts? 125 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1191.
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end of the spectrum in current American terms, tending as it does, 
to the preservation of the small trader's independence, has played 
a crucial role in the development of American treatment of 
vertical restraints.
The Sherman Act 1890 is the cornerstone of American*.
antitrust legislation and it, like Article 85 of the Treaty of
Rome, is couched in very broad and general terms: it pronounces a
blanket condemnation of "...every contract, combination...or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce...". Thus judges were
left with a wide discretion to interpret the Act as they saw fit.*c;
This led over the years to what Gellhorn calls "a kaleidoscope of
reactions... including confusion, hostility, expansive application-
21and skepticism" . In the first years, it was interpreted 
ridiculously broadly and literally, but soon the judges began to * 
search for a more reasonable interpretation of the prohibition.
If we examine the case-law for the seventy years after 
its introduction it is immediately striking that there is little 
reference to the possible application of notions of searching for 
the economically most efficient interpretation of the law. The 
dominant theme is the political - rather than economic - aim
described by Popofsky and Bomse as that of preserving "small
. . 2 2  businessmen against oppression by corporate giants" . This
populist ideal is evoked tirelessly by judges at all levels*
23throughout those years: for example, in Alcoa , Judge Learned 213
21. Climbing the Antitrust Staircase 1986 Antitrust Bulletin 341 
at 342.
22. Op.cit.fnote 18) at p.70.
23. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,427* 
(2d Cir.1945).
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Hand explained that Congress, in passing the Sherman Act, "was not
2 4necessarily activated by economic motives alone" . He continued:
"It is possible, because of its indirect social or moral effect, 
to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for his 
success on his own skill and character, to one in which the great 
mass of those engaged must accept the direction of a few".
25Later, we will be looking at Sylvania , a case 
concerning the legality of vertical territorial retraints, which 
probably marks the greatest single step towards judicial
recognition of the relevance of arguments based on economic 
efficiency so far taken. However, it is in that case that we find, 
not amongst the Supreme Court judgments but at a lower instance, 
one of the clearest expressions of the populist sentiment. Judge 
Browning (dissenting) explained that,
"Legislative history and Supreme Court decisions establish that a 
principal objective of the Sherman Act was to protect the right of 
independent business entities to make their own competitive 
decisions, free of coercion, collusion, or exclusionary practices.
Congress' general purpose in passing the Sherman Act was 
to limit and restrain accumulated economic power, represented by 
tha trusts, and to restore and preserve a system of free 
competitive enterprise. The Congressional debates reflect a 
concern not only with the consumer interest in price, quality, and 245
24. For the contrary view, see Bork R.H. Legislative Intent and 
the Policy of the Sherman Act 9 Journal of Law and Economics 7 
(1966) whose analysis leads him to conclude that economic 
efficiency was intended as the only aim of the Sherman Act.
25. Continental T.V.,Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,Inc.,433 U.S.36 (1977).
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quantity of goods and services, but also with society's interest
in the protection of the independent businessman, for reasons of
26social and political as well as economic policy ".
Popofsky and Bomse point out that at this time, the 
franchisee-franchisor relationship
"was repeatedly viewed as a contest pitting David against Goliath,
with the Sherman Act as the slingshot. As the decisions of the
time had it, the mandate of the Sherman Act would be fulfilled by
assuring small franchisees or distributors the right to determine
27for themselves their methods of operation..."
I have already mentioned that Sylvania was to mark a 
decisive change of direction. In it, the Supreme Court, for the 
first time ever, explicitly overruled one of its previous 
decisions, Schwinn , in order to hold that territorial restraints
should be considered under the "rule of reason" rather than held
, 29illegal per se
However, nowhere is the influence of the populist ethic 
more clearly shown than in the fact that not only the dissenter 
Judge Browning made use of its rhetoric, but so did Judge Ely, as 
part of the majority ! He turned it upside down, showing that, in 26789
26. 537 P.2d at p.1018.
27. Op.cit.(note 18) at p.71.
28. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn and Co., 388 U.S. 365 
(1967).
29. A "per se” rule declares a term necessarily illegal if it 
falls within the category to which the rule applies; a "rule of 
reason" requires a balancing of the pro- and anticompetitive 
effects of the term based on the structure of the relevant market 
and the position of the parties in that market.
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common with many political shibboleths, it is a weapon easily 
turned against its user. Judge Ely pointed out that,
"The adoption of the rule of per se illegality in a case such as 
this would undoubtedly hasten the disappearance from the American 
market place of the small independent merchant, now often a 
franchisee, and already an endangered entrepreneur.... If we were 
to adopt the approach of per se illegality, the ultimate result 
might be to undermine franchising as a tool to enable the small, 
independent businessman to compete with the large vertically 
integrated giants of many industries. One danger would be that a 
single franchisee, allowed to expand into a chain of stores and 
sell everywhere over the manufacturer's objection and in violation 
of; the contract, might make it impossible for other small single­
outlet. franchisees of the same manufacturer to compete 
f -ifestively. Thus the loyal network of small independent 
businessmen that the manufacturer desired for his franchisees 
might be supplanted by several "giant" franchisees, each having 
r.ut'Uiious outlets. Another risk would be that a small manufacturer 
who could not afford to integrate vertically, if prohibited from 
offering any degree of territorial protection from intrabrand 
competition or "elbow room", might not be able to attract dealers 
and thus might be unable to establish an effective system of 
distribution for its product. We cannot believe that Congress 
intended to implement a rigid per se rule of illegality that 
portends such serious risk to franchising arrangements, methods
that have made significantly worthy contributions to our Nation's 
„30economy." 30
30. 537 F.2d 999.
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In other words, it may be wondered how many franchisees 
would be able to compete at all as retailers, without the help and 
support of their franchisor - that is, the franchisee would go out 
of business or he would become an employee and thus lose entirely 
any commercial independence he might have had. Also, if the effect" 
of forbidding or making very difficult to establish efficiently 
franchising networks is to encourage many firms to integrate 
vertically, then nothing short of a monopoly could be challenged. 
So it was that the appreciation of this characteristic of 
franchising - that is, the benefits and strengthening of position 
that it conferred on small traders - in part, that led to the- 
reversal in policy marked by Sylvania, which of course had 
repercussions that went far beyond franchising contracts.
It is fascinating to see here such a clear illustration • 
of the truth that in order to justify the legality of certain 
clauses to be found in franchise contracts, it is possible, 
instead of rejecting the populist stance, to accept it and show 
that its position can be destroyed from within. This is probably 
the main reason why, far from being seen as an objection to 
franchising in EEC circles, these considerations have tended to 
support its cause: they go hand in hand with the protection and 
promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEfs) which have 
always been considered to deserve some kind of privileged 
status'*1. 31
31. The precise reason for this is not clear: it is certainly a 
political decision, and probably relates to the vulnerable 
position of small businesses in the face of the opening up of 
national borders within the Community.
( F o o tn o te  c o n t i n u e s  on n e x t  p a g e )
30
For the sake of clarity, it should be pointed out that 
the current "traditional" thinkers^ in the United States no 
longer support the protection of the small trader as such, but 
rather plead that antitrust law respect values such as the 
dispersion of economic power. They are therefore chiefly concerned 
about- monopolies and tight oligopolies and would have little to 
say against franchising itself, provided that interbrand 
competition were healthy in the relevant market. In the EEC, on 
the other hand, views very similar to those of the old populist 
thinkers are strong: happily for franchising, it has their 
support.
(ii) The new learning and economic efficiency
Lest it should seem more obvious than it really is that 
economic efficiency is a proper goal of antitrust law, we should 
again look at legal history. Today it may seem perfectly obvious 
and natural that considerations of economic efficiency should have 
their place in judicial interpretation and application of 
antitrust legislation and precedents. After all, competition law 
is part of "economic law": thus it might at first sight appear
(Footnote continued from previous page)
"In Europe, at least, the vast majority of franchisees would 
be characterised as SME's, except when department stores take a 
franchise which they incorporate into the relevant department in 
their shop, which often happens with fashion franchises. 32
32. See e.g. Pitofsky R. op.cit.(note 19)
31
difficult seriously to defend the position that arguments based on 
economic reasoning should be disregarded in this process.
Be that as it may: it was, nevertheless, the stance
adopted by judges in the American Supreme Court and the Federal 
Trade Commission from the time of the introduction of the Shermañ"- 
Act in 1890 until comparatively recently.
In Sylvania Judge Browning also gave reasons for judicial 
distrust of economics, saying:
"courts are ill-equipped to resolve the complex economic problems'
involved in deciding in a given case whether elimination of
intrabrand competition among dealers through territorial
restrictions in fact produce[s] compensating gains in interbrand
33competition among producers"
Whilst it is true that there are two sides to the 
economic argument, and that the argument in favour of vertical 
restraints is by no means irresistible, we may say, along with 
Judge Browning’s fellow dissenter, Judge Duniway:
"I am puzzled by the notion that because the courts are not very
well equipped to decide between conflicting notions of economic
policy, they should pick one side of such an argument and erect it
34into a rule of per se illegality"
This type of attitude continued to hold sway in the 
courts despite Judge Duniway*s puzzlement and despite the 34
33. 537 F.2d 1024.
34. Ibid, at 1030.
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appearance during the sixties of a growing body of literature 
analysing various rules of antitrust law. At this time, however, 
even dissenting judges in this kind of antitrust case did not make 
use of economics, but tended instead to take a rather intuitive 
approach, despite the fact that the negative impact on economic 
efficiency of such rules could be so clearly shown. Popofsky and 
Bomse suggest cynically - or perhaps perceptively? - two reasons 
for this:
"There appeared to be at least an implicit fear that if it was
acknowledged that economics had something pertinent to say about
the application of the antitrust laws, the judiciary might have to
start learning about the shape of elastic demand curves. Or
perhaps it was, simply, that the then-prevailing doctrine was
difficult to defend in economic terms. Thus, to invite a joining
of issues on that ground would have been to undermine the
35analytical basis of the law as it then existed"
36In Sylvania economic efficiency - or "consumer 
welfare", which makes it sound politically more acceptable - was 
ushered in as the new criterion for interpreting the Sherman 
Act. From then on, serious restrictions on the freedom of conduct 
of individual actors on the market was no longer automatically 
condemned.
So, although neither the economic analysis conducted by 
the 9th Circuit judges in Sylvania, nor that of the Supreme Court, 356
35. Op.cit.(note 18) at p.72.
36. The facts of this case were not unlike those of Pronuptia, 
although the goods involved were television sets rather than 
wedding apparrel.
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was particularly thorough or sophisticated, it was revolutionary 
in that it, in Popofsky and Bomse's words,
"entirely refocused the antitrust laws from an essentially
, . 3 7political statute to one grounded in modern welfare economics." ■
So today in the American courts, although all resistance 
to vertical restraints has not been broken down - in 
Monsanto(1984) it was held that vertical price restraints are 
still per se illegal, despite the absence in economic theory of 
any fundamental difference between price and non-price restraints'
the attitude to them is benevolent, and economic reasoning is
38generally listened to and treated with respect .
However, the acceptance of the relevance of economic 
analysis is only the beginning of the story: the real question'
then becomes whether franchising - or, rather, the various clauses 
appearing in franchise contracts - promote efficiency in the 
market place. Here the debate still rages , and I can but outline 
a few of the arguments put forward by some of the different 
schools of thought. 3789
37. Ibid, at note p.86.
38. For an imaginative prediction of the future of American 
antitrust see Fox E.M. Antitrust in its Second^ Century: the 
Phoenix Rises from its Ashes 1986 Antitrust Bulletin 383.
39. "The proposal [to make economic efficiency the only goal of' 
antitrust law] offers not the prospect of greater certainty and 
shorter litigation...but utter confusion. Economists are no more 
likely to agree than lawyers; only a disillusioned lawyer or a 
brash economist could believe otherwise." Dirlam J., Kahn A. Fair 
Competition: The Law and Economics of Antitrust Policy 28 (1954). 1
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It has long been recognised, and vast amounts of lega*
and economic literature have been produced on the subject, that
vertical restraints are generally conducive to economic
efficiency. We must leave aside here any discussion of the
41different definitions of "economic efficiency“ which may be 
relied on. Similarly, the difficulties that can arise in 
distinguishing between horizontal and vertical restraints in some 
situations cannot be gone into here.
It seems a reasonable proposition - and it can be shown 
by economists using graphs and equations and economic reasoning - 
that a rational manufacturing enterprise, even if it is a 
classical monopolist, will normally benefit financially from 
encouraging the maximum amount of competition amongst his 
retailers. It follows from this, it is argued, that a franchisor, 
for example, will impose only those vertical restraints that 
maximise its ability to compete and hence its economic 
efficiency.Let us take again the example of our franchise network 
selling wedding dresses. Economists can demonstrate, with the aid 
of course of certain assumptions, that we will only be interested 
in imposing the kind of restraints on our franchisees that enable 
our goods to be sold in the most efficient way, because we benefit 
most from a situation in which our goods are being distributed 
with optimum efficiency. 401
40. For a clear and relatively simple economic explanation see
White L.J. Vertical Restraints in Antitrust Law: A Coherent Model 
1981 Antitrust Bulletin 327. For a more sophisticated analysis 
which comes to similar conclusions but takes into account 
transaction costs and the consequences of bounded rationality and 
opportunism, see Williamson O.E. Assessing Vertical Market 
Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost
Approach 127 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 953 (1979).
41. r It refers basically to allocative efficiency or wealth 
maximisation.
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Reasons advanced for departure in certain circumstances 
from what would normally produce the most efficient result are 
almost all variants on the theme of the problem of the "free­
rider".
4 2 4 3As first made notorious by Telser , the free-rider is 
the distributor who leaves the expense and trouble of providing 
well-qualified sales staff and a comprehensive explanation of the 
products to other distributors to incur. When potential customers 
have made their choice at one of these "luxury” outlets, they are 
able to go to the "free-rider” across the road and obtain the same 
product for a much lower price. The free-rider is able to charge 
such low prices because he is not paying for the services that the 
"luxury" ■ distributors are. In the end, the more expensive shops 
will either go out of business - or simply cease to offer pre­
sales services of the sort for which they cannot charge potential 
customers, and an efficient method of distribution becomes 
unworkable and breaks down, and the customer loses out.
42. Telser L. Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade? 3 Journal 
of Law and Economics 86 (1960).
43. Strangely, this term almost always has a pejorative tone when
used in the American literature, whereas in the EEC the free­
rider has the status of a protected species: see Gyseln L.
Vertical Restraints in the Distribution Process: Strength and
Weakness of the Free Rider Rationale under EEC Competition Law 21 
Common Market Law Review 647 (1984). At p.649 he says "In the EEC 
Commission's eyes, however, the free-rider is a hero because his 
sales foster the free movement of the brand within the Common 
Market and thus contribute to market integration. Consequently, 
restraints which limit his room for manoevre are subject to close 
scrutiny and will often fail to qualify for an exemption under 
A.85, para.3 of the EEC Treaty." Even without introducing the 
market integration aim, however, it can be said in favour of 
free-riders that they can destabilise or prevent the 
establishment of cartels.
L
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As originally described by Telser, this argument could
apply to a relatively narrow range of products: that is, those
requiring or benefiting from expert knowledge available at the
point of sale. However, before long, it was appreciated that such
pre-sales "services” could include not only the obvious, such as a
test-drive in a new car, or technical advice about electrical
goods, but could extend to the creation of a certain reputation
for style or a particular "image". In other words, the expense
incurred, for example, in creating the image of Yves Rocher
perfume as a high quality, luxury good destined for' an elite
clientele is subject to free-riding by a cheap department store
which sells the perfume but without the chic and glossy
4 4surroundings that other outlets provide and pay for
If exclusive territories or retail price maintenance are 
the methods chosen - rather than, for example, advertising done 
centrally for all areas by the franchisor - this must be because 
it is the most efficient method. This may mean that, by means of 
conferring exclusive territories for example, or imposing
particular prices, we see fit to protect our franchisees from 
competition with each other, but this will only increase our 
economic efficiency and therefore our ability to compete with 
other brands of wedding dresses: that is, intrabrand competition 
may decrease but interbrand competition is enhanced.
This provides the basic argument for the legality of 
vertical restrictions such as retail price maintenance and 
territorial exclusivity, which provide protection against the 4
44. See e.g. Marvel H.P.,McCafferty S. Resale Price Maintenance 
and Quality Certification 15 Rand Journal of Economics 346
(1984).
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free-rider, either by making it impossible for him to charge a low 
price, thus forcing him to compete in other ways if he continues- 
to wish to stock the product, or by preventing him from selling 
too near the protected distributor's outlet.
Such restrictions also allow price discrimination between’ 
different areas, and this may or may not be considered wrongirv 
economic terms. In EEC political terms, however, it tends to be 
regarded as divisive of the single united market that it is 
striving for.
Another justification advanced for such restraints isr 
that restrictions can be used to obtain a sufficient return in 
large, centrally-positioned outlets to allow the franchisor to 
continue to be able to afford to supply remote shops which perhaps 
have a low turnover, too. Also, allocation of territories may 
increase economic efficiency by avoiding wastage such as 
duplication of delivery routes and by allowing more accurate sales' 
forecasting. Minimum prices can be used to protect a producer from
having his product used as a loss-leader: such use may bring a
short-term benefit, but in the long term such a practice is' 
damaging, since other dealers cease to stock it and it loses its 
quality of being a well-known brand.
This powerful argument, applying to almost any kind of 
product, from Levis' jeans to lawnmowers and to wedding dresses, 
is however by no means decisive. Apart from questioning the
validity of the unique goal of economic efficiency in itself, it
is possible to point to flaws within it in the form of its 
inherent assumptions and, perhaps most importantly, to the form 
that its transposition into workable legal rules should take.
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For example, one assumption in Telser's argument is that
the provision of pre-sales services is economically efficient, in
that it is providing customers with a service that they value and
are prepared to pay for in the price of the product: otherwise
they would buy a cheaper product without the services. But this
assumes that customers are undifferentiated, all having the same
4  5level of desire for particular services. In fact, as Comanor has 
pointed out, very often there will be a large number of "certain" 
customers who are willing to buy the product at the higher price 
but who have no need for the services, which may, on the other 
hand, attract in a small number of "marginal" customers. In this 
hypothesis it is in the interests of the retailer to provide 
largely superfluous services - that is, to do the inefficient 
thing.
A key issue underlying the discussion but not always 
voiced is the controversy over what factors constitute barriers to 
entry to the market. If one believes that the only real barriers 
are government regulations then one will hardly be worried by any 
behaviour in the market, for one envisages potential entrepreneurs 
waiting to step into the market and undercut, for example, a 
cartel which is charging monopoly prices. If, on the other hand, 
one recognises the difficulties inherent in raising capital and 
the imperfect and incomplete information held by potential 
entrants and consumers alike, one will be more suspicious of the 
ability of the competitive market to preserve itself. 45
45. Comanor W.S. Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market 
Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy 98 Harvard Law Review 
983 (1985).
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Another consideration is the reason for the adoption of 
restraints. Resale price maintenance, exclusive territories and 
similar vertical restrictions that appear in franchising contracts 
may be the result of pressure exerted on the franchisor by his 
franchisees: in itself, if it only amounts to pressure to confer 
sufficient protection on them to allow them to run the business to 
the standard required by the franchisor, there is little wrong 
with this: however, it is objectionable if in reality it is a 
franchisee cartel that is insisting on higher prices than are 
economically efficient.
Alternatively, the territories or prices may be the' 
result or the means of establishing or maintaining a horizontal 
cartel between franchisors or manufacturers, in order to restrain 
production or to maintain prices at monopoly profits levels. 
Territories help here as they break up large areas into more 
manageable parts to be cartelized and policed individually, and: 
uniform prices make the detection of cartel-breakers easier and so 
can help to stabilize and strengthen cartels.
Also in connection with free-riding as a justification' 
for vertical restraints, it is necessary to be aware of the' 
possibility that the "service" in question, whether it is a 
service in the usual sense of the word, or an "image" or glamour 
(sometimes called "quality certification") is either not brand- 
specific or alternatively specific to an individual franchisee. In 
such a case the free-rider justification cannot apply.
Even this brief survey of economic arguments and counter­
arguments makes it clear that vertical restraints can be imposed 
with two essentially different purposes - and two results(the 
purposes and results not always coinciding, of course); they may 
serve either to assist in improving the distribution or production-
40
of goods and services# or they may be directed towards the 
creation, allocation or exploitation of economic power.
For the moment accepting for the sake of argument that 
economic efficiency is a goal, it is then necessary to take the 
next step - that is, to decide exactly how to transform these 
theories into laws, legal presumptions and rules of evidence. For 
example, are intention or effects to be important, and how are 
they to be evidenced? It is notoriously difficult to discover the 
result of a commercial practice in isolation, as so many other 
variables affect the data used. It may be claimed too that the 
genuine "intention" of a franchisor is hard to establish, 
especially if he is aware of the rules of the game, as businessmen 
and their lawyers tend to be.
Perhaps it is here that the differences between the 
schools of thought become most obvious: some seek to discover the 
possible and likely uses of vertical restraints and to point out 
that each situation must be looked at individually and judged on 
its merits. Others, including both some lawyers and some 
economists, admit that such restraints can be efficient in some 
circumstances and conducive to inefficiency in others, but prefer 
a certain, if partly arbitrary rule for or against, depending on 
their view as to whether the benefits more often than not outweigh 
the dangers or vice versa.
Pitofsky, who advocates a per se rule against certain 
vertical restraints including airtight territories, believes that,
"A standard under which all circumstances are weighed, and 
violations found only upon demonstration of specific 
anticompetitive effects, may sound sober and moderate, but in the 
real world has little deterrent effect, produces trials of
41
inordinate length and expense and often undermines antitrust:
enforcement. Business practices tested under a full rule of
reason, with no pesumptions based on any set of facts and with the
burden of showing anticompetitive effect on the plaintiff, will
46usually turn out to be legal".
Similarly, according to Leffler it follows from the point' 
made by Comanor and referred to earlier that,
"A proper efficiency analysis of the use of RPM to call forth"
services therefore requires detailed information on individual"
consumers' demand functions with and without the provision of"
retailer service. Again, economists are unlikely to produce
reliable estimates of these empirical quantities, and courts are
unlikely to be able to assess the reliability of claims about such 
. 47empirical studies
In other words, the person whose economic analysis proves 
to him that each vertical restraint deserves to be judged on its 
merits is ignoring the huge losses in efficiency that would then 
occur through more frequent and lengthier litigation.
The other side of the argument is put by Small, who says 
of the rule of reason that,
"This does not mean...that the rule is impossible to apply, nor 
does it mean that the probability that the trier of fact will face 467
46. The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical 
Restrictions 78 Columbia Law Review 1 (1978) at p.2.
47. 28 Journal of Law and Economics 381 (1985) at p.383.
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i
a difficult decision justifies not making that decision on the 
48merits” .
Today in the United States the real controversy over 
economic analysis does not relate to its validity as a tool in 
understanding market and competition processes but in the use/ 
practically speaking, that can be made of it in the courts without 
incurring great efficiency losses there. In other words, can we 
hope to discover the purpose - or the effect - of each restraint, 
or are we better off overall with a per se rule with the certainty 
that that brings, one way or the other. Especially given the very 
marginal importance of the "traditional" or "populist" arguments 
in the context of franchising, this really appears to be the most 
open and controversial point debated today. Since a choice depends 
on the perceived actual state of the market, in particular in 
terms of the proportions of efficient and inefficient vertical 
restraints present in it, only with the aid of enormous quantities 
of research into many different markets and collection of 
empirical data - which in any case would not remain constant over 
time - could any really authoritative answer can be given.
So it does not automatically follow that EEC competition 
law - or any other system of competition law, for that matter - 
should smile uncritically on vertical restrictions such as those 
that appear in franchise contracts, even if economic efficiency is 
its chief goal. Also, in the EEC, not only is the small trader of 
much more importance in competition policy than in America, but 
there is in addition the overriding aim of market integration, 
unique to the EEC, to be considered. 48
48. Sylvania 1977 Wisconsin Law Review 1240 at 1248.
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( i i i )  Market  i n t e g r a t i o n
In the EEC context the aim of market integration takes 
first place: van Bael has stated that
"From its inception the EEC competition policy has been
49essentially geared to speed up single market integration."
Korah, too, has opened an article on this subject with
the words
"In the EEC, there is no agreement as to what objectives should be
pursued by competition policy. Probably the most important in the
view of the Commission and Court of the Communities is the
50integration of the common market."
Later in the same article she points out that, contrary 
to what might be understood from the bare words of a.2 of the 
Treaty, market integration is not simply a means to the end of 
achieving prosperity and other Community aims, but it is an end in 
itself. But it is a rather mysterious end: it is not at all clear 
what it means. It might be thought, for example that anything that 
made it easier for franchise networks to expand, taking their 
products to different countries and so allowing consumers all over 
the Community access to the goods, would be approved of. Instead, 
almost any form of territorial protection, whether it be in the 4950
49. Heretical Reflections on the Basic Dogma of EEC Antitrust: 
Single Market Integration 10 Revue Suisse de Droit International 
de la Concurrence 39 (1980) at p.40.
50. EEC Competition Policy - Legal Form or Economic Efficiency 
1986 Current Legal Problems 85.
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form of exclusive territories, differential pricing or an export 
ban, and often a necessary part of the franchise package, is 
regarded as intrinsically inimical to market integration.
This is a political aim, as mentioned earlier, and it is 
peculiar to the EEC legal system. Although the conferral of 
exclusive territories which do not permit parallel imports is 
considered inimical to a united market, in practice it may often 
be the case that, without franchising, the goods or services 
simply would not be available to so many consumers or over so wide 
a geographical area. However, a similar argument was not accepted51 ,by the Commission in Distillers in the context of differential 
pricing (which in pratice did not even amount to an absolute 
export ban) and in consequence of a refusal of exemption under 
a •85(3) various brands of whisky disappeared from the continental 
European market altogether and others from the United Kingdom 
market.
Markets are said to be "divided" by such terms in the 
sense that different prices can be charged in different areas. 
Given that not only do barriers to trade such as discriminatory 
taxes and regulations continue to exist at national boundaries, 
but different social and cultural conditions pertain - and, it is 
fervently to be hoped, will continue to pertain - it is by no 
means evident that uniform prices and conditions throughout the 
Community are either indicative of or conducive to a single, 51
51. 1978 OJ L50/16. The Court never pronounced on the question, 
since the appeal was decided against Distillers on procedural 
grounds (1980 ECR 2229).
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barrierless market^. However/ it is clear that/ whatever "market 
integration" means, it is an aim that will generally override that 
of economic efficiency in EEC policy-making. Its importance in 
that context cannot be overstated.
Other objects for competition law such as consumer.- 
protection from being deceived into believing that the franchisee, 
is legally part of a large, stable firm, fairness of contract, 
franchisee protection, full employment and income redistribution 
have from time to time been suggested. Although intrinsically very 
important, their role in the formation of competition policy is at 
most peripheral and will not be discussed further.
-So it is obvious that the answer to the question, "Is 
franchising anti-competitive ?" depends not only on the specific 
terms of the franchise contract and on our definition of the 
"competition" (interbrand or intrabrand: franchising tends to 
enhance the former at the expense of the latter) that is to be 
protected. It is also a function of our choice of what interests 
and values we see competition law as working to protect. And even 
if we are sure of our aims, it is often of course in practice by 
no means clear what is the best strategy to achieve them. 52
52. Van Bael I. op.cit.(note 46) at p.53: "...a uniform 
price...should be viewed as legally suspect and not the other way 
round; such a uniform price could well reflect the real market, 
power of the company in question since that company is in a 
position to set the price at a uniform level irrespective of 
differing demand factors...".
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9. EEC competition law.
The Treaty of Rone is founded on the assumption of a 
market ( the "common market") economy and it deals with freedom of 
competition as a fundamental part of the economic community which 
it sets up. In article 3(f) it provides for
"the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the 
common market is not distorted".
Later on in the Treaty, articles 85 to 94 provide more 
details of the EEC's competition policy. However, the only ones 
which apply to private undertakings and therefore franchisors are 
articles 85 and 86. Moreover, article 86 prohibits the abuse of a 
dominant position in the market and maybe the control of mergers, 
and, interesting as the problems raised by this prohibition are, 
they will not be discussed further since there is little to 
distinguish the application of article 86 to a franchisor from its 
application to any other sort of undertaking.
Instead, I shall from now on be concentrating on article 
85, whose application to franchise contracts raises all sorts of 
questions. Many important questions arise in relation to the 
application of a.85 to all kinds of agreements, such as the 
ascertainment of the relevant market, but I intend to deal only 
with problems peculiar to franchise contracts.
Before looking at the details of EEC competition law and 
its interpretation and application, it is as well to step back and 
notice the peculiarities that distinguish the European Community's 
legal and economic orders from those of states such as the United 
States of America or the individual Member States of the EEC.
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These distinctive characteristics lead to corresponding features 
in competition law.
First, European law is very new, very young and therefore 
relatively undeveloped: many finer points can therefore be
expected to remain undecided.
Second, the Common Market being made up of separate 
sovereign states, there is a need for market integration in a way 
which is simply not comparable with the situation in countries 
which introduced their competition law long after their territory 
was united and there was relative ease of flow of trade from one 
area of the country to another. As already stated, this is an 
exceptionally important factor, whose importance cannot be over­
emphasized and one of whose most notable effects has been to lead
to a very harsh treatment being meeted out in reaction to firms
whose commercial arrangements tend to divide up markets along 
national boundaries.
Other factors that should be borne in mind include the
absence of political and economic unity in the EEC, the importance
attached to the protection of small businesses - and also the use,
whether or not legitimate, of competition law to shape industrial
53growth and direct transport policy and the like. This multitude 
of goals makes for very unclear pointers to policy: all these 
factors and more will colour the approach taken to all
controversies to be resolved in the field of competition law, and
the question of franchising is an excellent illustration of this.
53. For a discussion of the diverse policies that may 
currently be being pursued in the name of competition policy, see~ 
Hornsby S.B. Competition Policy in the 80's: More Policy Less _ 
Competition? 12 European Law Review 79 (1987).
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10. Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome.
This article begins by laying down in its first paragraph 
a. prohibition as broad and general as that of the Sherman Act. 
Article 85(1) prohibits
" ...all agreements between undertakings, decisions by
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may 
affect trade between Member States and which have as their object 
or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of
competition within the common market..."
and it then goes on to give a non-exhaustive list of examples of 
contracts which violate this prohibition.
Article 85(2) declares that contracts infringing this
rule are void. It was confirmed very early on by the European
Court of Justice that this paragraph is automatically effective,
without the need for the Commission to take any kind of decision
to this effect - or indeed to know of the existence of the
infringing agreement or concerted practice: national courts are
54competent to declare such nullity
Notice what this meant for a business such as ours, 
before Pronuptia clarified the legal status of franchise contracts 
to a certain extent: suppose that we decided to expand our
business in the wedding-dress trade by means of a franchise 
network and that, subsequently, some disagreement arose between us 
and a franchisee who refused to pay us the percentage of profits 54
54. BRT v. SABAM No.l 1974 ECR 51.
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due to us under the contract. If we took him to court and sued him 
for what was owed to us, he might claim before the national court 
that the contract is void by virtue of article 85(2) for 
infringement of article 85(1) and if this were held to be so 
(either with or without the benefit of the answer to a preliminary 
reference to Luxembourg) our arguments on the real merits of the. 
case would be to no avail.
The last paragraph is the counter-balance to the sweeping 
prohibition in the first: article 85(3) allows exemption from such, 
invalidity if the arrangement
"...contributes to improving the production or distribution of 
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while 
allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and- 
which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which 
are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating 
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in 
question".
It is also provided that, as well as granting individual 
exemptions upon application to it by parties to a particular, 
contract, the Commission also has the competence, of its own 
initiative, to issue a "block exemption". This is a regulation, 
giving automatic exemption to certain types of contracts that are 
considered to be "a good thing" in terms of efficiency and 
consumer welfare, but which would otherwise be prohibited by
50
already been done for several types ofarticle 85(1). This has 
. 55agreement.
But the crucial thing to notice here is that - in the 
absence of a block exemption - exemption can only be granted by 
the Commission. Therefore/ however cogent the explanation to the 
national court of the economic advantages and benefits to the 
consumer provided by the system in question, these arguments will 
be irrelevant if such an exemption has not only been applied for 
but also granted by the Commission.
It was thus crucial to decide whether franchise contracts 
fell within a.85(1).A franchise contract clearly has the potential 
to* be considered anti-competitive for the reasons explained above. 
The answer must depend on the choices made in EEC law as regards 
the definition of competition and the aims of competition law.
The bare words of the Treaty are so all-encompassing that 
it was obviously necessary to look at how the Commission and the 
European Court had interpreted this provision in the past if there 
was to be any chance of predicting what their attitude to 
franchising might be. Although of course previous case law on 
vertical restraints gave some guidance as to the kind of ruling 
the Court of Justice might be expected to make, their distinctly 
free and teleological method of interpretation meant that, in such 
a controversial area as this one, it was very uncertain how a.85 
would be interpreted and applied, and when it was known that the 
reference in Pronuptia was to be decided by the Court, the 5
55. Namely exclusive dealing, exclusive purchasing, patent 
licence, specialisation and research and development agreements 
and selective distribution for motor vehicles.
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considerablebusiness community awaited the decision with5 6apprehension and anxiety 56
56. For detailed speculation on the possible outcome of the case 
see Goebel R.J. The Uneasy Fate of Franchising under EEC 
Antitrust Laws 1985 European Law Review 87. Of particular 
interest is a part of an answer from the Commission to a 
Parliamentary Question (No.1694/79 OJ 1980 C131/33) which he
cites: the Commission was at that time of the opinion that 
franchises were "difficult to define precisely" and that their 
assessment would depend "less on their actual designation and. 
form than on their scope and economic context". For that reason, 
no guidelines or special rules were envisaged at the time. One; 
wonders to what the Commission's change of heart a few years on; ;, 
is attributable.
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PART IV
11, Pronuptia and individual and block exemptions.
In this chapter the existing European competition law on 
franchising will be described. However, what follows does not 
purport to be a full description and analysis of the law, but 
rather a discussion of particular aspects of the law as it has so 
far developed which are of special relevance to my search for the 
motivation behind the policy,
57First, the Pronuptia case and the draft block
co 59exemption will be described briefly . Next, the way in which
the European Court of Justice and the Commission characterise and 
define franchising generally will be examined, and this will be 
followed by a look at the sub-division of franchising into dif­
ferent categories that they have made. Then the clauses considered 
"good" and "bad" will be looked at in turn. Comment will next be 
made on the part played by market analysis, and finally various 
miscellaneous points will be dealt with. 57*9
57. See note 1.
58.,.See note 3.
59. For full accounts see articles listed in the bibliography, in 
particular those by Korah V.
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(a) Pronuptia
The facts of Pronuptia were similar to those of :he 
example I evoked earlier. The plaintiff before the German court 
was a German subsidiary of the French franchisor "Pronuptia de 
Paris", a distributor of wedding dresses and other wedding clothes 
and accessories. This subsidiary, Pronuptia de Paris Gmbh, had not 
only a franchise network but also shops of its own. It had granted 
a franchise to a German franchisee, Mrs. Schillgalis, for three 
separate territories in the Federal Republic,and a dispute had 
subsequently arisen over unpaid royalties claimed as due by the 
franchisor and contested by the franchisee.
The case brought in the German national courts by 
Pronuptia de Paris Gmbh against Mrs Schillgalis reached the 
Bundesgerichtshof. She had won her case in the court below, 
therefore avoiding the contractual obligation to pay royalties, by 
invoking article 85 of the Treaty of Rome and claiming that the 
contract was void for violation of a. 85(1).
However, before deciding the case, the Bundesgerichtshof 
(the Federal Court of Justice) decided to put a preliminary 
question to the Court of Justice by the procedure laid down in a. 
177 of the EEC Treaty on the way in which, if at all, a. 85 should 
be applied to this kind of franchising agreement.
The terms of the contract were approximately those I* 
described before: the franchisor granted the franchisee the right 
to use its trademark in a defined territory and promised to 
provide continuing assistance and advice to the franchisee on many
54
1aspects of running the business. The franchisor also agreed not to 
open a shop itself or by any other means supply third parties in 
the territory, nor to grant a trademark licence to anyone else in 
the territory.
The franchisee for her part promised to pay a 10% royalty 
on.all sales made, to use the trademark only in connection with 
the retail shop in the specified territory, to conduct business 
only from that specified retail shop, which was to conform to the 
specifications of the franchisor, to purchase at least 80% of 
stocks from the franchisor and the rest only from suppliers 
approved by it, to cooperate over advertising, including that 
giving recommended but not obligatory prices, not to compete with 
the franchisor anywhere in West Germany for one year after the end 
of the contract and not to assign the franchise without the 
franchisor's consent.
The Court held that most of the clauses in this, fairly 
typical, franchise contract, were inherent in the nature of 
franchising itself, which could not function without them. Since 
franchising was perceived as a useful and desirable commercial 
device, these clauses were held not even to violate a.85(1). 
However, territorial restrictions, in particular where combined 
with location clauses, that led to market division, as well as 
price-fixing, were found to be contrary to a.85(1), although it 
was suggested that a degree of territorial protection might be 
permitted in consequence of an exemption under a.85(3). Resale 
price maintenance was declared illegal, although recommended 
prices were not prohibited. Broadly speaking, the judgment came as 
a r.elief to franchisors, although some would have wished that it 
might have gone further in the direction of permitting vertical 
restraints than it did.
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This decision of the Court of Justice was perhaps 
surprising in that in the past it had often tended to interpret 
article 85(1) broadly in order to give the Commission the power to 
put pressure on the parties to the contract to change its terms in 
order to win from it an exemption under article 85(3). As a result 
of this decision, many franchise contracts were now beyond the 
control of the Commission.
(b)The proposed block exemption
Although the judgment was a step in the right direction, 
confirming as it did that franchising is " a good thing", it was 
cautious and narrowly confined, and it left many questions' 
unanswered. Even before judgment had been given the European 
Franchise Federation had asked that a block exemption be prepared. 
Three individual exemptions were granted and Commissioner" 
Sutherland indicated as early as March 1985 that a block exemption' 
could be expected in the near future.
In the Official Journal of 27th August 1987, a draft 
Regulation was published. Clearly an improvement on the Pronuptia- 
guidelines, of wider and automatic application, it would 
essentially, if enacted, exempt certain types of territorial 
restrictions in franchise agreements from the application of 
a.85(1); at the same time it takes the opportunity to give an 
explicitly non-exhaustive list of clauses which, when used in the 
context of a franchising agreement, will not normally fall within 
the prohibition in a. 85(1) at all.
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Despite a certain amount of discussion by Valenzine
6 0Korah regarding the existence of competence in the Commission to 
enact such a Regulation by virtue of Council Regulation No. 19/65, 
there is little real likelihood in practice of any official 
challenge being made to its validity, if and when it is eventually 
enacted and comes into force, and even less of such a challenge 
being successful in the European Court of Justice. Korah's main 
point is that, "all the reasons given by the Court in Pronuptia 
for holding that Reg. 67/67 does not apply to franchising apply 
equally to the vires for exempting exclusive distribution under 
Article 1(1)(a) of Regulation 19/65 which empowers the Commission 
to grant a group exemption for exclusive distribution and 
purchasing." This is true, but Korah has argued elsewhere*’*' that 
this reasoning is not convincing, so she is pointing to an 
inconsistency rather than to a blatant exceeding of the 
Commission's powers.
As mentioned earlier, the Commission takes the position 
that franchising is "a good thing" in economic terms, and with 
this in mind, it sets out to provide as favourable as possible a 
regime as it dares, under which franchisors may establish, develop 
and run their business format franchises, to which this regulation 
is confined: in other words, the Commission followed the Court's
lead in treating franchising more or less benevolently.
In the preamble to the regulation the advantages to be 
gained from franchising are listed: in paras. 7 and 8 the benefits 601
60. Franchising and the Draft Group Exemption 1987 European 
Competition Law Review 124 at 127.
61. Pronuptia; Franchising: The Marriage of reason and the EEC
Competition Rules 1986 European Intellectual Property Review 99 
at 101.
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to small and medium-sized enterprises and to independent traders, 
increased interbrand competition and benefits to consumers are 
mentioned.
Later come the limiting factors: in para, 10 it is
specified that the regulation cannot apply where competition will
be substantially eliminated and that parallel imports must remain
possible. It is apparently not contemplated that interbrand
competition alone might suffice, however fierce that might be.In
any case, by exempting even this limited degree of territorial
exclusivity, the Commission is accepting a division of the market:'
parallel importing of hamburgers, for example, is unlikely to be a-
profitable activity for any entrepreneur. This is in keeping with.
the usual obsessive protection by the EEC of parallel importers,
although in practice these are not likely to be very important in
the context of franchising networks since they cannot work with *
service franchises, and there is little to be gained from
6 2transporting cheap pizzas from one country to another
Turning to the body of the regulation, a.l defines its" 
scope, which will be examined in detail later in this 
chapter; a.1(4) allows the franchisor's functions to be delegated 
to a "master franchisee": this may be particularly important in' 
the context of the Common Market since the markets and therefore 62
62. This truth is recognised by Mr. Sutherland: in the address 
cited in note 9 he refers to the first two individual exemptions 
granted by the Commission to franchising contracts including 
territorial restrictions, saying that,"...the contracts do lead 
to a degree of market sharing between those involved...". He 
thus clearly recognises that in respect of many products ( in 
these instances, wedding dresses and cosmetics respectively) 
where transport costs are relatively high or the goods perishable 
- or for services - parallel trading is not a realistic 
possibility.
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the “commercial or technical assistance" required may vary 
considerably between one Member State and another, because of 
cultural and social differences. This provision enables a 
franchisor to employ a resident and indigenous agent to do the job 
in a particular country, for example.
As suggested in Pronuptia, an open exclusive territory is 
exempted by a.2(a),for a given area or all of the Common Market. 
The franchisor may agree not to “give the right to exploit all or 
part of the franchise to third parties” or to "exploit itself the 
franchise, or supply itself the goods or services which are the 
subject of the franchise under a similar formula".
The obligations allowed on the franchisee, on the other 
hand, are that he exploit the franchise "only from the contract 
premises" (a.2(b)) - this despite the fact that the Court in 
Pronuptia suggests that this is against a.85(1) only in 
combination with an exclusive territory, that is, when (a) and (b) 
are both present: it would seem more appropriate following
Pronuptia that (b) appear in the "white list" in a.3.
r
According to a.2, only "one or more" of the listed 
restrictions are required to be included. This would appear to 
suggest, for example, that complete territorial exclusivity is not 
necessary: restriction (c), which exempts "an obligation on the 
franchisee to sell the goods which are the subject of the 
franchise only to end users or to other franchisees, without 
prejudice to the right of the franchisee to resell them to third 
parties which may also obtain from other sources those goods for 
resale" alone, say, would be sufficient, and the territory in
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question could be allocated to a number of different 
franchisees^**.
Cross-delivery between franchisees must be allowed, as 
must delivery to and from approved dealers if the goods in 
question are also distributed through a selective distribution 
network. Maybe these "selective distributors" are the "third 
parties" referred to in a.2(c). Alternatively, perhaps these 
"third parties" are dealers who receive parallel imports. If so, 
if franchisees are to be properly protected, it is arguable that a" 
franchise system should not be combined, even outside the EEC,' 
with a selective distribution system, say. '■
The "white" and "black" lists will be described in detail 
later in this chapter: they list respectively clauses that do not 
usually fall within a.85(1) at all and those whose presence 
prevent an agreement from benefitting from the block exemption.
Similarly, franchisor guarantees must be honoured by all 
franchisees , regardless of where the product was first bought, 
and franchisees must be free to make investments in competing 
companies so long as this does not give them control of the 
company . It may be wondered whether this gives sufficient 
protection to the franchisor, particularly in the case of a 
private company. The temptation to pass on know-how may be great/-
"5 \  ' - 6345
63. Although there is apparently no reason why this should be 
considered undesirable, the Commission held in Junghans GmbH 1977 
OJ L30/10 that Reg.67/67 (the predecessor to Reg.83/83, the block 
exemption for exclusive distribution) could not apply when a 
territory was allotted to a limited number of dealers instead of- 
to a single dealer.
64. A.4(b).
65. A.4(c).
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a n d  i t  i s  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  t h i s  i s  o n e  way i n  which  t h e  C om m iss ion  
r e f u s e s  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r .
The e x e m p t i o n  may b e  w i t h d r a w n  i n  c e r t a i n  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  
e x a m p l e s  o f  w h i c h  a r e  g i v e n  i n  a . 8 . :  t h e  tw o  m os t  i m p o r t a n t  r e l a t e  
t o  t h e  s t a t e  o f  t h e  r e l e v a n t  m a r k e t ;  i f  t h e  c u m u l a t i v e  e f f e c t  o f  
s i m i l a r  n e t w o r k s  i s  t o  r e s t r i c t  c o m p e t i t i o n  i n  o r  a c c e s s  t o  t h a t  
m a r k e t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  o r  i f  f o r  some o t h e r  r e a s o n  t h e  g o o d s  in  
q u e s t i o n  do n o t  f a c e  s u f f i c i e n t  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  t h e  e x e m p t i o n  may be 
w i t h d r a w n .  H ow ever ,  i t  i s  n o t  c e r t a i n  w h e t h e r  t h i s  w o u ld  a p p l y  t o  
a n  - e s t a b l i s h e d  n e tw o r k  w h o se  p o s i t i o n  on  t h e  m a r k e t  c h an g e d  
b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  a c t i o n s  o f  new a r r i v a l s ,  o r  t h e  d i s a p p e a r a n c e  of  
c o m p e t i t o r s ,  o r  w h e t h e r  i t  w o u ld  o n l y  a f f e c t  new e n t r a n t s .
( c )  C h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  a n d  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  f r a n c h i s i n g
The f i r s t  q u e s t i o n  a d d r e s s e d  t o  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  in  
P r o n u p t i a  was :
" I s  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 1 )  o f  t h e  EEC T r e a t y  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  f r a n c h i s e  
a g r e e m e n t s  s u c h  a s  t h e  c o n t r a c t s  b e t w e e n  t h e  p a r t i e s ,  w h i c h  have  
a s  t h e i r  o b j e c t  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a  s p e c i a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  s y s t e m  
w hereby  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r  p r o v i d e s  t o  t h e  f r a n c h i s e e ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  
g o o d s ,  c e r t a i n  t r a d e  n a m e s ,  t r a d e - m a r k s ,  m e r c h a n d i s i n g  m a t e r i a l  
a n d  s e r v i c e s  ?"
The C o u r t  r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r ' s  a r g u m e n t s  b a s e d  on 
i n c r e a s e d  i n t e r b r a n d  c o m p e t i t i o n  w h ic h  c o u l d  n o t  o t h e r w i s e  be 
e s t a b l i s h e d ,  t h a t  i s ,  t h a t  t h e  s y s t e m  " r e i n f o r c e s  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r ' s  
c o m p e t i t i v e  p o w e r  a t  t h e  h o r i z o n t a l  l e v e l ,  t h a t  i s  t o  s a y ,  w i t h  
r e g a r d  t o  o t h e r  fo rm s  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  A r g u m e n t s  r e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e
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f a c i l i t a t i o n  o f  e n t r y  o n t o  t h e  m a r k e t  o f  many s m a l l , i n d e p e n d e n t  
e n t e r p r i s e s  a n d  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  made i t  p o s s i b l e  f o r  a  f r a n c h i s o r  
t o  c r e a t e  o u t l e t s  t h a t  w o u ld  n o t  o t h e r w i s e  e x i s t  were  a l s o  c i t e d .  
F i n a l l y ,  i t  was  c l a i m e d  by t h e  f r a n c h i s o r  t h a t  t h e s e  a d v a n t a g e s  
c o u l d  n o t  b e  o b t a i n e d  w i t h o u t  t h e  m i n i m a l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on 
c o m m e r c i a l  l i b e r t y  im p o sed  by a f r a n c h i s e  c o n t r a c t  o f  t h i s  s o r t .
The f r a n c h i s e e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  p l a c e d  h e a v y  e m p h a s i s  on t h e  
t e r r i t o r i a l  e x c l u s i v i t y  c o n f e r r e d  by t h e  c o n t r a c t s ,  a n d  on  the* 
f a c t  t h a t  P r o n u p t i a  i t s e l f  c l a i m e d  t o  be t h e  w o r l d ' s  l e a d i n g  
F r e n c h  s u p p l i e r  o f  w ed d in g  d r e s s e s  an d  a c c e s s o r i e s .
F i r s t ,  t h e  C o u r t  s t a t e d  t h a t  f r a n c h i s i n g  c o n t r a c t s  c o u l d '  
n o t  be j u d g e d  " i n  a b s t r a c t o "  b u t  t h a t  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l  c l a u s e s  had* 
t o  be c o n s i d e r e d ,  w h ich  s e e m s  o b v i o u s  e n o u g h .  As B u r s t  a n d  Kovar* 
s o  s u c c i n c t l y  e x p r e s s  i t ,  i t  h a s  o f t e n  b e e n  c o n s i d e r e d  " q u e  l é  
c o n t r a t  d e  f r a n c h i s e  s e  c a r a c t é r i s a i t  p r é c i s é m e n t  p a r  son'  
h é t é r o g é n é i t é "  , and  i t  was h a r d l y  t o  b e  e x p e c t e d  t h a t  t h e  w h o le  
r e a l m  o f  f r a n c h i s i n g  be  d e a l t  w i t h  by o n e  a l l - e n c o m p a s s i n g  r u l e .
I n s t e a d  o f  t a k i n g  a  t r a d i t i o n a l  a p p r o a c h  an d  a d d r e s s i n g  
t h e  s o r t s  o f  a r g u m e n t s  p u t  f o r w a r d  by t h e  f r a n c h i s e e ,  t h e  C o u r t ,  
a p p a r e n t l y  d e c i d i n g  t o  s t a r t  a f r e s h ,  a n d ,  a v o i d i n g  a n y  a t t e m p t  t o  
g i v e  a c o m p r e h e n s i v e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  " f r a n c h i s i n g "  i t s e l f , *  
c h a r a c t e r i s e d  i t  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g ,  r a t h e r  s w e e p i n g  s t a t e m e n t :
" R a t h e r  t h a n  a  m e th o d  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  i t  i s  a way f o r  a n * 
u n d e r t a k i n g  t o  d e r i v e  f i n a n c i a l  b e n e f i t  f r o m  i t s  e x p e r t i s e  w i t h o u t  
i n v e s t i n g  i t s  own c a p i t a l . M o r e o v e r ,  t h e  s y s t e m  g i v e s  t r a d e r s  who 
d o  n o t  h a v e  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  e x p e r i e n c e  a c c e s s  t o  m e th o d s  w h i c h  t h e y '  6
6 6 .  La M a r i é e  e s t  en  B l a n c  1986  G a z e t t e  du  P a l a i s  392.
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c o u l d  n o t  h a v e  l e a r n e d  w i t h o u t  c o n s i d e r a b l e  e f f o r t  a n d  a l l o w s  them 
t o  b e n e f i t  f r o m  t h e  r e p u t a t i o n  o f  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r ’ s  b u s i n e s s  
n a m e . . « Such  a  s y s t e m , w h i c h  a l l o w s  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r  t o  p r o f i t  from 
h i s  s u c c e s s ,  d o e s  n o t  i n  i t s e l f  i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  c o m p e t i t i o n . . . ” fmy 
u n d e r l i n i n g ) .
One comment may b e  made i m m e d i a t e l y :  f i r s t ,  some r e c e n t  
6  7r e s e a r c h  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  i t  c a n  be c h e a p e r  f o r  f r a n c h i s e e s  t o  
o b t a i n  c a p i t a l  f rom  t h e  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  t h a n  t o  s e t  up  a f r a n c h i s e  
n e t w o r k  a n d  i t  i s  n o t  by  a n y  means  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t  h a s  any  
goo d  e v i d e n c e  f o r  d e s c r i b i n g  f r a n c h i s i n g  i n  t h i s  way; i t  h a s  b e en  
s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  r e d u c t i o n  i n  m o n i t o r i n g  c o s t s  i s  a  much s t r o n g e r  
i n c e n t i v e  t o  u s e  f r a n c h i s i n g  t h a n  d i f f i c u l t y  o r  e x p e n s e  o f  r a i s i n g  
c a p i t a l .  T h i s  i s  i m p o r t a n t ,  s i n c e  i f  i t  c o u l d  be  shown t h a t  a  f i r m  
c o u l d  i n t e g r a t e  v e r t i c a l l y  a s  e a s i l y  a s  i t  c o u l d  f r a n c h i s e  
i n d e p e n d e n t  r e t a i l e r s ,  t h e  i n d i s p e n s a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i o n  o f  a . 8 5 ( 3 )  
w o u ld  n o t  b e  s a t i s f i e d :  n o t  o n l y  w o u ld  i n d i v i d u a l  e x e m p t i o n s  n o t  
be  j u s t i f i e d ,  b u t  a f o r t i o r i  a  b l o c k  e x e m p t i o n  w ould  n o t  be  v a l i d ,  
g i v e n  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a  v i a b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e .
I n  t h e  same p a r a g r a p h  t h e  C o u r t  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  f r a n c h i s i n gp-
f r o m  a g r e e m e n t s  " w h ich  i n c o r p o r a t e  a p p r o v e d  r e t a i l e r s  i n t o  a 
s e l e c t i v e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  s y s t e m " ,  p e r h a p s  s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  
f r a n c h i s e e s  t e n d  t o  b e  new e n t r a n t s  t o  t h e  m a r k e t  a s  o p p o s e d  t o  
e s t a b l i s h e d  r e t a i l e r s .  T h i s  may w e l l  b e  t r u e  o n  t h e  w h o le  i n  t h e  
EEC, b u t  i s  n o t  a l w a y s  t h e  c a s e ,  a s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  when f r a n c h i s e s  
a r e  g i v e n  t o  d e p a r t m e n t  s t o r e s .
T h i s  way o f  l o o k i n g  a t  f r a n c h i s i n g  p r e s e n t s  i t  a s  a  fo rm  
o f  q u a s i  i n t e l l e c t u a l  p r o p e r t y :  t h a t  i s ,  i t  i s  s e e n  a s  t h e  way i n  67
6 7 .  See  R u b i n  P . H .  o p . c i t . ( n o t e  6 ) .
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w h i c h  a f r a n c h i s o r  r e a p s  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  s o m e t h i n g  t h a t  b e l o n g s  t o  
h im ,  much i n  t h e  way t h a t  he  m i g h t  e x p l o i t  a p a t e n t  o r  t r a d e m a r k ,  
s a y .  In  e s s e n c e ,  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  i s  i n v e n t i n g  a new k i n d  o f  
i n t e l l e c t u a l  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t ,  j u s t  a s  i t  h a s  i n v e n t e d  t h e  c o n c e p t  
o f  "know-how" a s  a p r o t e c t a b l e  k i n d  o f  p r o p e r t y ;  on e  c a n  be 
f o r g i v e n  f o r  w o n d e r i n g  i f  t h e r e  a r e  any  l i m i t s  t o  w ha t  i t  may 
i n v e n t  i n  t h i s  f i e l d  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  One m i g h t  a l m o s t  e x p e c t  t h e  
C o u r t  t o  go  on t o  s a y  t h a t  EEC la w  would  n o t  i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  t h e  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  e x p e r t i s e ,  b u t  w ou ld  i n t e r v e n e  t o  c o n t r o l  i t s  
e x p l o i t a t i o n  o r  e x e r c i s e  . On t h i s  b a s i s  o n e  c o u l d  a l s o  be 
f o r g i v e n  f o r  e x p e c t i n g  t h e  C o u r t  t o  go on  t o  a p p l y  by a n a l o g y  t h e  
r u l e s  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  p a t e n t  l i c e n c e s .  However-, no  su ch  p a r a l l e l  i s  
d r a w n ,  b e y o n d  t h i s  i n d i r e c t  a n d  i m p l i c i t  a l l u s i o n  q u o t e d  a b o v e ,  
n o r  i s  f r a n c h i s i n g  c o m p a r e d  w i t h  e x c l u s i v e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  s y s t e m s :  
i n s t e a d  t h e  C o u r t  g o e s  o n  t o  t r e a t  i t  a s  s u i  g e n e r i s ,  p u r p o r t i n g  
t o  r e a s o n  f ro m  f i r s t  p r i n c i p l e s .
S u ch  a  way o f  l o o k i n g  a t  f r a n c h i s e  n e t w o r k s  -  t h a t  i s ,  a s  
a  k i n d  o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l  p r o p e r y  l i c e n c e  -  i s  p e r h a p s  t h e  m o s t  a p t  
i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  w h a t  t h e  C o u r t  c a l l e d  " p r o d u c t i o n  f r a n c h i s e s " ,  when- 
t h e y  may b e  c o m p a r e d  t o  a  s e r i e s  o f  p a t e n t  l i c e n c e s ,  " s e r v i c e  
f r a n c h i s i n g " ,  a n d  t h e  k i n d  o f  " d i s t r i b u t i o n  f r a n c h i s e "  i n  w h ic h  
t h e  f r a n c h i s e e  s e l l s  g o o d s  s e l e c t e d  by t h e  f r a n c h i s o r .  H o w e v e r ,  
when t h e  f r a n c h i s e e  i s  s e l l i n g  g o o d s  p r o d u c e d  by t h e  f r a n c h i s o r  
h i m s e l f ,  t h e  n e t w o r k  i s  c l e a r l y ,  i n  e c o n o m i c  t e r m s ,  n o t h i n g  more 
o r  l e s s  t h a n  a d i s t r i b u t i o n  m e t h o d .  T h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  r e s u l t s  f rom 
t h e  f a c t  t h a t ,  i n  t h e  l a t t e r  c a s e ,  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  t h e  68
6 8 .  T h i s  i s  a  r a t h e r  u n h e l p f u l  d i s t i n c t i o n  u s e d  by t h e  C o u r t  i n  
c a s e s  s u c h  a s  P a r k e - D a v i s  v .  P r o b e l  1968 ECR 55 t o  d e s c r i b e  t h e  
e x t e n t  o f  t h e  E E C 's  c o m p e t e n c e  t o  r u l e  t h r o u g h  f r e e  m ovem ent  o f  
g o o d s  law o n  i n t e l l e c t u a l  p r o p e r t y  m a t t e r s .
o r  o rp o s s i b i l i t y  o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a f r a n c h i s e  n e tw o rk  
" i n t e g r a t i n g  v e r t i c a l l y "  -  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r e r  c o u l d  r e s o r t  t o  some 
a l t e r n a t i v e  m e th o d  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  w h e r e a s  i n  t h e  o t h e r  c a s e s  he  
w o u l d  i n s t e a d  b e  l e f t  o n l y  w i t h  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  o f ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  
t r y i n g  t o  l i c e n s e  h i s  know-how o r  t r a d e m a r k  o r  e v e n  r u n n i n g  
t r a i n i n g  c o u r s e s  f o r  w h i c h  he  c o u l d  c h a r g e  f e e s .  I t  s h o u l d  be  
n o t i c e d  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t  i n  P r o n u p t i a  e x p r e s s l y  r e f u s e d  t o  r u l e  on 
w h a t  i t  c a l l e d  " i n d u s t r i a l  f r a n c h i s i n g "  an d  t h e  C om m iss ion  i n  i t s  
d r a f t  b l o c k  e x e m p t i o n  e x c l u d e d  p r o d u c t i o n  f r a n c h i s e s  f ro m  t h e  
a m b i t  o f  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n ,  a p p a r e n t l y  b e c a u s e  i t  saw t h a t  a s  m ore  
a k i n  t o  i n t e l l e c t u a l  p r o p e r t y  l i c e n s i n g .  Yet  t h e  way i n  w h ic h  t h e  
C o u r t  e x p r e s s e s  i t s e l f  h e r e  so u n d s  a s  t h o u g h  i t  w a n t s  t o  
c h a r a c t e r i s e  a l l  f r a n c h i s i n g  a s  a k i n d  o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l  p r o p e r t y  
l i c e n s i n g .
I n  an y  c a s e ,  t h e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  f r a n c h i s i n g  i n  g e n e r a l  
p r o v i d e d  a s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  f o r  t h e  n o v e l  a p p r o a c h  t h a t  was t a k e n .  
A f t e r  a l l ,  had  t h e  C o u r t  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  t h e  P r o n u p t i a  n e t w o r k  a s  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  fo r m  o f  s e l e c t i v e  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  w o u ld  h a v e  a p p l i e d .  I n s t e a d  i t  t o o k  t h e  o p p o s i t e  
c o u r s e ,  an d  m ore  o r  l e s s  i n v e n t e d  a  new k i n d  o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l  
p r o p e r t y  deem ed  w o r t h y  o f  e x p l i c i t  l e g a l  p r o t e c t i o n .  L e g a l l y ,  i t  
w o u l d  s u r e l y  h a v e  b e e n  much n e a t e r  t o  h a v e  a p p l i e d  t h e  e x i s t i n g  
r u l e s ,  i n s t e a d  o f  s t a r t i n g  a f r e s h  w i t h  f r a n c h i s i n g .  T h i s  i s  t h e  
f i r s t  a n d  c h i e f  i n s t a n c e  i n  t h e  ju d g m e n t  w h e r e  t h e  C o u r t  m akes  a 
d e l i b e r a t e  p o l i c y  c h o i c e  -  i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t o  g i v e  f r a n c h i s i n g  t h e  
s p e c i a l  a n d  i n  many ways p r i v i l e g e d  s t a t u s  o f  a new k i n d  o f  
p r o p e r t y  r i g h t ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  j u d g i n g  i t  b y  t h e  s t r i c t  r u l e s  
a p p l y i n g ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  t o  s e l e c t i v e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  n e t w o r k s  and  t h e  
c a r  i n d u s t r y .
Adams a n d  M e n d e l s o h n  s a y  o f  f r a n c h i s i n g  a l m o s t  i n  t h e  
s am e  b r e a t h  t h a t  i t  i s  "a  m a r k e t i n g  m e th o d "  a n d  t h a t  i t
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" f ro m  a l e g a l  p o i n t  o f  v i e w ,  i s  s i m p l y  a  p a r t i c u l a r  fo r m  o f  t h e
l i c e n s i n g  o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s .  T r a d e m a r k s ,  t r a c e
nam es ,  c o p y r i g h t s ,  d e s i g n s ,  p a t e n t s ,  t r a d e  s e c r e t s  a n d  know-how-
may a l l  be  i n v o l v e d  i n  d i f f e r e n t  m i x t u r e s  i n  t h e  " p a c k a g e ” t o  be
l i c e n s e d .  I n  s t r u c t u r i n g  f r a n c h i s e  p a c k a g e s  o t h e r  a r e a s  o f  law"
a l s o  become r e l e v a n t ,  e . g .  c o m p e t i t i o n  ( o r  a n t i t r u s t )  l a w ,  company
69l a w . . . l a n d l o r d  a n d  t e n a n t  l a w . ”
T h i s  i s  an  i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  i s  o f  l i t t l e  
r e a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  t o  s a y  a s  t h e  C o u r t  d o e s  t h a t  f r a n c h i s i n g  i s  n o t : 
a  d i s t r i b u t i o n  m e th o d  b u t  a m e an s  o f  e x p l o i t i n g  p r o p e r t y ,  f o r  some '  
e m i n e n t  c o m m e n t a t o r s ,  i f  t h e y  do n o t  u s e  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n s  
i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y ,  c e r t a i n l y  do  n o t  c o n s i d e r  t h a t  t h e  one  e x c l u d e s  
t h e  o t h e r :  h o w e v e r  t h e  C o u r t  u s e s  t h e  t e r m s  t o  d i s g u i s e  i t s  p o l i c y  
c h o i c e  a s  t h e  i n e v i t a b l e  r e s u l t  o f  a n  i n e x o r a b l e  l i n e  o f  l e g a l -  
r e a s o n i n g .
S a y i n g ,  a f t e r  d e s c r i b i n g  f r a n c h i s i n g  i n  p o s i t i v e  t e r m s , "  
t h a t  "S u ch  a s y s t e m ,  w h ic h  a l l o w s  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r  t o  p r o f i t  f rom  
h i s  s u c c e s s ,  d o e s  n o t  i n  i t s e l f  i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  c o m p e t i t i o n ” c a n  
o n l y  be u n d e r s t o o d  a s  m e a n i n g  t h a t  i t  d o e s  n o t  i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  
c o m p e t i t i o n  t o  a n  u n d e s i r a b l e  e x t e n t .  The  C o u r t  m i g h t  e q u a l l y  
c o n v i n c i n g l y  f r o m  a l e g a l  s t a n d p o i n t  -  b u t  maybe more  - 
o b j e c t i o n a b l y  e c o n o m i c a l l y - s p e a k i n g  -  h a v e  c o n c l u d e d  r e g r e t f u l l y -  
t h a t  t h e s e  v e r t i c a l  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  h i n d e r i n g  a s  t h e y  do i n t r a b r a n d ^  
c o m p e t i t i o n ,  w e r e  c l e a r l y  p r o h i b i t e d  by a . 8 5 ( 1 )  a n d  t h a t  a n y -  
a r g u m e n t s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  e c o n o m i c  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  s u c h  a s y s t e m '  
c o u l d  be r e l e v a n t  o n l y ,  i f  a t  a l l ,  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  a . 8 5 ( 3 ) .  69
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W h eth e r  t h i s  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  f r a n c h i s i n g  a s  n o t  f a l l i n g  
w i t h i n  a . 8 5 ( 1 )  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  a s  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o r  f u r t h e r  
d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  a " r u l e  o f  r e a s o n " ,  h o w ev er  t h a t  may b e  d e f i n e d , i s  
n o t ,  a s  I h a v e  a l r e a d y  s a i d ,  my c o n c e r n  h e r e ,  f o r  t h a t  g o e s  t o  t h e  
fo rm  of  t h e  d e c i s i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  i t s  m o t i v a t i o n .  What i s  i m p o r t a n t  
i s  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t ,  d e p a r t i n g  r a d i c a l l y  f rom  a l e g a l i s t i c  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  a . 8 5 ( l ) ' s  p r o h i b i t i o n ,  was  l e d  t o  a l l o w  a l l  
s o r t s  o f  r e s t r i c t i v e  c o n t r a c t  c l a u s e s  w h i c h ,  u n d e r  i t s  p r e v i o u s  
a p p r o a c h ,  w o u ld  h a v e  b e e n  d e c l a r e d  v o i d  and  r e f u s e d  a n  e x e m p t i o n ,  
r e g a r d l e s s  o f  c o g e n t  a r g u m e n t s  b a s e d  o n  e c o n o m i c s  o f  t h e  k i n d  p u t
■ , . 70
f o r w a r d  e v e n  a s  l o n g  a g o  a s  1966  i n  C o n s t e n  v .  G r u n d i g
T u r n i n g  now t o  t h e  p r o p o s e d  r e g u l a t i o n ,  t h e  p r e a m b l e  
d e s c r i b e s  f r a n c h i s i n g  a g r e e m e n t s  a s  c o n s i s t i n g  " e s s e n t i a l l y  o f  
l i c e n s e s  o f  i n t a n g i b l e  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  c o n c e r n i n g  t r a d e m a r k s  o r  
s i g n s  and  know-how, w h i c h  c a n  be c o m b in e d  w i t h  r e s t r i c t i o n s  
r e l a t i n g  t o  s u p p l y  o r  p u r c h a s e "  [my u n d e r l i n i n g ] .  Here  we f i n d  t h e  
C om m iss ion  e c h o i n g  t h e  C o u r t ' s  e m p h a s i s  on  t h e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  
p r o p e r t y  a n a l o g y  a s  o p p o s e d  t o  t h e  s y s t e m  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  a n a l o g y .
, I t  i s  o f  f u n d a m e n t a l  i m p o r t a n c e  t o  b e  s u r e  o f  t h e  e x a c t
s c o p e  o f  t h e  R e g u l a t i o n ,  s i n c e ,  a s  i s  a l w a y s  t h e  c a s e  w i t h  b l o c k  
e x e m p t i o n s ,  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  f a l l i n g  o u t s i d e  i t s  t e r m s  a r e  v e r y  
s e r i o u s .  I n  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e  i t  i s  a l l  t h e  m ore  i m p o r t a n t  
s i n c e  i n  many ways  ( s e e  l a t e r )  t h e  r e g i m e  a l l o w e d  by  t h e  
r e g u l a t i o n  i s  much l e s s  s t r i c t  t h a n ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  r u l e s  on  t h e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  m o to r  v e h i c l e s  an d  s p a r e  p a r t s  a n d  t h o s e  on 
e x c l u s i v e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i n c l u d i n g  t h a t  o f  b e e r  a n d  p e t r o l .  H o w ev e r ,  
t h e  s c o p e  i s  by  no m ean s  c l e a r l y  d e f i n e d ,  a s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
e x a m i n a t i o n  i l l u s t r a t e s . 70
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A f i r s t  and  o b v i o u s  p o i n t  t o  make i s  t h a t  t h e  s c o p e  o f  
t h e  R e g u l a t i o n ,  t h o u g h  o f  c o u r s e  c o n s i d e r a b l y  w id e r  t h a n  t h a t  o f  
t h e  ju d g m e n t  g i v e n  i n  P r o n u p t i a , i s  n a r r o w :  i t  i n c l u d e s  o n l y  
f r a n c h i s e s  a c c o r d e d  t o  o n e  p a r t y  ( t h e  " f r a n c h i s o r " )  t o  o n e  o t h e r  
p a r t y  ( t h e  " f r a n c h i s e e " )  -  a . 1 ( 2 ) ( a ) ,  i n  r e t u r n  f o r  " f i n a n c i a l  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
The " f r a n c h i s e "  w h i c h  t h e  f r a n c h i s e e  g a i n s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  
e x p l o i t  i n  r e t u r n  f o r  s u c h  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  i s  d e f i n e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  a-:
" p a c k a g e  o f  i n t a n g i b l e  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t r a d e m a r k s ;  
t r a d e  n a m e s ,  s h o p  s i g n s ,  u t i l i t y  m o d e l s ,  d e s i g n s ,  c o p y r i g h t s ,  
know-how- o r  p a t e n t s ,  t o  b e  e x p l o i t e d  f o r  t h e  r e s a l e  o f  g o o d s  o r  
t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  s e r v i c e s  t o  e n d  u s e r s  a n d  w h ich  i n c l u d e s  a t  
l e a s t :
3
- t h e  u s e  o f  a common name o r  s i g n  an d  a  u n i f o r m  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  
c o n t r a c t  p r e m i s e s ,
- t h e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  by t h e  f r a n c h i s o r  t o  t h e  f r a n c h i s e e  o f  a 
s u b s t a n t i a l  know-how c a p a b l e  o f  c o n f e r r i n g  a  c o m p e t i t i v e  a d v a n t a g e  
o n  t h e  l a t t e r ,  a n d  *
t h e  c o n t i n u o u s  p r o v i s i o n  b y  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r  t o  t h e  f r a n c h i s e e  o f  
c o m m e r c i a l  o r  t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t a n c e  d u r i n g  t h e  l i f e  o f  t h é  
a g r e e m e n t .
T h e s e  minimum r e q u i r e m e n t s  ( " a t  l e a s t " )  am ount  t o  t h é  
n e c e s s i t y  f o r  t h e  u s e  o f  a  c o m m e r c i a l  " i d e n t i t y "  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  a 
name o r  s i g n  a n d  i n  t h e  a p p e a r a n c e  o f  t h e  o u t l e t s ,  an d  t h e  i n i t i a l  
a n d  c o n t i n u i n g  a s s i s t a n c e  o f  t h e  f r a n c h i s e e  by  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r  i n  
r u n n i n g  h i s  o u t l e t .
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The r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  t h e  R e g u l a t i o n ' s  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  r e t a i l  
o u t l e t s  ( " e n d  u s e r s " )  b e t r a y s  a c a u t i o u s n e s s  which i s  p r c o a b l y  
d u e  t o  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  t h e  l i m i t i n g  o f  t h e  freedom o f  a c t i o n  of 
r e t a i l  o u t l e t s  i s  l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  harm c o m p e t i t i o n  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
t h a n  l i m i t a t i o n s  a t t a c h i n g  t o  w h o l e s a l e r s ,  who w i l l  by d e f i n i t i o n  
a l r e a d y  be  f e w e r  i n  number.  Had t h e  Commission been mere 
e x p e r i e n c e d  i n  t h i s  f i e l d  i t  might have f e l t  c o n f i d e n t  enough t o  
e x t e n d  t h i s  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  ex em p t io n ;  t h e  same may be s a i d  abou t  
t h e  e x c l u s i o n  o f  " i n d u s t r i a l  f r a n c h i s e s " ,  and t h i s  c r e a t e s  
p r o b l e m s  o f  d e f i n i t i o n  a l r e a d y  a l l u d e d  t o :  can a f a s t  fcoc  
f r a n c h i s e  be s e e n  a s  p r e d o m i n a n t l y  an i n d u s t r i a l  f r a n c h i s e  i n  the  
s e n s e  t h a t  i t  t r a n s f e r s  ( t e c h n i c a l )  know-hew e n a b l i n g  th e  
f r a n c h i s e e  t o  m a n u f a c t u r e  a hamburger to  p r e c i s e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s ?  
I t  w ould  be  s t r e t c h i n g  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  t o  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e  f r a n c h i s e  
c o n s i s t e d  e s s e n t i a l l y  o f  t h e  a c t i v i t y  o f  p r o v i d i n g  s e r v i c e s , 
e s p e c i a l l y  i f  t h e  fo o d  was t o  be taken  away r a t h e r  th a n  e a t e n  or. 
t h e  p r e m i s e s ,  a n d  i t  i s  c e r t a i n l y  not t h e  " r e s a l e "  of g o o d s .
The f r a n c h i s e  i s  r e q u i r e d  to  be g r a n t e d  f o r  " f i n a n c i a l  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n "  an d  t h i s  e x p r e s s i o n  i s  r e p r o d u c e d  in  a .  1(2} ( a ) .  I t  
i s  n o t  c l e a r  w h e t h e r  t h i s  means t h a t  a lump sum i s  n e c e s s a r y  -  
v e r y  o f t e n  t h e r e  i s  no s u c h  sum demanded , but p r e s u m a b ly  a 
p r o v i s i o n  f o r  r o y a l t i e s  on a f i x e d  p e r c e n t a g e  b a s i s  would be 
s u f f i c i e n t .  H o w ev e r ,  a s  h a s  a l s o  been m e n t io n e d ,  i t  can happen  
t h a t  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r ' s  p r o f i t  i s  i n c lu d e d  i n  t h e  p r i c e  t h a t  he 
c h a r g e s  t o  h i s  f r a n c h i s e e s  when he s e l l s  h i s  m erch an d is e  t o  them 
w h o l e s a l e .  Would t h i s  be  " f i n a n c i a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n " ?  A l though  i t  i s  
d e s i r a b l e  t h a t  t h e  R e g u l a t i o n  be d r a f t e d  t o  a l l o w  a s  much 
f l e x i b i l i t y  a s  p o s s i b l e  t o  f r a n c h i s o r s  i t  may be t h a t  i n  t h i s  c a s e  
a  good  a r g u m e n t  c o u l d  be made f o r  th e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  p r o f i t  
b e i n g  t a k e n  by  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r  being made e x p l i c i t  t o  th e  
f r a n c h i s e e  -  a l t h o u g h  t h i s  c o u ld  a lways be c i r c u m v e n t e d  by t h e  
i m p o s i t i o n  o f  a  p u r e l y  n o m in a l  c h a r g e .
69
The i d e a  o f  "know -how "  i s  o f  c r u c i a l  i m p o r t a n c e  b e c a u s e  
i t  seems t o  h a v e  b e e n  s e i z e d  u p o n  by t h e  C o m m iss io n  an d  C o u r t  a s  
t h e  f u n d a m e n t a l  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  f r a n c h i s i n g :  a s  
h a s  a l r e a d y  b e e n  d i s c u s s e d ,  i t  h a s  b e e n  e l e v a t e d  t o  t h e  s t a t u s  o f  
a new t y p e  o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l  p r o p e r t y .  A r t i c l e  4 (d )  o f  t h e  d r a f t  
r e g u l a t i o n  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  t h e  know-how i n v o l v e d  be d e s c r i b e d  i n .  
d e t a i l ,  i n  w r i t i n g .
The t e r m  " s u b s t a n t i a l "  know-how i s  u n c l e a r ,  a l t h o u g h  i t  
i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  C o u r t  a n d  C o m m i s s i o n ’ s  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  t h e .  
e s s e n c e  o f  f r a n c h i s i n g  b e i n g  i n  t h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  c e r t a i n  m a r k e t ,  
know-how: p r e s u m a b l y  i t  i s  i n t e n d e d  t o  p r e v e n t  a b u s e  o f  t h e
R e g u l a t i o n  by t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  a g r e e m e n t s  ( f o r  
c a r s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ) ,  w h i c h  m i g h t  " a r t i f i c i a l l y "  be  made t o  come 
w i t h i n  t h e  t e r m s  o f  t h e  e x e m p t i o n ,  a n d  i n  w h i c h  o n l y  " t o k e n "  know­
how i s  t r a n s f e r r e d ,  b u t  t h e  t e r m  i s  c l e a r l y  a m b ig u o u s  a s  i f  
s t a n d s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e r e  may b e  much a r g u m e n t  o v e r  w h e t h e r  t h e  
know-how i s  " c a p a b l e "  o f  c o n f e r r i n g  a c o m p e t i t i v e  a d v a n t a g e :  t h i s -  
may w e l l  v a r y  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  p o s s e s s e d  by  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  f r a n c h i s e e .  P e r h a p s  a n  " i n t e n t i o n "  t o  c o n f e r  s u c h  an.  
a d v a n t a g e  w o u ld  b e  a b e t t e r  c r i t e r i o n  -  a l t h o u g h  s u b j e c t i v e  
c r i t e r i a  r e l a t i n g  t o  s t a t e  o f  m in d  b r i n g  t h e i r  own d i f f i c u l t i e s .
The  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  "know -how  i s  a l s o  p r o b l e m a t i c :  a much.
f u l l e r  a n d  c l e a r e r  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  g i v e n  i n  t h e  d r a f t  b lock .
71e x e m p t i o n  f o r  know-how l i c e n s i n g  . I t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  a f f i r m  t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  i t  i s  o f t e n  t h e  e x a c t  c o m p i l a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  
r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  p i e c e s  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  t h e m s e l v e s  w h ic h  
a r e  s e c r e t .  I t  s h o u l d  a l s o  b e  made c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  u n a u t h o r i s e d .  71
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d i s c l o s u r e  o f  know-how t o  t h e  p u b l i c  d o e s  n o t  p r e v e n t  i t s  
c o n t i n u i n g  p r o t e c t i o n .
As h a s  a l r e a d y  b e e n  s t a t e d ,  i t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  t h e  
s c o p e  o f  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n  b e  c l e a r :  i f  t h e  C om m iss ion  i n s i s t s  on 
b u i l d i n g  s e p a r a t e  p i g e o n h o l e s  f o r  e a c h  t y p e  o f  a g r e e m e n t  r a t h e r  
t h a n  r e l y i n g  on  a u n i f o r m  s e t  o f  p r i n c i p l e s  t h a t  a p p l y  t o  a l l  
c o n t r a c t s ,  i t  i s  i m p e r a t i v e  t h a t  i t  make t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  
d i v i s i o n s  c l e a r .  S i n c e  i t  i s  c o n c e i v a b l e  t h a t  t h o s e  s u p p l i e r s  who 
a r e  c u r r e n t l y  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  o l d e r  r e g u l a t i o n s  m ig h t  t r y  t o  b r i n g  
t h e m s e l v e s  w i t h i n  t h i s  new ,  m o re  a d v a n t a g e o u s  e x e m p t i o n ,  i t  i s  o f  
t h e  u t m o s t  i m p o r t a n c e  t h a t  t h i s  i s  p r e v e n t e d  -  u n l e s s  i t  i s  a 
r e s u l t  t h a t  t h e  C o m m is s io n  d e s i r e s ,  i n  w h ic h  c a s e  i t  i s  s t i l l  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  d e f i n e  t h e  b o u n d a r i e s  c l e a r l y .  The a s s o c i a t i o n  
r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  I t a l i a n  c a r  d i s t r i b u t o r s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  h a s  made 
f o r m a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  a b o u t  i t s  w o r r i e s  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  known t o  
t h e  C o m m is s io n .  A n o t h e r  p a r t i c u l a r  r e a s o n  f o r  c l a r i f y i n g  t h i s  
m a t t e r  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  s u g g e s t e d  i n  t h e  p r e a m b l e  t h a t  i n d u s t r i a l  
f r a n c h i s e s  may b e n e f i t  f r o m  t h e  b l o c k  e x e m p t i o n s  r e l a t i n g  t o  
p a t e n t  o r  know-how l i c e n c e s ,  b u t ,  a t  t h e  sam e t i m e  p a r a . 16 o f  t h e  
P r e a m b l e  p r e v e n t s  a g r e e m e n t s  t h a t  f a l l  u n d e r  t h e  p r e s e n t  
R e g u l a t i o n  f ro m  b e n e f i t i n g  f r o m  an y  o t h e r  b l o c k  e x e m p t i o n .  T h i s  i s  
n o t  t a k e n  up  a g a i n  i n  t h e  bod y  o f  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n ,  and i t  i s  n o t  a t  
a l l  c l e a r  w ha t  i t s  e x a c t  e f f e c t  may b e .  Nor i s  i t  c l e a r  why i t  was 
n o t  s t a t e d  t h a t  a g r e e m e n t s  t h a t  f a l l  u n d e r  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  r e g i m e  
e s t a b l i s h e d  by a n o t h e r  b l o c k  e x e m p t i o n  ( s u c h  a s  t h o s e  e s t a b l i s h e d  
f o r  c a r s  a n d  p u b l i c  h o u s e s )  s h o u l d  n o t  b e n e f i t  from t h a t  f o r  
f r a n c h i s i n g . The  g r o w i n g  c o m p l e x i t y  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  s y s t e m  f o r  v e r t i c a l  r e s t r a i n t s  seem s  t o  b e  l e a d i n g  
i t  i n t o  d e e p e r  a n d  d e e p e r  w a t e r .
B e f o r e  l e a v i n g  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  o f  
f r a n c h i s e  c o n t r a c t s ,  i t  s h o u l d  be m e n t i o n e d  t h a t  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o
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7 2t h e  s e c o n d  q u e s t i o n  p o s e d  t o  i t  i n  P r o n u p t i a  t h e  C o u r t  d e c i d e d  
t h a t  t h e  b l o c k  e x e m p t i o n  6 7 / 6 7  d i d  n o t  a p p l y  t o  t h e  c o n t r a c t s  i n  
q u e s t i o n ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  e l e m e n t s  o f  e x c l u s i v e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  p r e s e n t .  
I t  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  e m p h a s i s  i n  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t s  t o  
w h i c h  Reg .  6 7 / 6 7  i s  on o b l i g a t i o n s  o f  s u p p l y  a n d  p u r c h a s e  r a t h e r  
t h a n  on t h e  u s e  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  b u s i n e s s  s y m b o l ,  s p e c i f i c  b u s i n e s s  
m e t h o d s  a n d  t h e  p a y m en t  o f  r o y a l t i e s .  H o w ev e r ,  i f  t h e  c l a u s e s  t h a t  
t a k e  i t  o u t s i d e  Reg.  6 7 / 6 7  a r e  s a i d  a t  t h e  same t i m e  n o t  t o  
i n f r i n g e  a . 8 5 ( l )  i t  i s  h a r d  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  how t h e y  can  h a v e  t h i s  
e f f e c t .
The  s e c o n d  r e a s o n  g i v e n  i s  t h a t  t h e  e x e m p t i o n  i s  s t a t e d  
o n l y  t o  a p p l y  t o  e x c l u s i v e  d e a l i n g  a g r e e m e n t s ,  T h i r d l y ,  t h e  
a b s e n c e  o f  a n y  m e n t i o n  i n  t h e  R e g u l a t i o n  o f  o b l i g a t i o n s  t h a t  may 
b e  im p o s e d  on  t h e  s u p p l i e r  a n d  f o u r t h l y  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  any  
r e f e r e n c e  t o  o t h e r  c l a u s e s  s u c h  a s  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  p a y  r o y a l t i e s  
a p p a r e n t l y  l e d  t h e  C o u r t  t o  c o n c l u d e  t h a t ,
" R e g u l a t i o n  N o . 6 7 / 6 7  i s  n o t  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  f r a n c h i s e  a g r e e m e n t s  f o r  
t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  g o o d s  s u c h  a s  t h o s e  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  t h e s e  
p r o c e e d i n g s . "
The  l a s t  t h r e e  r e a s o n s  do n o t  a p p e a r  t o  a d d  a n y t h i n g  
s u b s t a n t i a l  t o  t h e  f i r s t  o n e . The r e a s o n i n g  i s  c o n s i s t e n t ,  
h o w e v e r ,  w i t h  t h e  d e s i r e  o f  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e ,  so  b l a t a n t  t h a t '  
i t  i s  a l l  b u t  e x p l i c i t ,  a t  a l l  c o s t s  t o  t r e a t  f r a n c h i s i n g  i n  a  way 
d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  t h a t  i n  w h i c h  t h e y  have  t r e a t e d  o t h e r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
m e t h o d s  i n  t h e  p a s t  an d  d i f f e r e n t  a l s o  f r o m  t h e  t r e a t m e n t  t h a t  72
7 2 .  I t  was n o t  i n  t h e  e v e n t  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  C o u r t  t o  a n s w e r  t h e  
t h i r d  an d  f i n a l  q u e s t i o n  a d d r e s s e d  t o  i t ,  s i n c e  i t  a s k e d  a b o u t  
t h e  s t a t u s  o f  v a r i o u s  c l a u s e s  u n d e r  R e g . 6 7 / 6 7 .
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s t r i c t  l e g a l  r e a s o n i n g  w o u l d  p e r h a p s  r e q u i r e .  The C o u r t  c l e a r l y  
w a n ted  f r a n c h i s i n g  t o  r e m a i n  l a r g e l y  w i t h i n  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  
c o n t r o l ,  i n  s u c h  a way t h a t  i t  had  t h e  f r e e d o m  t o  c r e a t e  a  s p e c i a l  
reg im e  f o r  f r a n c h i s e  c o n t r a c t s .
(d) d i f f e r e n t  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  f r a n c h i s e
I n  P r o n u p t i a  t h e  C o u r t  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  b e tw e e n  t h r e e  t y p e s  
o f  f r a n c h i s e  a g r e e m e n t  w h i c h  a r e ,
" ( i )  s e r v i c e  f r a n c h i s e s ,  u n d e r  w h i c h  t h e  f r a n c h i s e e  o f f e r s  a 
s e r v i c e  u n d e r  t h e  b u s i n e s s  name o r  s y m b o l  an d  s o m e t im e s  t h e  
t r a d e m a r k  o f  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r ,  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r ' s  
i n s t r u c t i o n s ,
( i i )  p r o d u c t i o n  f r a n c h i s e s ,  u n d e r  w h i c h  t h e  f r a n c h i s e e  
m a n u f a c t u r e s  p r o d u c t s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  i n s t r u c t i o n s  o f  t h e  
f r a n c h i s o r ,  a n d  s e l l s  t h a m  u n d e r  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r ' s  t r a d e m a r k ,  an d
( i i i )  d i s t r i b u t i o n  f r a n c h i s e s ,  u n d e r  w h i c h  t h e  f r a n c h i s e e  s i m p l y  
s e l l s  c e r t a i n  p r o d u c t s  i n  a  sh o p  w h i c h  b e a r s  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r ' s  
b u s i n e s s  name o r  s y m b o l . "
I t  t h e n  s t a t e d  t h a t  i t  w ou ld  d e a l  o n l y  w i t h  t h e  t h i r d .
The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  i t s e l f  i s  s t r a n g e  , s i n c e  i t  i s  n o t  a t  a l l  
c l e a r  w h e r e  i t  came f r o m  -  i t  d o e s  n o t  seem  t o  have  b e e n  d e r i v e d  
f ro m  any  n a t i o n a l  a p p r o a c h  o r  a c a d e m i c  d i s c u s s i o n  -  an d  v e r y  many 
" r e a l - l i f e "  f r a n c h i s e s  d o  n o t  f i t  n e a t l y  i n t o  s u c h  d i v i s i o n s :  f o r  
e x a m p l e ,  a p i z z a  r e s t a u r a n t  s u c h  a s  " P i z z a  H u t "  may be s e e n  a s  a
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s e r v i c e  f r a n c h i s e  when i t  s e r v e s  food  a n d  d r i n k  i n  t h e  r e s t a u r a n t  
o r  d e l i v e r s  p i z 2 a s  t o  c u s t o m e r s '  hom es ,  a s  a  p r o d u c t i o n  f r a n c h i s e  
when i t  i s  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  p i z z a s  t o  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r ' s  e x a c t ;  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s ,  o r  a s  a d i s t r i b u t i o n  f r a n c h i s e  when i t  s e l l s  f i z z y  
d r i n k s  s e l e c t e d  by t h e  f r a n c h i s o r  an d  s o l d  u n d e r  h i s  b u s i n e s s  name 
o r  s y m b o l ,  o r  a s  c o m b i n i n g  e l e m e n t s  o f  a l l  t h r e e  c a t e g o r i e s .  ■
T h i s  a r b i t r a r y  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  l o o k s  l i k e  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  a n
u r g e n t  d e s i r e  t o  c o n f i n e  t h e  e x a c t  r u l i n g  a s  c l o s e l y  a s  p o s s i b l e , .
w h i l s t  a t  t h e  same t i m e  a p p e a r i n g  t o  d e a l  w i t h  f r a n c h i s i n g  i n  a
l o g i c a l  a n d  p r i n c i p l e d  way:  A d v o c a t e  G e n e r a l  V e r l o r e n  v a n  Themaat; .
h a d  p r e c e d e d  t h e  s u b s t a n c e  o f  h i s  o p i n i o n  w i t h  t h e  r e m i n d e r  t o  t h e :
C o u r t  t h a t ,  e v e n  i f  t h e y  w e r e  t o  c o n f i n e  t h e m s e l v e s  t o  g i v i n g  an
a n s w e r  r e l a t i n g  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  t y p e  o f  f r a n c h i s i n g : ,
i n v o l v e d  i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t h i s  w o u l d  " h a v e  r e p e r c u s s i o n s  f o r  t h e .
v a l i d i t y  o f  t e n s  o f  t h o u s a n d s  o f  c o n t r a c t s " ,  an d  n o t e d  t h a t  the!
C o m m is s io n  h a d  n o t  a s  y e t  a d o p t e d  a  c l e a r  p o l i c y  i n  t h e  m a t t e r :  i t :
may w e l l  b e  t h a t  t h e  t a s k  o f ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  l e g i s l a t i n g  on s u c h  an
i m p o r t a n t  m a t t e r  w i t h  so  l i t t l e  e x p e r i e n c e  t o  b e  g u i d e d  b y ,  was  a
t a s k  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t  w ou ld  h a v e  p r e f e r r e d  t o  h a v e  a v o i d e d .  S i n c e  i t
c o u l d  h a r d l y  c o n f i n e  i t s e l f  t o  t h e  f a c t s  o f  t h e  c a s e  -  i n  o t h e r
w o r d s ,  t o  w e d d i n g - d r e s s  f r a n c h i s e s ,  i t  d i d  t h e  b e s t  i t  c o u l d  t o
7  3n a r r o w  t h e  r a n g e  o f  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  i t s  r u l i n g  . 73
7 3 .  T h i s  v i e w  i s  s h a r e d  by B u r s t  a n d  K o v a r ,  who c o n s i d e r  t h a t ,  ■
"Le s o u c i  de  l a  Cour d e  f a i r e  c o i n c i d e r  s a  d é c i s i o n  a v e c  l e s . -  
p a r t i c u l a r i t é s  q u i  p e u v e n t  e x i s t e r  à l ' i n t é r i e u r  meme d e  la*. • 
c a t é g o r i e  d e  c o n t r a t s  d e  f r a n c h i s e  d e  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  l ' a m è n e  a' 
r e s t r e i n d r e  l a  p o r t é e  d e  s o n  a r r e t  au x  s e u l s  c o n t r a t s  a y a n t  u n i -  
c o n t e n u  i d e n t i q u e  à  c e l u i  q u i  l u i  é t a i t  s o u m i s . "  o p . c i t . ( n o t e  66'). u 
a t  p . 392 .  * \
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A d i s t i n c t i o n  c o u l d  e q u a l l y  o b v i o u s l y  a n d  j u s t i f i a b l y  
h a v e  b een  d raw n  b e t w e e n  d i s t r i b u t i o n  f r a n c h i s e s  i n  w h ic h  i t  i s  t h e  
f r a n c h i s o r  h i m s e l f  who m a n u f a c t u r e s  t h e  g o o d s  t o  be  d i s t r i b u t e d ,  
a n d  t h o s e  i n  w h i c h  he b u y s  o r  s e l e c t s  them f r o m  a t h i r d  p a r t y :  
t h i s  l a s t  c o u l d  a l s o  b e  d i v i d e d ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  i n t o  t h e  a r r a n g e m e n t  
i n  which  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r  b u y s  t h e  goods  and  s e l l s  them on t o  t h e  
f r a n c h i s e e  a n d  t h a t  i n  w h i c h  t h e  f r a n c h i s e e  b u y s  g o o d s  d e s i g n a t e d  
o r  a u t h o r i z e d  by  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r  d i r e c t l y  f r o m  a t h i r d  p a r t y .  At
^  i
l e a s t  on e  w r i t e r '  h a s  c i t e d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a s  t h e  two c h i e f
c a t e g o r i e s :  " p a c k a g e  f r a n c h i s e s "  i n  w h ic h  t h e  f r a n c h i s e e  p r o d u c e s
g o o d s  and  p r o v i d e s  s e r v i c e s ,  m a k in g  u s e  o f  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r ' s  im a g e ,
i n t e l l e c t u a l  p r o p e r t y  a n d  know-how and i s  u n d e r  h i s  c o n t r o l  an d
" p r o d u c t  f r a n c h i s e s "  i n  w h i c h  t h e  f r a n c h i s e e  i s  s e l l i n g  g o o d s
a c t u a l l y  p r o d u c e d  by t h e  f r a n c h i s o r .  T h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  h a s  a
c e r t a i n  l o g i c  t o  i t ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h e  
7 5d i s c u s s i o n  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  s e e i n g  f r a n c h i s e s  a s  a 
q u a s i - i n t e l l e c t u a l  p r o p e r t y  l i c e n s i n g :  t h e  a n a l o g y  seem s  much more  745
7 4 .  G a l a n  C o r o n a  E. " . . . s e  d i s t i n g u e  e n t r e  e l  f r a n c h i s i n g  de  
e s t i l o  e m p r e s a r i a l  o " P a c k a g e  F r a n c h i s e "  en l a  q u e  e l  f r a n c h i s e e  
a d o p t a  e l  e s t i l o  e m p r e s a r i a l  e s t a b l e c i d o  p o r  e l  f r a n c h i s o r  e 
i d e n t i f i c a d o  p o r  s u  m a r c a ,  f a b r i c a n d o  p r o d u c t o s  o p r e s t a n d o  
s e r v i c i o s  b a j o  l a  misma c o n  s u j e c i ó n  a l  c o n t r o l  o a s i s t e n c i a  d e l  
f r a n c h i s o r ,  y e l  f r a n c h i s i n g  de  d i s t r i b u c i ó n  o " P r o d u c t  
F r a n c h i s e " ,  en  e l  qu e  e l  f r a n c h i s e e  d i s t r i b u y e  p r o d u c t o s  
f a b r i c a d o s  p o r  e l  f r a n c h i s o r ,  p r o v i s t o  d e  l a  m a r c a  d e  é s t e ,  y 
t a m b i é n  b a j o  s u  c o n t r o l  o  a s i s t e n c i a . "  Los  C o n t r a t o s  d e
" F r a n c h i s i n g "  a n t e  e l  D e r e c h o  C o m u n i t a r i o  P r o t e c t o r  de l a  L i b r e  
C o m p e t e n c i a  13 R e v i s t a  d e  I n s t i t u c i o n e s  E u r o p e a s  687 £1986)  a t
p . 689•
7 5 .  See  s u p r a  p . 6 4 .
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T 6a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  t h e  f o r m e r  c a t e g o r y  t h a n  t o  t h e  l a t t e r  .
The n e t w o r k  i n  P r o n u p t i a  was a c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  
a l t e r n a t i v e  c a t e g o r i e s  t h a t  h a v e  j u s t  b e e n  d i s c u s s e d :  801 o f  g o o d s  
b o u g h t  i n  by M rs .  S c h i l l g a l i s  w e re  t o  be p r o d u c e d  by  P r o n u p t i a  
i t s e l f  and  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  20% w e r e  t o  come f r o m  a p p r o v e d  s u p p l i e r s .  
S o ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  a r r a n g e m e n t  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  t h i s  l a t t e r  20% was 
c l e a r l y  a n  e x c h a n g e  o f  r o y a l t i e s  i n  r e t u r n  f o r  w h a t  may be 
r e g a r d e d  a s  a  k i n d  o f  b u s i n e s s  know-how,  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  t h e  o t h e r  
80% t h e  d o m i n a n t  e l e m e n t  i s  t h a t  o f  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  s y s t e m .  S i n c e  
t h e  f r a n c h i s e  t h e r e f o r e  c o n s i s t e d  o f  a  m i x t u r e  o f  e l e m e n t s  f rom  
t h e s e  v a r i o u s  c a t e g o r i e s  s u g g e s t e d ,  t h e  c h o s e n  d i s t i n c t i o n s  were  
c l e a r l y  m ore  c o n v e n i e n t  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  c a s e ,  an d  i t  l o o k s  
s u s p i c i o u s l y  a s  t h o u g h  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e  g o v e r n e d  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  
o f  t h e  g e n e r a l  r u l e ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  v i c e  v e r s a .
I n  a n y  c a s e ,  t h e  C o u r t ' s  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  d i s g u i s e s  t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  f r a n c h i s i n g  c o u l d  q u i t e  e a s i l y  h a v e  been  d e a l t  w i t h  
u n d e r  e x i s t i n g  r u l e s  o f  t h e  t y p e  a p p l i e d  i n  t h e  p a s t  t o  s e l e c t i v e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  s y s t e m s ,  i n t e l l e c t u a l  p r o p e r t y  l i c e n s i n g  a n d  o t h e r '  
c o n t r a c t s  i n v o l v i n g  v e r t i c a l  r e s t r a i n t s .  The  E u r o p e a n  C o u r t  
i n s t e a d  w a n t e d  a f r e e  r e i n  t o  d e a l  w i t h  f r a n c h i s i n g  a n d  s o  
i n v e n t e d  t h i s  n ew ,  m y s t e r i o u s  s e t  o f  c a t e g o r i e s ,  t o  w h ic h  t h e y  a r e  76
7 6 .  I n d e e d ,  G a l a n  C o ro n a  E. m akes  t h e  same p o i n t .  A f t e r  m a k i n g ^  
t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  d e s c r i b e d ,  h e  co m m en ts  on  t h e  C o u r t ' s  s t a t e m e n t ^  
t h a t  f r a n c h i s i n g  i s  n o t  r e a l l y  a  m e th o d  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  s o  muctY; 
a s  a  way o f  r e a p i n g  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  e x p e r t i s e ,  s a y i n g ,  " . . . p e r o  no 
c a b e  d u d a  d e  q u e ,  d e s c e n d i e n d o  a  l a  f r a n q u i c i a  de  d i s t r i b u c i ó n ,  
l a  f i n a l i d a d  de  c o m e r c i a l i z a c i ó n  no p u e d e  s e r  m a r g i n a d a ,  máxime. ,  
c u a n d o  con  f r e c u e n c i a  no e s  f á c i l  d i s c r i m i n a r  e l  f r a n c h i s i n g  de 
d i s t r i b u c i ó n  d e  l a  f i g u r a  d e  l a  c o n c e s i ó n  m e r c a n t i l . "  O p . c i t .  
( n o t e  74) a t  p . 6 9 1 .
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t h e n  a b l e  t o  a t t r i b u t e  a <ind o f  u n iq u e n e s s ,  v.nich a l lo w s  
d e p a r t u r e  f r o m  t h e  u s u a l  r u l e s .  In  o t h e r  words,  t h i s  e n d  zt  
l a b e l l i n g  p a v e d  t h e  way f o r  a  new approach  w i th  v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  
c o n s e q u e n c e s  f rom  t h o s e  t h a t  would have  fo l low ed  from t.ne 
a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  e x i s t i n g  r u l e s  mentioned above.
The same t h r e e - f o l d  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  i n t o  i n d u s t r i a l ,  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  a n d  s e r v i c e  f r a n c h i s e s  i s  rad e  in  the  p reamble  t o  t.oe 
d r a f t  r e g u l a t i o n ,  and  d i s t r i b u t i o n  f r a n c h i s e s  a r e  f u r t h e r  suo-  
d i v i d e d  i n t o  " p r o d u c e r ' s  f r a n c h i s e ,  c o n c e r n in g  the  r e t a i l  c f  goods 
m a n u f a c t u r e d  o r  s e l e c t e d  by t h e  f r a n c h i s o r  o r  on i t s  b e h a l f  and 
b e a r i n g  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r ' s  name or t radem ark"  and " d i s t r i b u t o r  ' s 
f r a n c h i s e ,  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  r e t a i l  of goods m a n u fac tu red  by t h i r d  
p a r t i e s  an d  s e l e c t e d  by t h e  f r a n c h i s e e  in  c o l l a b o r â t  icn w i t h  tne  
f r a n c h i s o r " .  No m e n t i o n  i s  made of the  f a c t  t h a t  v e ry  o f t e n  a 
f r a n c h i s e  c o n t r a c t  may be a com bina t ion  o f  two cr more c f  t h e s e  
t y p e s ,  a s  was t h e  c a s e ,  f o r  example ,  in  P r o n u p t i a .
S e r v i c e  f r a n c h i s e s  a r e  s a i d  to  in c lu d e  a l s o  “on__a
s u b s i d i a r y  b a s i s  t h e  s u p p l y  o f  goods d i r e c t l y  l i n k e d  to  tn e  
p r o v i s i o n  o f  t h e  s e r v i c e s "  [ u n d e r l i n i n g  m in e ) :  a l t h o u g h  t h i s  i s  
u n c l e a r ,  i t  i s  u n l i k e l y  t o  c r e a t e  major p ro b le m s ,  s i n c e ,  giver,  
t h a t  b o t h  d i s t r i b u t i o n  and s e r v i c e  f r a n c h i s e s  a r e  exempted in  the  
s am e  t e r m s ,  t h e  e x a c t  p o s i t i o n  o f  the  boundary  between t h e  two 
s h o u l d  n o t  be  i m p o r t a n t a n t  i n  p r a c t i c e .
The e x e m p t i o n  i s  s a i d  to  app ly  on ly  t o  d i s t r i b u t i c n  (not 
t o  be  c o n f u s e d  w i t h  " d i s t r i b u t o r ' s " )  and s e r v i c e  f r a n c h i s e s ,  but 
n o  a t t e m p t  i s  a p p a r e n t l y  t o  be  made t o  make i t  any e a s i e r  to  
d e c i d e  w h e t h e r ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  a f r a n c h i s e  f o r  the  p r o d u c t i o n  and 
s a l e  o f  h a m b u r g e r s  m ig h t  , a t  a c e r t a i n  p o i n t ,  i f ,  say t h e  r e c i p e  
f o r  t h e i r  p r e p a r a t i o n  became co m p l ica ted  enough, become an 
i n d u s t r i a l  f r a n c h i s e .  I n d u s t r i a l  f r a n c h i s e s  a r e  s a i d  t o  " r e l a t e  to
I\
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r e l a t i o n s h i p s  b e t w e e n  p r o d u c e r s " :  i t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  e i t h e r  w h a t  t h i s  
m e a n s ,  i f  a n y t h i n g ,  w h e t h e r  i t  b e a r s  a n y  r e l a t i o n  t o  a . 5 ( a )  
w h ic h  e x c l u d e s  f rom  t h e  e x e m p t i o n  a g r e e m e n t s  b e tw e e n  c o m p e t i n g  
m a n u f a c t u r e r s  -  : t h e s e  s k e t c h i l y  d ra w n  d i s t i n c t i o n s  a r e  n o t
r e p e a t e d ,  l e t  a l o n e  e l a b o r a t e d ,  i n  t h e  body  o f  t h e  R e g u l a t i o n ,
The  m o t i v a t i o n ,  a l r e a d y  a l l u d e d  t o ,  b e h i n d  t h e  c r e a t i o n  
o f  t h i s  e l a b o r a t e  new c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  s y s t e m  w i l l  be  d i s c u s s e d  
l a t e r .
( d ) The Good
I n  a n y  c a s e ,  i n  P r o n u p t i a , h a v i n g  a n a l y s e d  f r a n c h i s i n g  i n  
t h i s  way -  t h a t  i s ,  i n  a  way t h a t  e s t a b l i s h e s  f r a n c h i s i n g  a s  "a 
g o o d  t h i n g " ,  b e i n g  t h e  way i n  w h i c h  t h e  j u s t  r e w a r d s  o f  i n v e n t i o n  
a n d  o w n e r s h i p  a r e  r e a p e d  a n d  t h i s  f o r m  o f  know-how, w h i c h  i s  
v a l u a b l e  t o  s o c i e t y ,  i s  d i s s e m i n a t e d  -  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  
g o e s  on t o  s t a t e  t h a t :
" I n  o r d e r  f o r  t h e  s y s t e m  t o  work  two c o n d i t i o n s  m u s t  be 
m e t . . . F i r s t ,  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r  m u s t  be  a b l e  t o  c o m m u n ic a t e  h i s  know­
how t o  t h e  f r a n c h i s e e s  a n d  p r o v i d e  th em  w i t h  t h e  n e c e s s a r y 1 
a s s i s t a n c e  i n  o r d e r  t o  e n a b l e  th e m  t o  a p p l y  h i s  m e t h o d s ,  w i t h o u t  
r u n n i n g  t h e  r i s k  t h a t  t h a t  know -how  and  a s s i s t a n c e  m i g h t  b e n e f i t  
c o m p e t i t o r s ,  e v e n  i n d i r e c t l y . . .  S e c o n d l y , t h e  f r a n c h i s o r  m u s t  be 
a b l e  t o  t a k e  t h e  m e a s u r e s  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  m a i n t a i n i n g  t h e  i d e n t i t y ,  
a n d  r e p u t a t i o n  o f  t h e  n e t w o r k  b e a r i n g  h i s  b u s i n e s s  name o r  
s y m b o l . . . "
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As a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e s e  two n e c e s s a r y  
c o n d i t i o n s ,  p r o v i s i o n s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  t h e i r  f u l f i l m e n t  a r e  
l e g i t i m a t e :  t h u s ,  c l a u s e s  p r o t e c t i n g  know-how, n o n - c o m p e t i t i o n
c l a u s e s  -  e v e n  a f t e r  t h e  c o n t r a c t  h a s  come t o  an e n d  -  , n o n ­
a l i e n a t i o n  t e r m s ,  and  t e r m s  g i v i n g  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  
f r a n c h i s e e ' s  b u s i n e s s  m e t h o d s ,  t h e  a p p e a r a n c e  o f  h i s  p r e m i s e s ,  
g o o d s  s o l d  i n  t h e  s h o p  a n d  a d v e r t i s i n g  do n o t  i n f r i n g e  a . 8 5 ( 1 ) .
I t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  how t h e  C o u r t  s e e s  s u c h  c l a u s e s  i n  
p r e c i s e  l e g a l  t e r m s :  s t r a n g e l y ,  i t  s t a t e s  c l e a r l y  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no 
i n t e r f e r e n c e  w i t h  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  a l t h o u g h  no e c o n o m i s t  w o u ld  d i s p u t e  
t h a t  i n t r a b r a n d  c o m p e t i t i o n  b e tw e e n  f r a n c h i s e e s  i s  r e s t r i c t e d .  I t  
m i g h t  be  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t  i s  s a y i n g  t h a t  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  t h e  
f r a n c h i s e  n e t w o r k  t h e s e  r e t a i l e r s  w o u ld  n o t  e x i s t  a n d  s o  no 
c o m p e t i t i o n  t h a t  would  o t h e r w i s e  e x i s t  i s  a f f e c t e d ,  a s  i t  h e l d  in  
N u n q e s s e r  . H o w e v e r , i f  t h i s  i s  t h e  e x p l a n a t i o n ,  i t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  
why t e r r i t o r i a l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  d i d  n o t  r e c e i v e  t h e  same f a v o u r a b l e  
t r e a t m e n t  t h a t  t h e y  d i d  i n  N u n q e s s e r , g i v e n  t h e  a d m i s s i o n  by t h e  
C o u r t  t h a t  s u c h  a c l a u s e  m i g h t  be  n e c e s s a r y  s o m e t im e s  t o  a t t r a c t  
f r a n c h i s e e s  t o  t h e  n e t w o r k  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e .
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I f ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e  r e s t r a i n t s  a r e  s e e n  a s  w ha t
a r e  known i n  A m e r ic a  a s  " a n c i l l a r y " :  t h a t  i s ,  p e r m i s s i b l e  b e c a u s e
n e c e s s a r y  an d  o n l y  a n c i l l a r y  t o  t h e  a t t a i n m e n t  o f  a  l e g i t i m a t e
78c o m m e r c i a l  o b j e c t i v e  , i t  i s  s u r e l y  n o t  a c c u r a t e  t o  s a y  t h a t  
c o m p e t i t i o n  i s  n o t  a f f e c t e d :  t h e  p o i n t  i s ,  r a t h e r ,  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  78
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r e s t r i c t i v e  o f  c o m p e t i t i o n  b u t  t h e y  a r e  a l l o w e d  a s  t h e y  a r e  a 
n e c e s s a r y  p a r t  o f  a p e r m i s s i b l e  a g r e e m e n t .  In  a n y  c a s e ,  t h e  
d o c t r i n e  o f  a n c i l l a r y  r e s t r a i n t s  d o e s  n o t  s i t  e a s i l y  i n  a . 8 5 ,  
s i n c e  o n e  o f  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  e x e m p t i o n  u n d e r  a . 8 5 ( 3 )  i s  t h a t  
t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  be i n d i s p e n s a b l e  f o r  t h e  a t t a i n m e n t  o f  t h e  
b e n e f i t s  a l l e g e d  t o  f l o w  f r o m  i t .  From t h e  p o i n t  o f  v i e w  o f  s t r i c t  
l e g a l  a n a l y s i s ,  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  s i t u a t i o n  i s  v e r y  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y :  i t  
s h o u l d  mean t h a t  i f  a r e s t r a i n t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  a t t a i n  some 
l e g i t i m a t e  c o m m e r c i a l  o b j e c t i v e  t h e n  i t  w i l l  e s c a p e  a . 8 5 ( 1 ) ,  and '  
i f  i t  i s  n o t , i t  i s  n o t  e l i g i b l e  f o r  e x e m p t i o n ,  and  a . 8 5 ( 3 )  i s  
r e n d e r e d  r e d u n d a n t . ~
A " w h i t e  l i s t "  i s  g i v e n  i n  a . 3 o f  t h e  d r a f t  b l o c k  
e x e m p t i o n :  r e s t r i c t i o n s  l i s t e d  h e r e  a r e  c o n s i d e r e d  g e n e r a l l y  n o t
r e s t r i c t i v e  o f  c o m p e t i t i o n  a t  a l l  ( t h a t  i s ,  n o t  p r o h i b i t e d  by 
a . 8 5 ( 1 ) )  b u t  e x e m p t e d ,  i f  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  t h e y  a r e  
c o n s i d e r e d  a n t i - c o m p e t i t i v e . I t  i n c l u d e s  e x c l u s i v e  s u p p l y  
t e r m s ,  q u a l i t y  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s ,  n o n - c o m p e t i t i o n  c l a u s e s ,  minimum 
s t o c k s ,  minimum t u r n o v e r  a n d  n o n - a s s i g n m e n t  s t i p u l a t i o n s .
S i m i l a r l y ,  a p r o h i b i t i o n  on  d i s c l o s i n g  t h e  know-how t o  t h i r d :  
p a r t i e s  a n d  o b l i g a t i o n s  t o  s e n d  s t a f f  o n  c e r t a i n  t r a i n i n g  c o u r s e s ^  
a n d  t o  a p p l y  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r ' s  c o m m e r c i a l  m e th o d s  a r e  i n c l u d e d  in :  
t h e  l i s t .  I t  i s  a  n o n - e x h a u s t i v e  l i s t ,  b u t  i t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  w h e t h e r  
c o n t r a c t s  c o n t a i n i n g  e x t r a  c l a u s e s  m u s t  be s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  
o p p o s i t i o n  p r o c e d u r e ,  o r  w h e t h e r  t h e y  a r e  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  e x e m p t  - i f *  
t h e  e x t r a  c l a u s e s  a r e  n o t  i n  t h e m s e l v e s  a n t i - c o m p e t i t i v e .
Many o f  t h e s e  c l a u s e s  seem  t o  g o  f u r t h e r  t h a n  n e c e s s a r y :  
f o r  e x a m p l e ,  i t  m i g h t  w e l l  b e  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  a u t h o r i s e  a  " b e s t -  
e n d e a v o u r s "  c l a u s e ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  a l l o w i n g  f i x e d  minimum t u r n o v e r s '  
a n d  s t o c k s  t o  be  l a i d  down.  S i m i l a r l y ,  i t  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  a l l o w e d -  
f o r  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r  t o  w i t h o l d  h i s  c o n s e n t  t o  a s s i g n m e n t  
u n r e a s o n a b l y ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  o n  t h e  d e a t h  o r  i n c a p a c i t a t i o n  o f  t h e
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f r a n c h i s e e .  A l s o ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s e e  how r e s t r a i n t s  s u c h  a s  
t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  a t t a i n  a  minimum t u r n o v e r ,  w h ic h  c l e a r l y  
r e s t r i c t  t h e  f r a n c h i s e e ' s  f r e e d o m ,  c a n  be j u s t i f i e d  a s  n e c e s s a r y  
f o r  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  e i t h e r  o f  t h e  r e p u t a t i o n  o f  t h e  n e t w o r k  o r  t h e  
f r a n c h i s o r ' s  i n t e l l e c t u a l  p r o p e r t y  o r  know-how.
P o s t - t e r m  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on c o m p e t i t i o n  w i t h  t h e  f r a n c h i s e  
n e tw o rk  a r e  a l l o w e d  up  t o  a  maximum o f  o n e  y e a r ,  w h ic h  i s  s t r a n g e  
t o .  s a y  t h e  l e a s t ,  g i v e n  t h a t  s u ch  a n  e x e m p t i o n  a p p e a r e d  i n  Reg. 
6 7 / 6 7  b u t  was removed when R e g . 1 9 8 3 / 8 3  r e p l a c e d  i t . I t  i s  a l s o  
p o s s i b l e  t h a t  s u ch  a  t e r m  would  b e  i l l e g a l  u n d r  some n a t i o n a l  
l a w s .
( f )  The b a d
The P r o n u p t i a  j u d g m e n t  d i v i d e s  f a i r l y  c l e a r l y  i n t o  two 
p a r t s :  t h e  b e n e v o l e n t  a t t i t u d e  t a k e n  t o w a r d s  f r a n c h i s i n g  g e n e r a l l y  
a n d  t o  t h e  many c l a u s e s  j u s t  d e s c r i b e d  d o e s  n o t  e x t e n d  t o  
t e r r i t o r i a l  r e s t r a i n t s .  When t h e s e  a r e  d i s c u s s e d ,  t h e  t o n e  c h a n g e s  
a b r u p t l y .  T e r r i t o r i a l  r e s t r a i n t s  a r e  c o n d e m n e d ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  when 
com bined  w i t h  a l o c a t i o n  c l a u s e  ( w h i c h ,  a l o n e ,  i s  a p p a r e n t l y  n o t  
w i t h i n  a . 8 5 ( l ) ) ,  on t h e  g r o u n d s  t h a t  t h e y  r e s t r a i n  c o m p e t i t i o n  
b e tw e e n  f r a n c h i s e e s :  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  w i t h o u t  t e r r i t o r i a l  
p r o t e c t i o n  a  p r o s p e c t i v e  f r a n c h i s e e  w o u ld  n o t  t a k e  t h e  r i s k  o f  
j o i n i n g  t h e  n e t w o r k  m i g h t  s u g g e s t  l o g i c a l l y  t h a t  a  t h i r d  c o n d i t i o n  
f o r  t h e  w o r k i n g  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  m ig h t  w e l l  b e  t h a t  t h e  t e r m s  o f  t h e  
c o n t r a c t  s h o u l d  b e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  f a v o u r a b l e  t o  a t t r a c t  
f r a n c h i s e e s , a n d  t h a t  i n  c e r t a i n  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  t h i s  w ou ld  
n e c e s s i t a t e  e x c l u s i v e  t e r r i t o r i e s ,  a t  l e a s t  f o r  a c e r t a i n  p e r i o d
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o f  t im e  . H o w e v e r ,  t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  d e s c r i b e d  by t h e  C o u r t  a s  
b e i n g  " r e l e v a n t  o n l y  t o  a n  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  a g r e e m e n t  i n  t h e  
l i g h t  o f  c o n d i t i o n s  l a i d  down i n  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 3 ) " ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  t h e y  a d m i t  t h a t  s u c h  a c l a u s e  may be  i n d i s p e n s a b l e  t o  t h e  
f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h e  n e t w o r k  l
Not  o n l y  t h i s ,  b u t  i t  i s  e x p r e s s e d  i n  t h i s  way:
" . . . f a r  f r o m  b e i n g  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  know-how 
p r o v i d e d  o r  t h e  m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  t h e  n e t w o r k ' s  i d e n t i t y  and  
r e p u t a t i o n ,  c e r t a i n  p r o v i s i o n s  r e s t r i c t  c o m p e t i t i o n  be tween-  
members  o f  t h e  n e t w o r k ."
Even t h o s e  f u l l y  i n  f a v o u r  o f  v e r t i c a l  r e s t r a i n t s  o f  t h e  
s o r t  a p p r o v e d  b y  t h e  C o u r t  e a r l i e r  i n  t h e  j u d g m e n t  a d m i t  t h a t  t h e y  
r e s t r i c t  c o m p e t i t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  n e t w o r k  ! T h e i r  p o i n t ,  h o w e v e r ,  i s  
t h a t  c o m p e t i t i o n  w i t h  o t h e r  b r a n d s  a n d  n e t w o r k s  i s  i n c r e a s e d .  So- 
t h i s  s t a t e m e n t  a p p e a r s  a l i t t l e  n o n s e n s i c a l ,  u n l e s s  we a r e  t o  r e a d  
i n t o  i t  t h a t  i t  m eans  t h a t  c e r t a i n  p r o v i s i o n s  a r e  more  r e s t r i c t i v e  
t h a n  o t h e r s .
Even  m o re  i l l o g i c a l ,  i n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  e x e m p t i o n  g r a n t e d  
by  t h e  C o m m is s io n  t o  P r o n u p t i a  s h o r t l y  a f t e r  t h e  C o u r t  d e c i s i o n , -  
i t  s t a t e s  t h a t  c e r t a i n  o b l i g a t i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  minimum s t o c k s  a n d : 
r o y a l t i e s  f a l l  o u t s i d e  a . 8 5 ( 1 ) ,  an d  e x p l a i n s  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  sac tv  
c l a u s e s  m i g h t  f a l l  w i t h i n  a . 8 5 ( 1 )  i f  u s e d  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  
s e l e c t i v e  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  f r a n c h i s i n g  i s  d i f f e r e n t :  "The e x c l u s i o n  
o f  a n y  o t h e r s  f r o m  t h e  t e r r i t o r y  a l l o t t e d  t o  t h e  f r a n c h i s e e  i s  79
7 9
7 9 .  I n  t h e  b l o c k  e x e m p t i o n  f o r  p a t e n t  l i c e n s i n g  a i r t i g h t  ; 
t e r r i t o r i a l  e x c l u s i v i t y  i s  a l l o w e d  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  f i v e  y e a r s  from 
t h e  p r o d u c t ' s  b e i n g  p u t  o n  t h e  m a r k e t : R e g . 2 3 4 9 / 8 4  1984 OJ
L 2 1 9 / 1 5  a . 1 ( 1 ) £ 6 ) .
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t h e r e f o r e  a c o n s e q u e n c e  w h ic h  i s  i n h e r e n t  i n  t h e  v e r y  s y s t e m  or  
f r a n c h i s i n g . M T h i s  i s  a  s t r a n g e  e x p l a n a t i o n ,  g i v e n  t h e  C o u r t ' s  
s t a t e m e n t  i n  P r o n u p t i a  t h a t  e x c l u s i v e  t e r r i t o r i e s  w e r e  n o t  
i n h e r e n t  t o  f r a n c h i s i n g  !
A n o t h e r  p o i n t  t o  n o t i c e  i s  t h a t  t h e  same a t t i t u d e  i s  
t a k e n  t o  t h e  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  i n t e r b r a n d  c o m p e t i t i o n  i s  i n c r e a s e d  a s  
a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  r e s t r a i n t  a s  was t a k e n  a s  f a r  b a c k  a s  1966 in  
C o n s t e n  v G r u n d i g , w h e r e  t h e  C o u r t  i n  t h a t  c a s e  s t a t e d  q u i t e  
u n a m b i g u o u s l y ,  t h a t  o n c e  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  o n  i n t r a b r a n d  c o m p e t i t i o n  
by th e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  t e r r i t o r i a l  r e s t r a i n t s  was e s t a b l i s h e d ,  
f u r t h e r  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  e f f e c t s  o n  t h e  m a r k e t  became 
i r r e l e v a n t  :
" a l t h o u g h  c o m p e t i t i o n  b e t w e e n  p r o d u c e r s  i s  g e n e r a l l y  more 
n o t i c e a b l e  t h a n  t h a t  b e t w e e n  d i s t r i b u t o r s  o f  p r o d u c t s  o f  t h e  same 
make,  i t  d o e s  n o t  t h e r e b y  f o l l o w  t h a t  a n  a g r e e m e n t  t e n d i n g  t o  
r e s t r i c t  t h e  l a t t e r  k i n d  o f  c o m p e t i t i o n  s h o u l d  e s c a p e  t h e  
p r o h i b i t i o n  o f  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 1 )  m e r e l y  b e c a u s e  i t  m i g h t  i n c r e a s e  t h e  
f o r m e r . . .  t h e r e  i s  no n e e d  t o  t a k e  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  c o n c r e t e  e f f e c t s  
o f  an  a g r e e m e n t  o n c e  i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  i t  h a s  a s  i t s  o b j e c t  t h e  
p r e v e n t i o n ,  r e s t r i c t i o n  o r  d i s t o r t i o n  o f  c o m p e t i t i o n .  T h e r e f o r e ,  
t h e  a b s e n c e  i n  t h e  c o n t e s t e d  d e c i s i o n  o f  an y  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  
e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  a g r e e m e n t  on c o m p e t i t i o n  b e t w e e n  s i m i l a r  p r o d u c t s  
o f  d i f f e r e n t  m a k es  d o e s  n o t ,  o f  i t s e l f ,  c o n s t i t u t e  a  d e f e c t  i n  t h e  
d e c i s i o n . "
A l t h o u g h  t h i s  l i n e  h a s  s i n c e  b e e n  s o f t e n e d  s o m e t i m e s ,  a s  
f o r  e x am p le  i n  N u n g e s s e r , t e r r i t o r i a l  r e s t r a i n t s  h a v e  g e n e r a l l y  
b e e n  h e l d  t o  i n f r i n g e  a . 8 5 ( 1 ) ,  and  h e r e  i n  P r o n u p t i a  t h e  C o u r t  
c i t e s  C o n s t e n  v .  G r u n d i g  i t s e l f  f o r  t h i s  p r o p o s i t i o n .  But 
s t r a n g e l y ,  t h e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  t h a t  s eem s  t o  h a v e  b e e n  a p p l i e d ,  a t  
l e a s t  a s  p a r t  o f  t h e  r e a s o n i n g ,  t o  s a v e  many f r a n c h i s e  c o n t r a c t
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c l a u s e s  f r o m  n u l l i t y  u n d e r  a . 8 5 ( 2 )  -  t h a t  i s ,  t h a t  i n t e r b r a n d  
c o m p e t i t i o n  i s  b e i n g  i n c r e a s e d ,  e v e n  i f  i n t r a b r a n d  c o m p e t i t i o n  i s  
d i m i n i s h e d  -  i s  s u d d e n l y  a p p a r e n t l y  no  l o n g e r  a c c e p t a b l e  i n  t h e  
c o n t e x t  o f  e x c l u s i v e  t e r r i t o r i e s .  And i n  any  c a s e ,  i n  P r o n u p t i a  
t h e r e  was no a b s o l u t e  e x p o r t  ban a s  t h e r e  was e f f e c t i v e l y  i n  
C o n s t e n  v .  G r u n d i g  s o  i t  was n o t  i n e v i t a b l e  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t  app ' ly  
t h i s  r u l e .
Such  a r e s u l t  i s  o f  c o u r s e  j u s t i f i a b l e  on  v a r i o u s  
g r o u n d s ,  s u c h  a s  t h e  c o n f l i c t i n g  c l a i m s  o f  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  m a r k e t  
i n t e g r a t i o n , b u t  t o  s a y  t h a t  some c l a u s e s  do n o t  r e s t r i c t  
c o m p e t i t i o n  w h i l e  e x c l u s i v e  t e r r i t o r i e s  d o ,  i s  a m u d d le d  
a n d  a m b ig u o u s  way o f  m ak in g  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n .  In  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  
A d v o c a t e  G e n e r a l  p o i n t s  o u t ,  a f t e r  h a v i n g  o b s e r v e d  t h e  b e n e v o l e n t  
a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  r u l e  o f  r e a s o n  t o  v e r t i c a l  r e s t r a i n t s  i n c l u d i n g  
t e r r i t o r i a l  p r o t e c t i o n  i n  A m e r i c a ,  t h a t ,  ~-
" . . . i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  t h e  p r o b l e m  t o  t h e  EEC o f  s e p a r a t e  
n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t s  w i t h  p r i c e s  w h i c h  a r e  o f t e n  w i d e l y  d i v e r g e n t  d o e s  
n o t  e x i s t .  A s i n g l e  i n t e r n a l  m a r k e t  was a c h i e v e d  l o n g  a g o  i n  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  s o  t h a t  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  o b s t a c l e s  t o  p a r a l l e l -  
i m p o r t s  d o e s  n o t  a r i s e ' * .
T h a t  i s ,  he  m a k es  a  much more  e x p l i c i t  and  c o n v i n c i n g  
l i n k ,  a d m i t t i n g  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  some k i n d  o f  c o n f l i c t  b e t w e e n  t h e  
n e e d  t o  i n t e g r a t e  t h e  m a r k e t  o n  t h e  one  h a n d  a n d  t h e  f o s t e r i n g  o f  
e f f i c i e n t  f r a n c h i s e  n e t w o r k s  on  t h e  o t h e r .
A l t h o u g h  s t r i c t l y  s p e a k i n g  o f  no l e g a l  v a l u e ,  t h e  o p i n i o n  
o f  t h e  A d v o c a t e  G e n e r a l  c a n  g i v e  u s  a  g o o d  p i c t u r e  o f  t h e  i d e a s  
p r e s e n t e d  t o  t h e  C o u r t  b e f o r e  t h e y  made t h e i r  d e c i s i o n :  t h i s  i s  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  v a l u a b l e  i n  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  s e e  b e h i n d  t h e  j u d g m e n t  t o  
t h e  a im s  a n d  o b j e c t s  m o t i v a t i n g  i t ,  i n  t h a t  i t  shows u s  some o f
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c h e  p o l i c y  c h o i c e s  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t  must c o n s c i o u s l y  h a v e  r e j e c t e d .  
A l s o  h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  -  a b o u t  t o  be  d e s c r i b e d  -  o f  t h e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  f r a n c h i s i n g  may h a v e  made i t  e a s i e r  f o r  t h e  
C o u r t  t o  t r e a t  t e r r i t o r i a l  e x c l u s i v i t y  d i f f e r e n t l y  f r o m  c l a u s e s  
p r o t e c t i n g  t h e  know-how t r a n s f e r r e d  an d  t h e  r e p u t a t i o n  o f  t h e  
n e t w o r k .
The A d v o c a t e  G e n e r a l  d e s c r i b e d  " [ t ] h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  
f r a n c h i s i n g  s y s t e m  a s  a new d i s t r i b u t i o n  s y s t e m 11 (my u n d e r l i n i n g ) .  
He„ d i s c u s s e d  t h e  r e c e n t  a n d  r a p i d  g r o w th  o f  f r a n c h i s i n g  i n  E u r o p e ,  
n o t e d  t h e  c o m p l e t e  a b s e n c e  o f  any  n a t i o n a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  i n  t h i s  
a r e a ,  and  o b s e r v e d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
f r a n c h i s e s  i n  a l l  Member S t a t e s :
" ( 1 )  a l t h o u g h  t h e y  r e m a i n  i n d e p e n d e n t  a n d  b e a r  t h e i r  own r i s k s ,  
f r a n c h i s e e s  a r e  i n t e g r a t e d  t o  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  e x t e n t  i n  t h e  
f r a n c h i s o r ’ s d i s t r i b u t i o n  n e t w o r k ;
,<2) m a r k e t i n g  s t r a t e g y  i s  b a s e d  on a c h a i n  e f f e c t ,  b r o u g h t  a b o u t  
b y , t h e  u s e ,  i n  r e t u r n  f o r  p a y m e n t ,  o f  a common b u s i n e s s  nam e,  
t r a d e - m a r k ,  s i g n  o r  s y m b o l ,  a n d  -  i n  many c a s e s  -  u n i f o r m  
a r r a n g e m e n t  o f  s h o p  p r e m i s e s ;
(3 )  e x c l u s i v e  r i g h t s  a r e  g r a n t e d  t o  t h e  f r a n c h i s e e  w i t h i n  a 
d e f i n e d  a r e a  a n d  f o r  d e f i n e d  p r o d u c t s ,  a n d  e x c l u s i v e  r i g h t s  t h a t  
v a r y  i n  s c o p e  a r e  g r a n t e d  t o  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  
s u p p l y  o r  s e l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o d u c t s  t o  b e  s o l d  by  t h e  f r a n c h i s e e " .
I t  i s  n o t e w o r t h y  t h a t  t e r r i t o r i a l  r i g h t s  a r e  i n c l u d e d  i n  
t h i s  l i s t  o f  t h e  i d e n t i f y i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  a f r a n c h i s e  
n e t w o r k :  h e  t h e n  c i t e s  o t h e r  d e s c r i p t i o n s ,  o n e  o f  w h ic h  t a l k s  o f  
e x c l u s i v e  t e r r i t o r i e s  and  t h e  o t h e r  o f  w h i c h  d o e s  n o t . L a t e r  i t  i s  
m e n t i o n e d  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  t h e  F r e n c h  j u r i s p r u d e n c e  t h a t  e x c l u s i v e  
t e r r i t o r i a l  r i g h t s  -  i n  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  m o s t  o f  t h e  o t h e r  commonly  
o c c u r r i n g  e l e m e n t s  o f  a f r a n c h i s e  s y s t e m  -  a r e  n o t  a l w a y s  r e g a r d e d
a s  e s s e n t i a l .  A l s o  on t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  t e r r i t o r i a l  e x c l u s i v i  t y  he 
m e n t i o n s  t h a t  t h i s  i s  a l l o w e d  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o f  Amer ica  
u n d e r  t h e  r u l e  o f  r e a s o n  i n t e r b r a n d  c o m p e t i t i o n  i n  t h e  r e l e v a n t  
m a r k e t  i s  h e a l t h y .
The  A d v o c a t e  G e n e r a l  summed up t h i s  p a r t  o f  h i s  o p i n i o n  
by l i s t i n g  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  f e a t u r e s  o f  a  f r a n c h i s e  
a g r e e m e n t  t h a t  h e  ha s  d e r i v e d  f rom  a n  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  t h e  
a v a i l a b l e  l i t e r a t u r e  and  j u r i s p r u d e n c e ,  and  t e r r i t o r i a l  
e x c l u s i v i t y  i s  n o t a b l e  by i t s  a b s e n c e .  B u t  he  s a y s  a l s o  t h a t  b o th  
i n  E u r o p e  a n d  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o f  A m e r i c a ,  " t h e  s p e c i f i c  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  o f  t h e  r e l e v a n t  m a r k e t . . . [ a r e ] p a r t i c u l a r l y  r e l e v a n t  
w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  v a r i o u s  e x c l u s i v i t y  c l a u s e s  t o  be f o u n d  i n  
f r a n c h i s e  a g r e e m e n t s " .
T he  C o u r t  may h a v e  b e e n  i n f l u e n c e d  by t h e  a p p a r e n t  
d i f f e r e n c e  i n  i m p o r t a n c e  a t t a c h e d  i n  p r a c t i c e  t o  t e r r i t o r i a l  
e x c l u s i v i t y  a s  co m p ared  w i t h  o t h e r  r e s t r a i n t s .  B u r s t  an d  Kovar 
e x p r e s s  i t  i n  t h e  l e g a l i s t i c  l a n g u a g e  o f  t h e  C o u r t ' s  
j u r i s p r u d e n c e :  t h e y  p e r c e i v e  a  c e r t a i n  " o b j e t  s p é c i f i q u e "  o f  a 
f r a n c h i s e ,  a n d  e x p l a i n  t h a t  t e r r i t o r i a l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  a r e  a m o n g s t  
" l e s  s t i p u l a t i o n s  q u i  s o n t  é t r a n g è r e s  a c e t  o b j e t  s p é c i f i q u e  du 
c o n t r a t  d e  f r a n c h i s e . . . "  . H o w e v e r ,  t h i s  i s  a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  
w h i c h ,  a s  when i t  i s  u s e d  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l  p r o p e r t y  
r i g h t s 0 1 , h a s  no  p r e d i c t i v e  u s e  a n d  c a n  b e  a p p l i e d  o n l y  a f t e r  t h e  
C o u r t  h a s  r u l e d  on  t h e  c o n t e n t  o f  t h e  " o b j e t  s p é c i f i q u e ” o f  any  
g i v e n  r i g h t .  I t  c a n n o t  p r o v i d e  g u i d a n c e ,  s i n c e  i t  c an  o n l y  
c l a s s i f y  a f t e r  t h e  e v e n t .  801
8 0 .  O p . c i t . ( n o t e  6 6 )  a t  p . 3 9 4 .
8 1 .  e . g .  W i n d s u r f e r  1 9 3 / 8 3 .
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A l s o ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  c o n d e m n a t i o n  i s  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  "a
8 2b u s i n e s s  name o r  s y m b o l  w h i c h  i s  a l r e a d y  w e l l - k n o w n "  i t  may be 
i m p e r a t i v e  when e n t e r i n g  a new g e o g r a p h i c a l  m a r k e t  -  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  
a new c o u n t r y  -  t h a t  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r  be  a b l e  t o  o f f e r  e x c l u s i v e  
t e r r i t o r i e s ,  a t  l e a s t  f o r  a l i m i t e d  p e r i o d  o f  t i m e ,  e v en  i f  t h e  
name o r  sym bo l  i s  a l r e a d y  w e l l - k n o w n  i n  some p l a c e s .  No a l l o w a n c e  
i s  made f o r  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i n  f r a n c h i s i n g ,  i t  i s  n o t  p o s s i b l e  t o  
s t r i k e  o u t  i n t o  d i f f e r e n t  Member S t a t e s  w i t h o u t  c o n s i d e r a b l e  
p r e p a r a t i o n  a n d  p r o b a b l y  some k i n d  o f  p i l o t  schem e:  t h i s  i s  a
r e s u l t  o f  t h e  d i v e r s  l a n g u a g e s ,  l a w s ,  c u l t u r e s  a n d  s o c i a l  and  
p u r c h a s i n g  h a b i t s  o f  c o n s u m e r s  i n  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  o f  t h e  
Community .  H o w ev e r ,  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t h i s  p r o v i s o  i s  
l i m i t e d  i n  f r a n c h i s i n g ,  s i n c e  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r ' s  name o r  s i g n  a l m o s t  
a l w a y s  i_s w e l l - k n o w n ,  s i n c e  t h i s  i s  a l a r g e  p a r t  o f  w ha t  w i l l  
e n a b l e  h im  t o  a t t r a c t  f r a n c h i s e e s  t o  h i s  n e t w o r k  i n  t h e  f i r s t  
p l a c e :  h o w e v e r ,  i t  c o u l d  make a d i f f e r e n c e  i f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e
name was n o t  w e l l - k n o w n  i n  a new g e o g r a p h i c a l  m a r k e t  c o u l d  be 
t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t .
The i n d i v i d u a l  e x e m p t i o n s  s o  f a r  g r a n t e d  by t h e  
C o m m is s io n  a r e  f o r  t h e  m o s t  p a r t  u n e x c e p t i o n a b l e ,  b u t  t h e y  
i l l u s t r a t e  t h a t  t e r r i t o r i a l  r e s t r a i n t s  w i l l  o n l y  f a l l  o u t s i d e  
a . 8 5 ( 1 )  -  i f  e v e r  -  when t h e  m a r k e t  s h a r e  i s  v e r y  t i n y  i n d e e d .
The f i r s t  e x e m p t i o n ,  Yves  R o c h e r , i n v o l v e d  a n  e x c l u s i v e  
t e r r i t o r y  c o m b in e d  w i t h  a s p e c i f i c  l o c a t i o n  c l a u s e ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  82
3
8 2 .  Some c o n s i d e r  t h i s  t o  be  no  more t h a n  t h e  r e s t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  
" d e  m i n i m i s "  r u l e ,  f i r s t  s t a t e d  i n  Volk v .  V e r v a e c k e  1969 ECR 
2 9 5 :  s e e  e . g .  D u b o i s  J .  F r a n c h i s i n g  u n d e r  EEC C o m p e t i t i o n  Law: 
I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  P r o n u p t i a  Ju d g m e n t  and  t h e  P r o p o s e d  B lo c k  
E x e m p t io n  1986 A n t i t r u s t  a n d  T r a d e  P o l i c i e s  i n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
T r a d e  (Fordham  C o r p o r a t e  Law I n s t i t u t e  1 3 t h  A n n u a l  M e e t i n g )  117 
a t  1 3 2 .
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f r a n c h i s o r  r e s e r v e d  t h e  r i g h t  t o  s e l l  by  m a i l  o r d e r ,  shows  and 
f a i r s  w i t h i n  t h e  t e r r i t o r y .
T h i s  d e c i s i o n  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h a t  t h e  p r o h i b i t i o n  on 
t e r r i t o r i a l  r e s t r a i n t s  a p p l i e s  e v en  i f  t h e  m a r k e t  s t r u c t u r e  i s  
" h e a l t h y "  i n  c o m p e t i t i o n  t e r m s  a n d  t h e  m a r k e t  s h a r e  i n v o l v e d  ' i s  
s m a l l :  e v e n  i n  F r a n c e ,  w h e r e  Yves R o c h e r  h a s  a r e l a t i v e l y  w e l l -  
e s t a b l i s h e d  a n d  w i d e s p r e a d  n e t w o r k ,  i t  h a s  o n l y  j u s t  o v e r  5% o f  
t h e  c o s m e t i c s  m a r k e t  a n d  no  more t h a n  15% o f  any  i n d i v i d u a l  
p r o d u c t  m a r k e t  -  y e t  an  e x e m p t i o n  was n e c e s s a r y ,  a p p a r e n t l y .  And 
t h i s  d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  th e"  t e r r i t o r i a l  e x c l u s i v i t y  p r o v i d e d  no 
f o r m  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  s a l e s  by m a i l  o r d e r  o r  o t h e r  m e t h o d s  
i n t o  t h a t  t e r r i t o r y  by t h e  f r a n c h i s o r .
T he  P r o n u p t i a  c o n t r a c t  e x e m p t e d  was s i m i l a r :  P r o n u p t i a  
w e r e  a s k e d  t o  make i t  c l e a r  i n  t h e  c o n t r a c t s  t h a t  c r o s s - s u p p l y i n g  
b e t w e e n  f r a n c h i s e e s  was a l l o w e d  a n d  a l s o  t h a t  g o o d s  n o t  r e l a t e d  t o  
t h e  " e s s e n t i a l  o b j e c t "  o f  t h e  f r a n c h i s e  m i g h t  be o b t a i n e d  f rom  
s o u r c e s  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r ,  who w o u ld  have  o n l y  a n  a 
p o s t e r i o r i  c o n t r o l  i n  c a s e  t h e s e  g o o d s  s h o u l d  b e  s u c h  a s  t o  damage  
t h e  n e t w o r k ' s  r e p u t a t i o n .  An e x c l u s i v e  zo n e  was g r a n t e d  a n d  a 
l o c a t i o n  s p e c i f i e d .  H e r e ,  a l t h o u g h  P r o n u p t i a  h a d  30% o f  t h e  b r i d a l  
w e a r  m a r k e t  i n  F r a n c e ,  i t s  s h a r e  i n  o t h e r  Member S t a t e s  was much 
s m a l l e r .
T he  t h i r d  e x e m p t i o n  g r a n t e d  by  t h e  C om m iss ion  u n d e r  
a . 8 5 ( 3 )  was  t o  C o m p u t e r l a n d : a g a i n  i t  was  c o n f i r m e d  t h a t  a  s m a l l  
m a r k e t  s h a r e  w i l l  r a r e l y  i f  e v e r  a l l o w  a  n e t w o r k  t o  e s c a p e  th e T 
C o m i s s i o n ' s  c o n t r o l .  C o m p u t e r l a n d ,  a  d i s t r i b u t o r ' s  f r a n c h i s e ,  
a c c o u n t e d  f o r  o n l y  3 , 3  % o f  s a l e s  o f  m i c r o - c o m p u t e r  p r o d u c t s  i n  
t h e  Community  a s  a w h o l e ,  a n d  f o r  no  m o r e  t h a n  4% i n  any  
i n d i v i d u a l  Member S t a t e ,  a l t h o u g h  i t  h a d  much l a r g e r  s h a r e s  i n  
o t h e r  p a r t s  o f  t h e  w o r l d .  O t h e r w i s e  t h e  t e r m s  w ere  r e l a t i v e l y
8 8
l i b e r a l :  t h e  f r a n c h i s e e  c o u l d  o p e n  " s a t e l l i t e "  s t o r e s  a n y w h e r e  
a p a r t  f ro m  i n  a n o t h e r  f r a n c h i s e e ' s  a r e a ,  a n d  a p p r o v e d  p r o d u c t s  
c o u l d  be o b t a i n e d  f rom a n y  s o u r c e  a v a i l a b l e .
Coming t o  t h e  p r o p o s e d  r e g u l a t i o n ,  a . 2 i m p l i e s  t h a t  
f r a n c h i s e  c o n t r a c t s  c o n t a i n i n g  t e r r i t o r i a l  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  any  s o r t  
f a l l  u n d e r  a . 8 5 ( l ) .  No m e n t i o n  o f  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  t h e  C o u r t  i n  
P r o n u p t i a  t h a t  t h e  s i g n  o r  name be  " w e l l - k n o w n . . . "  i s  made.  The 
C o m m is s io n  i s  t h u s  a p p a r e n t l y  p u r p o r t i n g  t o  a s s u m e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  a 
g r e a t e r  r a n g e  o f  n e t w o r k s  t h a n  t h e  C o u r t  w o u ld  h a v e  i n t e n d e d  t o  
a l l o w  and t h a n  i s  j u s t i f i e d ,  u n l e s s  i t  r e a l l y  i s  o n l y  a  s t a t e m e n t  
o f  t h e  "de  m i n i m i s "  r u l e :  a s  we h av e  s e e n ,  t h e  m a r k e t  s h a r e  w i l l  
h a v e  t o  be v e r y  s m a l l  i n d e e d  b e f o r e  t h i s  e x c e p t i o n  w i l l  be  h e l d  by 
t h e  C o m m is s io n  t o  a p p l y .
As w e l l  a s  t e r r i t o r i a l  e x c l u s i v i t y ,  p r i c e - f i x i n g  was 
s t a t e d  by t h e  C o u r t  n o t  t o  b e  i n h e r e n t  t o  f r a n c h i s i n g .  P r i c e ­
f i x i n g  h a s  a l w a y s  b e en  s u b j e c t  t o  a  m o re  o r  l e s s  p e r  s e
83p r o h i b i t i o n  a l t h o u g h  t h e  C o u r t  d i d  s u g g e s t  i n  Binon , i n  t h e  
c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  s a l e  o f  n e w s p a p e r s  a n d  m a g a z i n e s ,  t h a t  i n  some 
s p e c i a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  an  a . 8 5 ( 3 )  e x e m p t i o n  m i g h t  be  e n v i s a g e d  f o r  
s u c h  a c l a u s e :  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  g e n e r a l  r u l e  i s  r e i t e r a t e d  i n  r e s p e c t  
o f ■ f r a n c h i s i n g  c o n t r a c t s ,  d e s p i t e  A d v o c a t e  G e n e r a l  V a n l o r e n  v a n  
T h e m a a t ' s  s u g g e s t i o n  t o  t h e  c o n t r a r y .
• The P r o n u p t i a  c o n t r a c t  n o t i f i e d  t o  t h e  C om m iss ion  f o r  
e x e m p t i o n  u n d e r  a . 8 5 ( 3 )  c o n t a i n e d  a c l a u s e  s t a t i n g  t h a t  t h e  
f r a n c h i s e e  was n o t  t o  harm t h e  b r a n d  im age  o f  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r  by 
h i s-, p r i c i n g  l e v e l .  The C o m m is s io n  was  a p p a r e n t l y  p r e p a r e d  t o  
e x e m p t  s u c h  a c l a u s e :  i t  was o n l y  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h i r d  p a r t i e s '  83
8 3 .  B in o n  & C ie  v .  Agence de  l a  P r e s s e  1985 ECR 2 0 1 5 .
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o b j e c t i o n s  t h a t  t h i s  was  d e l e t e d  f rom  t h e  c o n t r a c t ,  a l t h o u g h  i t
l o o k s  l i k e  a v e r y  t h i n l y  v e i l e d  minimum p r i c e  c l a u s e .  I n  t h e
P r o n u p t i a  e x e m p t i o n  t h e  C o m m is s io n  makes  i t s  p o s i t i o n  c l e a r  on
34recommended p r i c e s ,  s h o w in g  a m a r k e d l y  more  l i b e r a l  a t t i t u d e  
t h a n  h a s  h i t h e r t o  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  i t s  a p p r o a c h  t o  t h e  s u b j e c t :
"W i th  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  c i r c u l a t i o n  o f  r e t a i l  p r i c e s  by  the '
f r a n c h i s o r ,  t h e  C o m m is s io n  h a s  no e v i d e n c e  o f  a n y  c o n c e r t e d  
p r a c t i c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  f r a n c h i s o r  a n d  f r a n c h i s e e s  o r  b e t w e e n  
f r a n c h i s e e s  i n t e r  s e  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e s e  p r i c e s .  I n  t h e s e  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  t h e  mere  s u g g e s t i o n  o f  p r i c e s  f o r  t h e  g u i d a n c e  o f  
f r a n c h i s e e s  c a n n o t  be r e g a r d e d  a s  r e s t r i c t i v e  o f  c o m p e t i t i o n . . . "
T u r n i n g  t o  t h e  d r a f t  r e g u l a t i o n ,  t h e  " b l a c k  l i s t "  i n  a . 5 
o f  c l a u s e s  t h a t  w i l l  p r e v e n t  t h e  e x e m p t i o n  a p p l y i n g  i n c l u d e s
" (d )  t h e  f r a n c h i s e e  i s  r e s t r i c t e d ,  d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y ,  i n  t h e  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  r e s a l e  p r i c e s  f o r  t h e  p r o d u c t s  o r  s e r v i c e s  w h ic h  
a r e  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  t h e  f r a n c h i s e ; "
w h i c h  a t  f i r s t  s i g h t  c o u l d  b e  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  i n c l u d i n g  a 
c o n d e m n a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i n g  recommended p r i c e s  84
8 4 .  The c a s e s  i n  w h ic h  a v e r y  s t r i c t  a t t i t u d e  h a s  b een  t a k e n  e v e n  
t o  s u g g e s t e d  p r i c e s  a r e  d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  s i n c e  t h e y  i n v o l v e  
h o r i z o n t a l  r a t h e r  t h a n  v e r t i c a l  a g r e e m e n t s .  I t  i s  p r o b a b l e  t h a t  
e v e n  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  f r a n c h i s i n g ,  i f  i t  w e re  shown t h a t  a  
f r a n c h i s e e  h a d  h a d  h i s  f r a n c h i s e  t e r m i n a t e d  b e c a u s e  h e  h a d "  
d e p a r t e d  f ro m  t h e  r e c o m m e n d e d  p r i c e s ,  t h e  t e rm  w o u ld  be  
c o n s i d e r e d  i l l e g a l .  F o r  f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h i s  p o i n t  s e e  
W a e l b r o e c k  M . ' s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  p a n e l  d i s c u s s i o n  o n ’ 
F r a n c h i s i n g  a n d  S e l e c t i v e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  u n d e r  EEC C o m p e t i t i o n  Law- 
1 9 8 6  A n t i t r u s t  a n d  T r a d e  P o l i c i e s  i n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  T r a d e  ( F o r d h a m '  
C o r p o r a t e  Law I n s t i t u t e  1 3 t h  A n n u a l  M e e t i n g )  a t  p . 2 3 3 .
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g  e
t o  f r a n c h i s e e s .  The Consum er  C o n s u l t a t i v e  C o m m i t t e e  a s s u m e s  t h a t
s u c h  a p r a c t i c e  i s  n o t  p e r m i t t e d  by t h i s  c l a u s e  b u t  t h i s
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  i n  c l e a r  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  o f  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e
i n  P r o n u p t i a , a n d  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  i n d i v i d u a l  e x e m p t i o n  o f  t h e
same name. H o w ev e r ,  t h e  CCC m a i n t a i n s  t h a t  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  e f f e c t  o f
s u c h  " recom m ended"  p r i c e s  i s  i n  f r a n c h i s i n g  t h e  same a s  t h a t  o f
86f o r m a l  r e t a i l  p r i c e  f i x i n g
The CCC a l s o  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  a  p r o h i b i t i o n  on p r i c e - f i x i n g  
i s  o f  l i t t l e  v a l u e  i n  v i e w  o f  t h e  o t h e r ,  n o n - p r i c e ,  r e s t r a i n t s  
t h a t  a r e  p e r m i t t e d  -  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on s o u r c e s  o f  
s u p p l y  a n d  t h e  l a c k  o f  f r e e d o m  f o r  t h e  f r a n c h i s e e  t o  d e v e l o p  t h e  
b u s i n e s s .
The b l a c k  l i s t  a l s o  o u t l a w s  a g r e e m e n t s  b e t w e e n  
m a n u f a c t u r e r s ,  c l a u s e s  p r e v e n t i n g  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l  
p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  b e i n g  c h a l l e n g e d ,  c u s t o m e r  r e s t r i c t i o n s  a n d  
e x c l u s i v e  s u p p l y  p r o v i s i o n s  t h a t  a r e  n o t  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  
p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  r e p u t a t i o n  o f  t h e  n e t w o r k .
( g ) m a r k e t  a n a l y s i s
When t h e  C o u r t  b e g i n s  i t s  j u d g m e n t  i n  P r o n u p t i a  by 
s t r e s s i n g  t h a t  e a c h  f r a n c h i s i n g  c o n t r a c t  m u s t  b e  j u d g e d  a c c o r d i n g  85*
8 5 .  Consumer C o n s u l t a t i v e  C om m it tee  O p i n i o n  on t h e  d r a f t  
e x e m p t i o n  r e g u l a t i o n  f o r  f r a n c h i s i n g  C C C / 5 4 / 8 7 .
86-. T h i s  was a l s o  c l a i m e d  by t h e  f r a n c h i s e e  i n  h e r  s u b m i s s i o n s  i n  
t h e  C o u r t  c a s e  o f  P r o n u p t i a : s e e  t h e  R a p p o r t  d ' A u d i e n c e ,  C a s e  
N o . 1 6 1 / 8 4  a t  p . 2 2 .
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t o  i t s  i n d i v i d u a l  t e r m s ,  i t  s t r a n g e l y  makes no r e f e r e n c e  
w h a t s o e v e r  t o  t h e  r e l e v a n t  m a r k e t  o r  t o  P r o n u p t i a ' s  p o s i t i o n  on  
t h a t  m a r k e t .  T h i s  w ou ld  p e r h a p s  h a v e  b e e n  t h e  e a s i e s t  way f o r  t h e  
C o u r t  t o  d i s p o s e  o f  t h e  c a s e  w i t h o u t  e f f e c t i v e l y  l e g i s l a t i n g  f o r  
f r a n c h i s e  c o n t r a c t s :  i t  c o u l d  h a v e  s a i d  t h a t ,  g i v e n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e '  
o f  t h e  m a r k e t  a n d  P r o n u p t i a ' s  p o s i t i o n  on  i t ,  c o m p e t i t i o n  was h o t  
a p p r e c i a b l y  a f f e c t e d  by  t h e  c l a u s e s  i n  t h e  c o n t r a c t .  I n s t e a d ,  i t  
c h o s e  v i r t u a l l y  t o  i g n o r e  t h i s  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  c a s e  and t o  t a k e  t h e  
i n n o v a t i v e  a p p r o a c h  a l r e a d y  d e s c r i b e d .
When t h e  a n s w e r  t o  t h i s  f i r s t  q u e s t i o n ,  on  t h e  
a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  a .  85 t o  f r a n c h i s i n g  a g r e e m e n t s  i s  summed u p  i n  t h e  
fo r m  o f  s i x  b r i e f  n u m b e re d  p o i n t s ,  i t  i s  n o t e w o r t h y  t h a t  t h e  
l e g a l i t y  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  p r i m a  f a c i e  " g o o d "  c l a u s e s  i s  s a i d  t o  be  
d e p e n d e n t  on " t h e i r  e c o n o m i c  c o n t e x t "  a l t h o u g h  t h e  C o u r t  d o e s  
n o t  i n  i t s  r e a s o n i n g  r e f e r  t o  t h e  n a t u r e  a n d  q u a n t i t y  o f  t h e  
p r o d u c t s ,  n o r  t o  m a r k e t  p o s i t i o n s ,  n o r  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  t h e  
n e t w o r k :  t h e r e  i s  n o t  e v e n  a p a s s i n g  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  s t a t e  o f  t h e  
m a r k e t  f o r  w e d d i n g  d r e s s e s  o r  o f  P r o n u p t i a ' s  p l a c e  on i t  h a s  a t  
a n y  p o i n t  i n  t h e  j u d g m e n t  e x c e p t  i n  a s i n g l e  l i n e  w here  i t  r e p o r t s  
t h a t  t h e  f r a n c h i s e e  l a y s  e m p h a s i s  on t h e  f a c t  t h a t  P r o n u p t i a  
i s , " a s  i t  i t s e l f  a s s e r t s ,  t h e  w o r l d ' s  l e a d i n g  F r e n c h  s u p p l i e r  o f  
w ed d in g  d r e s s e s  a n d  a c c e s s o r i e s " .  The C o u r t  d o e s  n o t  d i s c u s s ,  f o r  
e x a m p l e ,  w h e t h e r  P r o n u p t i a  i s  a  s m a l l  o r  a l a r g e  c o n c e r n ,  w h e t h e r  
i t  i s  new o r  w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d ,  no r  w h e t h e r  t h e r e  e x i s t s  an : 
o l i g o p o l y  o f  f r a n c h i s o r s  i n  t h e  w e d d i n g - d r e s s  m a r k e t .
When i t  comes  t o  t h e  " b a d "  c l a u s e s ,  t h e  C o u r t  d o e s  n o t  a t  
a n y  p o i n t  m e n t i o n  m a r k e t  s t r u c t u r e  a s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  -  o r  e v e n  87
8 7 .  The C o m m i s s i o n  h a s  f o l l o w e d  t h i s  i n  t h e  c a v e a t s  i n c l u d e d  i n  
t h e  d r a f t  b l o c k  e x e m p t i o n  r e g u l a t i o n  i n  a . 4 a n d  a . 8 .
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relevant - factor. Instead, it seems to take a rather formalistic 
approach, condemning territorial restrictions and price-f ixir.g 
without reference to market analysis. No. 4 of the listed 
points prohibits market-sharing in absolute terms again, no 
mention being made either of the economic context or of the 
requirement that the name or symbol be well-known.
The Advocate General had come to the conclusion that:
"Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty is applicable to franchise 
aggreements such as those concluded between the parties in this 
case in so far as, inter alia
(a) they are concluded between a franchisor from one Member State, 
.or its subsidiary as referred to in Question 3(a), and one or
- more franchisees in one or more other Member States, and
(b) by way of its subsidiaries and franchisees in one or more of 
those Member States or in a significant part of their 
territory the franchisor has a substantial share of the market
t for the relevant product;
and either
. . .
(c.) the agreements prevent or restrict, or are intended to prevent 
or restrict, parallel imports of the products covered by the 
contract into the contract territory or exports of those 
: products by the franchisee to other Member States,
or
(d) the agreements result - in particular through the 
establishment of local or regional monopolies for the products
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covered by the contract, through royalty provisions and 
contractual provisions or concerted practices with regard to 
the setting of prices and on account of the absence of 
effective competition from similar products - in the setting 
of unreasonably high retail prices, that is to say, prices 
which could not be charged if effective competition existed', 
even allowing for the superior quality of the products covered 
by the contract".
He goes on to comment that (c) will - except where 
negligible market shares are involved - always be fulfilled where 
absolute territorial protection of national markets is given. This 
position is considerably more liberal than that eventually assumed 
by the Court of Justice. He appears here to have in mind perhaps 
the distinction drawn by the Court in Nunqesser between "open" and 
"closed" protection. In any case, it is clear that for him market 
analysis is crucial to the determination of the status of a 
franchise contract.
The Advocate General had cited a passage from Societe 
Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau EJlm [1966] on exclusive 
distribution which he considered relevant by analogy:
"...In order to decide whether an agreement containing a clause 
'granting an exclusive right of sale1 is to be considered as 
prohibited by reason of its object or of its effect, it is 
appropriate to take into account, in particular the nature and 
quantity, limited or otherwise, of the products covered by the 
agreement, the position and importance of the grantor and the 
concessionnaire on the market for the products concerned, the 
position in a series of agreements, the severity of the clauses 
intended to protect the exclusive dealership or, alternatively,
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the opportunities allowed for other commercial competitors in the 
same products by way of parallel re-exportation and importation".
Although the Court might seem implicitly to have rejected 
the relevance of market analysis, presumably we must take it that 
market analysis is relevant in most cases. If not, the judgment 
would be going far beyond even the American position, which still 
at any rate in theory requires an examination of market structure 
and a sort of balancing of the competitive and anti-competitive 
effects involved, rather than a blanket acceptance of all such 
restraints. Certainly this is the way in which the Commission has 
interpreted it, as shown by the care with which market share and 
structure have been examined and described in granting individual 
exemptions under a.85(3).
(h)miscellaneous points
One discussion conspicuous by its absence is that of the 
question of the apparently complete freedom to select franchisees 
on qualitative, quantitative or any other grounds. The point is 
glossed over by the Court which says that,
"The prohibition of the assignment by the franchisee of his rights 
and obligations under the contract without the franchisor’s 
approval protects the latter's right freely to choose the 
franchisees, on whose business qualifications the establishment 
and maintenance of the network's reputation depend" (my 
underlining).
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Apart from the fact that the franchisee's business 
qualifications will often be negligible, this freedom should 
surely be limited to the extent necessary for the protection of 
the network, if only to avoid radically different treatment of 
distribution networks depending on whether they happen to be 
classified as selective distribution or franchising.
A general point about the interpretation of a. 85(1} is 
raised regarding the meaning of "liable to affect trade between 
member states". Its scope is in Pronuptia extensively defined, so 
that a purely domestic network may infringe this article if it 
prevents franchisees from establishing themselves in another 
Member State : presumably this means that at least any franchise 
contract that includes a location clause or territorial protection 
will fall potentially within the ambit of a.85(1). Again, Advocate 
General Verloren van Themaat was more liberal in his opinion:*' 
he would require at least a "cross-border" contract before a.85*'* 
was applicable.
Another point of general interest arising out of this 
decision is the development of a European "rule of reason" and,* 
related to this, the growing role of national courts in this
So we have arrived at the position that many franchise' 
contract clauses do not fall under article 85(1)'s prohibition at 
all and others can be exempted, now only on an individual basis, 8
88. It is not dealt with here as it is a general question and in 
any case has more to do with legal form and labelling than with'“ 
motivation. For a taste of the variety of different views., 
existing on this topic see articles cited in the bibliography, in;*: 
particular those of Gyseln L., Kovar R. and Steindorff E.
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but almost certainly soon automatically under a block exemption 
Regulation.
Before going on in the next section to examine the 
thinking and motivation behind the new rules described above, it 
may be useful to outline briefly the way in which they depart in 
principle from previous regulations and decisions in the area of 
vertical restraints, for it is essentially the existence of these 
new, departures that make it interesting to look at what may be 
behind the largely unexplained new approach.
First, the franchisor is allowed a much tighter control
over the products sold in the outlets than is the case, say, for
the car manufacturer's control over spare parts offered by his 
distributors. Also, there is no maximum duration of contract set 
as there is for exclusive distribution (5 years), beer (5 years) 
and petrol (10 years) although the Yves Rocher individual
exemption included a 5 year maximum. Then there is no reference to 
the selection of franchisees on other than qualitative grounds, 
although this has always been a chief concern of the Court and the 
Commission in their dealings with selective distribution networks. 
We have already mentioned the anomalous permitting of a non­
competition clause extending for a year after the contract is 
ended; it is also the case that many of the restraints listed in 
a .3 are harsher than have been allowed before: for
example, permitting the imposing of obligations of result in 
respect of turnover rather than of "best endeavours". Similarly, 
for example, there may be an absolute prohibition on assignment *
89
89.. The regulation is likely to become law in October or November 
1988.
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without the franchisor’s consent, with no requirement that that 
consent will not be unreasonably witheld.
As for restrictions on the location of the dealer's 
outlet, in the context of selective distribution these have not 
even been exempted under a.85(3), let alone held to fall outside 
a.85(1)* Then there is the right to control the franchisee's- 
advertising activities that can be reserved by the franchisor: in 
Hasselblad this kind of clause was held by the Court to be 
contrary to a.85(l). *
In the final part of this paper I intend to attempt to 
shed some light on the possible motives behind the approach 
observed -in this part. 90
90. Hasselblad (GB) Ltd, v. Commission 1984 ECR 883.
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PART V
12.What aims and objectives have influenced EEC competition policy 
on franchising ?
In this Part the previous two Parts will be drawn 
together, in an attempt to connect the existing EEC competition- 
policy on franchising with the motives and aims that may have 
inspired it. It will be necessary to discuss in turn the main 
aspects of the policy choices that have been made so far and are 
described in Part IV, in the light of the possible aims of 
competition law considered in Part III. First, the question of the- 
motivation behind the generally benevolent attitude shown towards 
franchising is discussed, and then the reasons for the relative 
severity brought to bear on certain clauses are sought.
(a) Why the favourable treatment?
Now what is behind this decision to treat franchising so 
generously ? A first and obvious source of influence to be 
considered is that of economic analysis: at first sight it is 
plausible that, seeing economic advantages in this distribution 
technique, the Court took the opportunity to present it as sui 
generis and thus deserving of special, liberal treatment. The 
favourable attitude taken, generally speaking, by the Community 
authorities, to franchising, conforms with the more or less 
unanimous view of economists that vertical restraints should not
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be treated with the severity that the EEC has brought to some of 
its previous dealings with other forms of distribution methods.
However, this coincidence could be no more than that: we 
are a long way from establishing that economic reasoning was the 
main, or even an influential, factor in reaching this result. The 
sparse evidence that there is would point to the conclusion that, 
although economic analysis dictates a lenient approach to
franchise contracts, and this may well have encouraged the Court, 
there is at least as much emphasis in the decisions on the 
benefits to the small trader as there is on "consumer welfare" in 
the technical sense.
For example, in Judge Joliet's rapport d'audience (only 
available in French) for Pronuptia, he states that,
"...les petites et les moyennes entreprises peuvent participer à 
un réseau de distribution supra-régional sans perdre leur
indépendance... de petits commerçants peuvent ainsi retirer de 
nombreux bénéfices dont ne profitent normalement que de grandes 
entreprises de commerce de détail."
Later, he refers to, "l'intégration de petites et 
moyennes entreprises, par le renforcement de la capacité 
concurrentielle de celles-ci...".
The Pronuptia judgment and the preamble of the draft 
regulation make similar statements? also the Commissioner 
responsible for competition, Mr. Peter Sutherland, made two 
statements that are telling; at a Euro-Conference (on 25th March, 
immediately after the Pronuptia judgment was issued) he said that 
franchising,
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"...can stimulate economic activity throughout the Community * 
particularly by small and medium-sized enterprises..."
91and at another conference he told an international audience that,
"...the European Commission intends to adopt a generally
favourable attitude towards franchising, not only in applying the 
rules of competition...but also in the context of developing its 
policy towards small and medium-sized enterprises."
Thus heavy emphasis is laid by all concerned on the
92advantages of franchising for SME's and no explicit mention 
whatsoever is made of any form of economic analysis. Nowhere are 
Telser or Bork - let alone the legitimate interest of a 
manufacturer in protecting his dealers against free-riders - nor 
any other aspects of the economic analysis discussed in Chapter 
8, even mentioned expressly by these writers and speakers. In 
fact, when "economic advantages" are mentioned, closer scrutiny 
usually reveals that this refers to the benefits to SME's. It 
seems very likely that, had franchising not presented these 
advantages, it might well have been treated very differently. 912
91. See conference named in note 9.
92. Corabi L. considers that this is thè motive for thè
favourable attitude: "Il motivo del favore della Corte risiede,
come essa stessa precisa, nella possibilità che questo sistema, 
offre ai piccoli imprenditori di penetrare mercati ed acquisire 
conoscenze tecnico-commerciali che altrimenti resterebbero a loro' 
precluse se non a costo di enormi rischi economici." Franchising: 
La Difficile Convivenza della "Rule of Reason" con 1 ' Illegalità . 
"per se" nello Sviluppo della Giurisprudenza Comunitaria 25\'[ 
Diritto Comunitario e degli Scambi Internazionali 684 (1986) a t _ 
687.
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(b)Why are territorial exclusivity and R?M treated sc severe
Once the initial policy choice had been :a<en, another 
arose for decision: whatever the reason for deciding initiallv tc 
take, a benevolent approach, how far could it be allowed to lead 
the European Court away from its old rules on vertical restraints?
Now here, an arbitrary - in terns of pure economic 
analysis - line is drawn: protection of the "know-how" transferred 
and maintenance of the identity and reputation of the networ< are 
said to be essential to the working of the system, whereas 
territorial protection is not, despite the acceptance by the Court 
that it is "..of course possible that a prospective franchisee 
would not take the risk of becoming part of the chair..." in such 
circumstances.
Various reasons can be thought of for this apparent 
inconsistency in the Pronuptia judgment: it has been suggested
that the continuing objection to territorial protection is more 
likely to stem from a reluctance to overrule Consten v. Grur.dia
o~3 ---------------
rather than from any objection of principle . Indeed, it is 93
93. Korah V. makes this suggestion in Pronuptia; Franchising: The 
Marriage of Reason and the EEC Competition Rules 1986 European 
Intellectual Property Review 99. Interestingly, Bork R.H. makes 
the identical point in the context of an analysis of the Sylvania 
case in Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled 1977 Supreme Court 
Review 171: "The trouble with the current analysis of vertical 
restraints is that it appeared in the literature long after the 
law had to deal with the phenomenon, so that now the courts are 
asked to rethink and abandon an entire body cf doctrine cf many 
years standing." The difference is, of course, that economic 
analysis was available to the European Court and Ccmmission at 
the outset but it was more or less ignored for the sake of market 
integration.
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suggested by the Court in its next breath that exemption may be 
available for such a clause, the net result being that a certain 
degree of territorial protection can be regarded as legal under 
Community law, even if permission must be sought in the absence of 
a block regulation. . .
Some commentators have been harsh in their judgment of/ 
the decision, seeing it as the religious perpetuation of mistaken 
precedent or as a meaningless compromise between disagreeing 
judges: Demaret, writing on the subject of this seemingly
contradictory approach, says that,
"The force of precedents is the most likely explanation for the 
Court's not entirely consistent attitude with regard to 
distribution franchises. The Court was not ready to turn its back 
on more than twenty years of case law. Since the mid-1960's, 
territorial exclusivities, at least when they have a bilateral 
character, have been dealt with in the context of Article 85(3). 
All the regulations adopted with regard to distribution agreements 
rest upon that very idea. The legitimation of territorial
restrictions in distribution franchises would have forced the
Commission to reconsider the foundation of its policy towards
. . 9 4vertial restraints."
Pescatore, the former judge of the European Court, has 
interpreted the decision as follows: 94
94. Selective Distribution and EEC Law after the Ford, Pronuptia 
and Metro II Judgments 1986 Antitrust and Trade Policies in- 
International Trade (Fordham Corporate Law Institute 13th Annual 
Meeting) 151 at 181.
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"It looks to me as if this expressed a sort of minority opinion in 
the Court...The minority said: "Well, if you do not have in the 
franchise agreement some territorial protection, it is rendered 
senseless and nobody would invest his money in that." This 
argument, which in my opinion makes sense, really is brushed 
away...I think this is a very unhappy piece of case law of the 
European Court: a general statement unsustained by any analytical 
reasoning and leading to a profoundly unjust result * that of 
freeing the franchisee from her obligation to pay royalties
This is an insight of particular interest, in the light 
of the personal experience of the speaker of the way in which a 
"unanimous" decision of the judges is reached in practice.
- . , K
Similarly, vertical price-fixing is forbidden, although 
price "recommendation" is permitted. Whether this is a meaningful 
distinction at all in the context of franchise networks is 
extremely questionable in itself. However, the important point 
made in this connection by many economists is that, in terms of 
pure economic theory, there is no difference in kind between price 
and non-price vertical restraints and that they should all 
therefore be treated in the same way: some explanation other than
this kind of economic analysis must be looked for.
r  . i
I have already cited some outraged reactions to this 
approach to territorial restraints, and in pure, Chicagoan 
economic terms it certainly looks anomalous. However, it is quite 
possible that although the Court was aware of the economic 
advantages of franchising, either these considerations were by no 95
95. See the panel discussion cited at note 84 at p.237.
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means paramount, for when they clashed with other concerns, a 
compromise was sought, or a different kind of economics was 
applied.
In other words, it is not inconsistent of the Court to be 
aware of possible advantages in terms of economic efficiency'of 
vertical restraints including exclusive territories and retàil 
price maintenance and yet at the same time to take the course that 
it did. Such a policy can be explained either in terms of 
competing economic views, including practical or procedural 
considerations, or of the other objectives that may be pursued by 
competition law. Any one or more of these explanations may make it 
perfectly reasonable that the Commission should retain close 
control over the use made of territories, both on economic grounds 
and in order to ensure as far as possible that the Community 
enjoys the improvements in efficiency stemming from them, without 
sacrificing its other objectives in the process.
So there are essentially two different kinds of 
explanation that may account for departure from the path that many 
economists - and American doctrine and jurisprudence today - would 
recommend.
For now I turn to examine the possibility that it may in 
fact be explained by economics itself - and perhaps even a more 
"realistic" and helpful economics than that propounded by the 
Chicago school and even the Harvard school, whose ideas are now 
accepted by the United States courts.
As was discussed at length in Chapter 8, there are many 
counter-arguments to be raised against making vertical restraints 
per se legal or even subject to the rule of reason.
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First, there are the arguments such as those of Comanor, 
relating to the different requirements of different customers and 
the greater weight which it pays the manufacturer to accord to the 
preferences of marginal customers, which certainly suggest that 
per se legality should not be the rule for all vertical 
restraints. Similarly, there is the potential use of such 
restraints to create or sustain horizontal dealer or manufacturer 
cartels which militates against such a solution.
However, there are also very good reasons for not even 
introducing the rule of reason into this area of the law. First, 
it may be doubted whether free-rider problems cannot be coped with 
adequately by less restrictive clauses such as those defining an 
"area of primary responsibility" on which a franchisee is obliged 
to spend a certain percentage of his time and money:even if such 
solutions are not ultimately the economically most efficient in 
Bork's or Telser's terms, a paramount consideration in this area 
is, of course, that we are discussing rules that are to be used in 
a practical context.
Those who call for the application of a rule of reason in 
this area of the law assume that it is always possible and 
practicable to ascertain the true object or effect of any given 
agreement. Once the difficulties of detection and proof of 
horizontal cartels, for example, are taken into account, there is 
much to be said in for the prohibition of practices that 
contribute substantially to their stability.
Horizontal cartels are very difficult to detect, and we 
may win much more by prohibiting absolute territorial protection 
and price-fixing, without which such cartels are almost bound to 
be very unstable, than we lose in efficiency by forcing 
franchisors to adopt a "second-best" solution to the free-rider
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problem such as centralised fiancing of advertising: to put it
another way, some economists appreciate parallel traders as 
performing a useful role in destabilising and discouraging cartels 
and do not view them as the meritless parasites that Chicago 
economists see them as.
The severely limited resources that the EEC has for
policing, enforcement and decision-making make it crucial that
such factors be borne in mind. A rule of reason would require the
effect of each agreement on the relevant market to be judged,
which cannot but make for complex and lengthy litigation and the
presentation of large amounts of probably conflictin and
96inconclusive evidence.
One of the most cogent explanations of why some vertical
restraints should be forbidden per se rather than a rule of reason
97applied comes from Pitofsky , who points out that per se rules 
are designed to outlaw conduct that “almost always results in 
adverse competitive effects, and almost never is justified by 
business reasons sufficiently persuasive to counteract those 
adverse effects”. In other words, it is by no means the case that 
the theoretical potential of a contract to do more harm than good 
should always mean that it escapes a per se prohibition. More 
generally, Pitofsky's thesis is that: 967
96. There are two sides to the practical efficiency argument too,: 
of course: if some claim that the rule of reason provokes lengthy 
and complex litigation over the alleged benefits and dangers of 
agreements, others say that a per se rule leads to equally long 
drawn out arguments over classification.
97. The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical 
Restrictions 78 Columbia Law Review 1 (1978) at p.3.
107
"It is possible to give full scope to economic insights 
into supplier interests in imposing non-price vertical 
restrictions and the nature of the trade off in pro- and 
anticompetitive effects, and still advocate selective per se 
treatment of some categories of vertical restrictions - if one 
takes into account... some practical considerations about how 
cartels are initiated and administered, alternative methods of 
achieving the legitimate business needs of suppliers, and the 
limitations of the judicial process in isolating and measuring 
complicated supplier motives and economic effect."
He concludes that, amongst others, airtight territorial 
restraints should be forbidden per se, as a result of taking into 
account the factors listed.
The above suggestions simply amount to the result of 
taking as an economic model of the business world a system where 
there is not perfect information available and transaction costs 
exist: that is, the practical problems that face business and law- 
enforcement agencies are taken into account. To put it another 
way, as a result of taking a different - and arguably more 
realistic - economic model, it is perfectly possible reasonably to 
take the view that more often than not they are harmful to the 
economy and therefore should be prohibited per se or at least only 
allowed under strict control, as is the case in EEC law,
i ' i
Alternatively, as indicated above, one way of approaching 
the Court's suspicion of certain vertical restraints but not 
others, is to wonder whether a policy of deliberately sacrificing 
a,degree of economic efficiency for the sake of other goals is 
being adopted: after all, nowhere is it written that the purpose 
of competition policy is solely to further economic efficiency in
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the strict, economic sense of the word . Indeed, in recent times
it has been suggested even that industrial planning and transport
99policy are properly considered in forming competition policy
Disposing first of concern for small businesses, it seems 
fairly clear in many contexts that these are still dear to-the 
heart of the EEC, and this has already been discussed. However-," 
for the EEC, the franchisee is seen as the small trader enabled to 
run his independent business helped rather than hindered by the 
bonds of the franchise contract. So in this context, far from 
being in conflict with arguments of economics, populist rhetoric 
backs it up. For this reason, the resulting policy can tell us 
nothing definitive about any preference the EEC authorities may 
have as between economic efficiency and small traders, although 
the quotations cited above may be of some help.
By far the most important competing concern must be that 
of market integration: it is the only reason expressly given by
the Court in Pronuptia for the illegality under a.85(1) of 
territorial restraints. Although I come to mention it only now, it 
may well be that the aim of market integration should take first 
place: its influence in the EEC is paramount.
But in both the draft exemption and the Court decision 
the use of market integration reasoning is strange. In allowing 
exemption for exclusive territorial clauses under a.85(3), they 
purport to strike a balance between competing claims. But surely 98
98
98. Indeed, it is possible to see a.85(3) as allowing for 
exceptions to be made to the usual competition rules in special 
circumstances in order that a conflicting aim of economic 
efficiency be fostered.
99. See article cited at note 53.
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it is almost inevitably going to be the case that if the degree of 
territorial protection allowed is sufficient to protect the 
franchisee from freeriders» it will be sufficient to partition the 
market to an appreciable extent. That is to say, if noone else but 
me is allowed actively to sell Pronuptia wedding dresses in my 
assigned territory and the nearest competing retailer is far 
enough away for me to be substantially protected from his 
freeriding on my promotional efforts, surely he is far enough away 
for me to be able to raise my prices somewhat, without fear that 
too many of my potential customers will know about or be prepared 
to make the journey to the cheaper retailer. In other words, the 
exemption of exclusive territories means that lip-service is paid 
to the market integration goal: the uselessness of parallel 
importing as far as services and goods such as pizzas is concerned 
has already been evoked.
So although one might be tempted to see this rather 
"mixed" approach as an attempt to allow the Community to enjoy the 
potential economic advantages of vertical restraints and yet to 
retain sufficient control for the Community authorities to be able 
to step in in the event that the use made of them is endangering 
other Community goals, in particular market integration, the 
language of the Court and the Commission is disappointing. The 
rational economic explanation suggested above for retaining 
control over territorial restraints is nowhere suggested by their 
words, and is but a speculative suggestion on my part as to how 
they might have justified laying down the rules that they did.
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13. Conclusions
The main problem that one has in performing this analysis 
is, of course, the lack of hard argument presented by the Court 
and Commission in their decisions. The Commission, those arguing 
before the Court and the Court itself are aware of the different 
arguments of economic analysis that can be applied in the case of 
such vertical restraints, but they do not deal with them 
explicitly, either to accept or reject them.
So to sum up intelligibly the parts that different aims 
and objectives have played in the formation of European 
franchising law as it has developed so far is no easy task. 
Populism and economic efficiency happily coincide and market 
integration reasoning seems to move in such a mysterious way that 
its importance in the process of coming to a decision is hard to 
guage.
Although economic analysis is capable of backing up the 
liberal approach taken by the Court to franchising quite as well 
as is the social aim of protecting the small trader, the latter is 
given far more emphasis than the former. In fact, not once is 
reference made to the arguments I outlined above, such as the 
free-rider rationale for vertical restraints, although all this 
and more would have been before the Court. On the other hand, ft 
is noticeable that the protection of the independent businessman 
is clearly of very great importance indeed*^. 10
10. However, it is open to question how meaningful this legal but 
otherwise often rather nominal "independence" is: see Rubin P.H. - 
loc.cit. at note 6 for a description of franchising as, in 
economic terms, a form mid-way between independence and 
employment.
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Whether this "reasoning" is used because the judges shy 
away from expressing themselves in economic terms or rather 
because they are expressing a sense that priority should be given 
to social considerations before considerations of economic 
efficiency, is hard to say. Although their reticence on the matter 
is to some extent understandable, given the political nature of 
the choices to be made, the complete absence of mention of any 
such reasoning does sudggest that it is of very little primary 
importance, even if it does play a subsidiary role.
For this reason - that is, because populist and economic 
goals appear to coincide so neatly in the context of franchising - 
it is not possible with confidence to ascribe the liberal approach 
taken to a sort of economic "enlightenment". I tend to the view 
that economic analysis plays an extremely limited role in forming 
competition policy in the EEC. "Economic" advantages to SME's are 
very much more important than the kind of economics put forward, 
for example, by Telser, and the free-rider remains a hero on this 
side of the Atlantic.
Also, a strong impression is created that franchising is 
being treated as a very special case since its image - and, very 
largely, its reality - is so bound up with the picture of the 
small man and the family-run business that it could hardly fail to 
capture the imagination of the EEC authorities. It is a topical 
subject, discussed in popular newspapers all over Europe and often 
in the form of instructions to the individual on how best to go 
about setting up as a franchisee. In this climate, a liberal 
approach was almost inevitable and, heretical though the 
suggestion may be, the legal reasoning - to the extent that there 
is any real, rigorous legal argument - employed was very much 
secondary to the result. It can be seen as economic in the sense 
that franchising and the vast majority of restrictions imposed in
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franchise contracts are seen as efficient, bona fide commercial 
methods and the prohibition on airtight territorial restraints is 
not incompatible with economics; it is populist in the importance 
it attaches to the small trader and in this instance these 
concerns fitted in nicely with the dictates of economic analysis; 
market integration aims are cited to justify a degree of caution 
in the formulation of the rules.
The most extraordinary aspect of all to me, however, is 
that the Court and Commission should choose to express and justify 
their rules in the way that they do. As we have seen, the actual 
rules developed are easily justified on economic, practical and 
other grounds, yet they are instead backed up with vague mention 
of SME's and confusing references to clauses deemed essential to 
franchising and those not so considered.
It seems unlikely that this is best understood as a 
perverse manifestation of the unconscious genius of the Community 
institutions: it looks as though the similarity of the result 
reached by the Court and Commission to a result that can be 
reached by a convincing form of economic reasoning is little more 
than a happy coincidence.
A coherent explanation of the given rules in the terms 
suggested above would have been far preferable, not only from ah 
intellectual point of view, but more importantly because it would 
have allowed businessmen and lawyers more accurately to judge the 
legality or otherwise of a given contract. The law is becoming 
more and more complex in this area, and this is really quite 
unnecessary. The results that the Court and Commission apparently 
want to achieve are easily justifiable on various rational 
grounds: there is simply no need for such a confused and sometimes 
incoherent path to be followed in order to reach them.
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The tentative conclusions reached above allow one or two 
general comments about the future of ESC law on franchising and on 
distribution systems generally to be made.
First, the goodwill evidenced by the Community 
authorities towards franchising is clearly largely reliant on its 
advantages for the existing or potential small trader, and its 
perceived benefits in encouraging independent enterprise on a 
small scale. This means that if it is to continue to enjoy its 
present privileged status, it must continue to play this role: if 
it is considered by the Commission that too many franchisees are 
in fact , say, large discount or department stores or subsidiaries 
of substantial businesses, "the party will be over".
Also following from the above is the necessity for 
the scope of the block exemption to be clearly delineated, since 
if it is "abused" by car manufacturers, for example, this will 
endanger it,
It remains to be seen whether the legal and 
administrative hurdles faced by a franchisor wishing to include 
some form of territorial protection in his franchise contracts 
will act as a significant incentive to integrate vertically rather 
than to set up a franchising network: Grundig bought up Consten 
after the agreement between them was held void under a.85(3). 
If the EEC authorities were to see that its policy was having the 
effect of destroying networks of small, independent networks in 
this way, it is possible that it might adapt its policy to try and 
prevent this.
However, as suggested earlier, there are reasons other 
than limited capital for choosing the franchising option: many 
large and rich firms choose to do it, mainly because hierarchies
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bring their own problems in the form of transaction costs that
increase considerably as the firm grows in size. The evidence so
far available suggests that franchising will continue to be very
widely used, and as the law becomes more certain and exemptions
can be granted more swiftly, the climate for franchising can only
improve; this despite the usual disadvantage inherent in block
exemptions that forms of contract may become more uniform and less 
10innovative
As intimated above, extreme caution is necessary if any 
generalisations are to be made on the basis of the above 
findings. If not in economic terms, then certainly in other ways, 
franchising is sui generis: it is perceived by Community
institutions and the general public alike as providing 
opportunities for small individual enterprise to those to whom 
such a chance would otherwise not be available. Unlike, for 
example, selective distribution, it enjoys a unique association 
with populist concerns, which has enabled it to claim what can 
only be described as “special treatment".
The chief lesson for competition lawyers is, perhaps, 
that it is by no means inevitable that a contract clause will be 
condemned under a.85(1) simply for formalistic legal reasons: if
there is merit, and, above all, political or social merit, in a 
type of agreement, the Court is clearly prepared to take an 
imaginative approach. It will achieve the outcome it wants, 10
10. For example, Benetton franchises are currently granted by a 
"stretta di mano1' contract - a sort of gentlemen's agreement. In 
order to benefit from the block exemption as it stands this 
system would have to be replaced with a detailed written 
agreement, at least as far as the description of the know-how 
transferred goes.
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treating the reasoning used to arrive at the result as secondary 
to that result. As to the lesson for advocates before the Court of 
Justice or the Commission, the tone of the Court's judgment in 
Pronuptia suggests that emotive, populist arguments will succeed 
more readily than dry and rigorous economic analysis.
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